





The Case for Noncompetes 
Jonathan M. Barnett† & Ted Sichelman†† 
Scholars and other commentators widely assert that enforcement of contrac-
tual and other limitations on labor mobility deters innovation. Based on this view, 
federal and state legislators have taken, and continue to consider, actions to limit 
the enforcement of covenants not to compete in employment agreements. These ac-
tions would discard the centuries-old reasonableness standard that governs the en-
forcement of these provisions, often termed “noncompetes,” in all but four states (no-
tably, California). We argue that this zero-enforcement position lacks a sound basis 
in theory or empirics. As a matter of theory, it overlooks the complex effects of con-
tractual limitations on labor mobility in innovation markets. While it is frequently 
asserted that noncompetes may impede knowledge spillovers that foster innovation, 
it is frequently overlooked that noncompetes may encourage firms to invest in culti-
vating intellectual and human capital. As a matter of empirics, we show that two 
commonly referenced bodies of evidence fail to support zero enforcement. First, we 
revisit the conventional account of the rise of Silicon Valley and the purported fall 
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of the Boston area as innovation centers, showing that this divergence cannot suita-
bly be explained by differences in state law regarding noncompetes. Second, we show 
that widely cited empirical studies fail to support a causal relationship between non-
competes, reduced labor mobility, and reduced innovation. Given these theoretical 
and empirical complexities, we propose an error-cost approach that provides an eco-
nomic rationale for the common law’s reasonableness approach toward contractual 
constraints on the circulation of human capital. 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 23, 2017, two titans of Silicon Valley went to 
war in federal court: Google filed a lawsuit against Uber, accusing 
it of using intellectual property allegedly stolen by one of the lead 
engineers on Waymo, Google’s self-driving automotive subsidi-
ary.1 Specifically, Google alleged that Anthony Levandowski had 
misappropriated Google’s intellectual property before departing 
(along with other Google engineers) to found Otto, a self-driving 
car startup subsequently acquired by Uber for $680 million.2 The 
legal basis for Google’s lawsuit against Uber and Levandowski 
consisted of a medley of federal trade secret, patent infringement, 
and state trade secret and unfair competition claims.3 Given the 
high economic stakes, commentators speculated that if Google 
prevailed, the ultimate damages could exceed a billion dollars.4 
While the litigation was pending, the trial judge ordered  
Levandowski to stop working on projects involving the technology 
that had been allegedly misappropriated.5 Although Google and 
Uber settled the dispute shortly after trial proceedings com-
menced for a mere $245 million, an arbitration panel subse-
quently found against Levandowski (who was fired by Uber6) and, 
on an interim basis, awarded Google $127 million in damages, for 
which Uber may be financially responsible under indemnification 
obligations to its former employee.7 
 
 1 Complaint, Waymo LLC v Uber Technologies, Inc, No 3:17-cv-00939, *2–5 (ND Cal 
filed Feb 23, 2017) (available on Westlaw at 2017 WL 726994) (Waymo Complaint) (stating 
various causes of action against Uber relating to alleged actions by a former Waymo em-
ployee in connection with his departure from Waymo to Uber’s self-driving car project). 
 2 See id at *3–4 (describing evidence showing that Levandowski, former Waymo en-
gineer, misappropriated information from Waymo upon departure from company). 
 3 Id at *2, 16, 19, 21, 27 (stating trade secret, patent infringement, and unfair com-
petition causes of action). 
 4 See Aarian Marshall, Google’s Robocar Lawsuit Could Kill Uber’s Future and Send 
Execs to Prison (Wired, Feb 28, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/SH8J-ZQ2H. 
 5 Joe Mullin, Judge’s Order Bars Uber Engineer from Lidar Work, Demands Return 
of Stolen Files (Ars Technica, May 15, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/B7KC-ZD46; 
Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Plaintiff’s Motion for Provisional Relief, 
Waymo LLC v Uber Technologies, Inc, No 3:17-cv-00939, *23 (ND Cal filed May 11, 2017). 
 6 Aarian Marshall, Uber Fired Its Robocar Guru, but Its Legal Fight with Google 
Goes On (Wired, May 30, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/YZ3K-78TV. 
 7 Uber Technologies, Inc, Form S-1 Registration Statement F-72, F-82 (SEC filed 
Apr 11, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/Z2JE-NZBQ. 
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The Google-Uber litigation, and the rich suite of legal and 
economic instruments deployed to restrain the departure of a 
prized employee, is a notable counterexample to the now- 
standard account of unrestrained employee movement in Silicon 
Valley, the world’s preeminent innovation cluster. That account 
emphasizes the ease with which technical and managerial talent, 
and the intellectual capital embodied in that talent, circulates 
among competitors, resulting in knowledge spillovers that re-
dound to the collective benefit of the innovation ecosystem. This 
free-flowing movement of human capital is widely attributed to 
cultural norms, organizational practices, and, especially among 
legal scholars, California’s refusal to enforce a contractual clause 
known as a “covenant not to compete” (or “noncompete”).8 
A noncompete typically limits a former employee’s ability to 
work for competitors in a certain industry and a certain geo-
graphic area for a certain period of time. In contemporary schol-
arly and policy discussions of innovation policy, the noncompete 
has recently become a surprising focal point. Specifically, the lit-
erature has widely adopted the view initially espoused by Profes-
sor Ronald Gilson—albeit in a much more qualified form—that 
California’s general refusal to enforce noncompetes in significant 
part explains the exceptional growth of Silicon Valley since the 
early 1980s while Massachusetts’s willingness to enforce noncom-
petes spurred the purported decline of the Route 128 area around 
Boston.9 Following this view, California has enjoyed a healthy  
 
 8 On cultural norms and organizational practices, see AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional 
Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 1–9, 32–34, 44–45, 
50–56 (Harvard 1996) (arguing that Silicon Valley’s comparative advantage compared to 
Route 128 derived from its “network-based” system that promotes collective learning 
through informal collaboration within and between firms, as compared to Route 128’s hi-
erarchical system based on centralized and vertically integrated corporate entities). On 
noncompetes, see Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Indus-
trial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 NYU L Rev 
575, 602–09 (1999) (arguing that differences in the enforceability of noncompetes contrib-
uted significantly to the ascendance of Silicon Valley over Route 128 by promoting the 
circulation of human and intellectual capital among competing firms). 
 9 For the original statement of this view, see Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 602–09 (cited 
in note 8). In the legal literature, representative contributions that have adopted and ex-
panded upon Gilson’s insight include: Orly Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free: Why We Should 
Learn to Love Leaks, Raids and Free Riding 67–70 (Yale 2013) (arguing that California’s 
refusal to enforce noncompetes at least partly accounts for its ascendance over Route 128 
and attributing this hypothesis to Ronald Gilson); Orly Lobel, The New Cognitive Property: 
Human Capital Law and the Reach of Intellectual Property, 93 Tex L Rev 789, 825–26 
(2015) (likening noncompetes to “a thick cluster of property rights that rigidifies the mar-
ket and reduces the ability to move forward”); Viva R. Moffat, Making Non-Competes Un-
enforceable, 54 Ariz L Rev 939, 979–80 (2013) (arguing for a uniform rule of nonenforcea-
bility on the ground that noncompetes skew the balance in intellectual property policy 
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circulation of human capital, while Massachusetts has been de-
prived of the “agglomeration economies” that promote robust in-
novation clusters.10 The result in California is a virtuous circle of 
accelerated innovation that led to the rise of Silicon Valley; the 
result in Massachusetts is a sad story of a Silicon Valley that 
could have been but wasn’t. 
The recent surge of interest in noncompetes is a welcome ex-
tension of innovation policy analysis. Noncompetes, and the 
broader universe of contractual and economic restraints on labor 
mobility, are a critical but overlooked tool in promoting robust in-
novation ecosystems. Scholarly discussions of innovation policy 
typically focus on the extent to which intellectual property rights 
such as patents or copyrights regulate the flow of informational 
assets. But this misses a key component of any innovation envi-
ronment—namely, the flow of intellectual capital embedded in 
the human beings that innovate and commercialize new products 
and services. In the business world, firms are keenly aware of the 
value of human capital and use contractual and economic instru-
ments to avoid losing their most valuable personnel to competi-
tors. Based on a survey of 11,500 participants, a recent study 
found that an estimated 18 percent of all US workers (roughly, 
30 million people), and approximately one-third of workers in  
professional, scientific, and technical occupations, are subject to 
noncompetes.11 The extent to which the law should enforce these 
contractual instruments is a matter of fundamental importance. 
 
between protecting R&D incentives and the public domain); Viva R. Moffat, The Wrong 
Tool for the Job: The IP Problem with Non-Competition Agreements, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev 
873, 911–20 (2010) (arguing that noncompetes are a poor tool for protecting IP rights). In 
the economics literature, see Sampsa Samila and Olav Sorenson, Noncompete Covenants: 
Incentives to Innovate or Impediments to Growth, 57 Mgmt Sci 425, 436 (2011) (arguing 
that empirical evidence supports relaxing enforcement of noncompetes to accelerate labor 
mobility and stimulate entrepreneurship). In an important variant on this line of argu-
ment, Professor Alan Hyde agrees that labor mobility lies behind the success of Silicon 
Valley but attributes this difference principally to California firms’ reluctance to bring 
trade secret claims against former employees and California courts’ resistance to grant 
such claims, rather than differences in the treatment of noncompetes. See Alan Hyde, 
Working in Silicon Valley: Economic and Legal Analysis of a High-Velocity Labor Market 
32–40 (M.E. Sharpe 2003). 
 10 Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 576, 606–07 (cited in note 8). 
 11 See J.J. Prescott, Norman D. Bishara, and Evan Starr, Understanding Noncom-
petition Agreements: The 2014 Noncompete Survey Project, 2016 Mich St L Rev 369, 461; 
Evan Starr, J.J. Prescott, and Norman Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force *16–
19 (University of Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper, Aug 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/ZXU6-NAGU. 
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In recent years, a growing number of scholars and policymak-
ers have adopted a simple answer to this question: never.12 Fol-
lowing this view—popularized by the slogan, “talent wants to be 
free”—the free circulation of human capital always, or usually, 
promotes innovation. As such, any constraints “imposed” by em-
ployers reflect either overreaching or economic irrationality.13 As 
a matter of policy, this view recommends that all states adopt 
California’s purported zero-tolerance regime—a change that 
would undo the common-law “reasonableness” standard currently 
used by forty-six states to adjudge the enforceability of noncom-
petes.14  (The current exceptions are California, North Dakota, 
and Oklahoma, which bar noncompete enforcement against indi-
viduals in most circumstances;15 recently, Hawaii barred noncom-
petes for “technology business[es].”16) To be clear, even under the 
long-standing common law doctrine (dating from an English prec-
edent in 171117), noncompete clauses are enforceable only if they 
set forth “reasonable” temporal, geographic, and scope-of- 
industry limitations.18 For the “talent wants to be free” school of 
 
 12 See note 13 (noting scholars and policymakers adopting this view); Part I.C (same). 
 13 For representative sources that express this view, see Lobel, Talent Wants to Be 
Free at 27–41, 201 (cited in note 9) (arguing that legal constraints, such as noncompetes, 
that impede labor mobility discourage innovation by hindering employee creativity and 
blocking interfirm flows of intellectual capital); Yochai Benkler, Law, Innovation and Col-
laboration in Networked Economy and Society, 13 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci 231, 235 (2017) 
(arguing that noncompetes are incompatible with a “network view,” rather than an “atom-
istic view,” of innovation, and citing empirical evidence that innovation thrives in network 
relationships with high rates of knowledge flow); Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free at 64 
(cited in note 9) (arguing that firms that advocate for noncompete enforcement “would 
likely benefit from the very movement they are attempting to limit”); Moffat, 52 Wm & 
Mary L Rev at 893–97 (cited in note 9) (“[N]oncompetes are at odds with both the fair 
bargaining process and efficiency underpinnings of the freedom of contract rationale.”); id 
at 898–99 (arguing that the “IP justification” for noncompetes is insufficient and advocat-
ing a policy of zero enforcement); Alan Hyde, Should Noncompetes Be Enforced?, 33 Reg-
ulation 6, 9 (Winter 2010–11) (stating that losing an employee means gaining access to a 
new information network, rather than losing an information asset). Ronald Gilson ex-
presses a similar view, although he clarifies that the positive welfare effects he attributes 
to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes may be limited to that particular state at a 
particular point in time in its economic trajectory. See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 619–20, 
627–29 (cited in note 8). 
 14 For a review of state laws on noncompetes, see generally J. Gregory Grisham, Be-
yond the Red-Blue Divide: An Overview of Current Trends in State Non-Compete Law, 18 
Federalist Society Rev 42 (June 19, 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/33Q7-N9JF. 
 15 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600; ND Cent Code § 9-08-06; 15 Okla Stat § 217.  
 16 Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 480-4(d). 
 17 Mitchel v Reynolds, 24 Eng Rep 347, 347 (KB 1711) (stating that a “bond or prom-
ise to restrain oneself from trading in a particular place, if made upon a reasonable con-
sideration, is good”). 
 18 See id at 348 (drawing distinction between restraints “not to exercise a trade 
throughout the kingdom,” which are deemed to be void, and restraints that are “limited to 
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thought, it seems that no limitation on the movement of talent 
can ever be deemed reasonable. 
These academic views now play a prominent part in ongoing 
policy debates and press coverage concerning proposed laws that 
would limit, or bar, the enforcement of noncompetes.19 On March 7, 
2019, a bipartisan group of six Democratic and Republican US sen-
ators sent a joint letter to the Government Accountability Office 
requesting that it investigate the impact of noncompetes “on 
workers and on the economy as a whole.”20 Citing academic re-
search that “California’s ban on non-compete agreements has 
been a prime factor in the state’s growing economy,” three Demo-
cratic US senators introduced legislation in April 2018 to impose 
a ban on noncompetes nationwide, which was re-introduced by 
 
a particular place,” which may be deemed reasonable). For more detailed discussion of the 
reasonableness standard, see Part II.A.3.b. 
 19 Reflecting unusual interest in the intricacies of employment contracts, The New 
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Forbes, Fortune, The Boston Globe, and other media 
outlets have run stories and op-eds on the use of noncompete clauses and legislative pro-
posals to ban these clauses. See, for example, Orly Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t 
Let Their Workers Do the Same (NY Times, May 4, 2017), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/LG33-EUTV (discussing states’ differences in enforcing noncompetes, federal 
proposals to limit noncompetes, and the harmful effects of noncompetes on employees); 
Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in Array of Jobs (NY Times, 
June 8, 2014), archived at https://perma.cc/P575-QQCX (discussing proposed legislation 
in Massachusetts limiting enforcement of noncompetes); Neil Irwin, When the Guy Making 
Your Sandwich Has a Noncompete Clause (NY Times, Oct 14, 2014), archived at 
https://perma.cc/FQ4X-FNKB (discussing the economic, legal, and moral issues raised by 
noncompetes); Ruth Simon and Angus Loten, Litigation over Noncompete Clauses Is Ris-
ing (Wall St J, Aug 14, 2013), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/litigation-over-non 
compete-clauses-is-rising-does-entrepreneurship-suffer-1376520622 (visited Feb 17, 
2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (discussing increasing litigation over, and prevalence 
of, noncompete agreements); Joann S. Lublin, Companies Loosen the Handcuffs on Non-
Competes (Wall St J, Aug 12, 2013), online at https://www.wsj.com/articles/companies-
loosen-the-handcuffs-on-noncompetes-1376320350 (visited Feb 11, 2020) (Perma archive un-
available) (discussing cases in which employers declined to strictly enforce noncompetes 
when executives departed for other large corporations); Eric Goldman, Why Congress 
Should Restrict Employee Non-Compete Clauses (Forbes, June 30, 2015), archived at 
https://perma.cc/52G4-KTLD (supporting federal legislation to limit enforcement of non-
competes); Claire Zillman, Are Noncompete Agreements Hurting Tech Innovation? (For-
tune, July 1, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/2YRK-95G4 (discussing differing views 
on enforceability of noncompetes, their impact on innovation, and proposed state legisla-
tion to limit enforceability); John McEleney, Noncompetes Hurt Workers and Their Em-
ployers (Boston Globe, June 28, 2015), online at https://www.bostonglobe.com/ 
opinion/2015/06/27/onshape-ceo-john-mceleney-noncompetes-hurt-workers-and-their- 
employers/6NbXbI5jhZpl5wyvc28FSI/story.html (visited Feb 3, 2020) (Perma archive un-
available) (CEO of Massachusetts-based company arguing that noncompetes should “go 
away altogether”). 
 20 Senator Christopher Murphy, et al, Letter to the Honorable Gene Dodaro, Comp-
troller General, US Government Accountability Office *1 (Mar 7, 2019), archived at 
https://perma.cc/W38U-2YRR. 
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two Democratic and Republican US senators in October 2019.21 
Like these US senators, advocates for strict limitations on, or out-
right bans of, noncompetes explicitly refer to selected empirical 
studies in arguing that these reforms would facilitate labor mo-
bility and promote innovation.22 A leading academic opponent of 
noncompetes has written: “[T]he research suggests that noncom-
petes should be banned for all employees, regardless of skill, in-
dustry or wage; they simply do more harm than good.”23 In 2018, 
the influential Economist magazine endorsed an only slightly 
more qualified position, arguing that noncompetes should be en-
forced only in narrow circumstances and similarly referring to ac-
ademic research to support this position.24 
A sizeable number of state legislatures have derived similar 
conclusions. Since 2014, the legislatures of thirty-seven states 
have formally considered laws that would affect the enforceability 
of noncompetes in employment agreements.25 Of those proposed 
 
 21 On the April 2018 proposed legislation, see Office of Senator Ron Wyden, Press 
Release, Wyden, Murphy, Warren Introduce Bill to Ban Unnecessary and Harmful Non-
Compete Agreements (Apr 26, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6N2T-V6N2 (“The new 
legislation would prohibit the use of non-compete agreements. . . . Many believe that  
California’s ban on non-compete agreements has been a prime factor in the state’s growing 
economy.”); Workforce Mobility Act of 2018, S 2782, 115th Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 26, 2018). 
On the October 2019 proposed legislation, see Office of Senator Todd Young, Press Release, 
Young and Murphy Introduce Bill to Limit Non-Compete Agreements, Protect Workers (Oct 
17, 2019), archived at https://perma.cc/PFU9-6GWW (“Research indicates that workers 
trapped by non-competes are less mobile, which results in firms having difficulty hiring 
workers with the right set of skills.”); Workforce Mobility Act of 2019, S 2614, 116th Cong, 
1st Sess (Oct 27, 2019). 
 22 See, for example, Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in 
note 19). Lori Ehrlich, a Massachusetts representative who introduced a bill to preclude 
most noncompete enforcement, believes noncompetes have an “overall impact of stifling 
innovation” and cites academic studies on her website. Lori A. Ehrlich, Fact Sheet: H. 2366 
(2018), archived at https://perma.cc/6XJR-9ZY8 (discussing a “recent peer-reviewed aca-
demic paper” which shows that nearly one in five employees are bound by a noncompete). 
See also Zillman, Are Noncompete Agreements Hurting Tech Innovation? (cited in note 19). 
 23 Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in note 19). 
 24 Restrain the Restraints: The Case Against Non-compete Clauses (The Economist, 
May 19, 2018), online at https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/05/19/the-case-against 
-non-compete-clauses (visited Feb 11, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (supporting a re-
quirement for employers to demonstrate genuine harm in noncompete litigation, as well 
as arguing that noncompetes should be enforced only if they apply for a short time and 
they are negotiated before an employee accepts a job offer). 
 25 These states are Alabama, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,  
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,  
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New 
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, South  
Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and West Virginia. This includes all legisla-
tures in which a member has formally proposed a law affecting noncompetes, whether 
generally or in specific industries, since 2014, based on a search of legislative proposals in 
the Westlaw and LexisNexis databases. See also Appendix. 
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bills, all but six proposed to limit enforceability (up to and includ-
ing outright bans). In twenty-one states, these debates have 
translated into action. This includes Massachusetts, which in 
2018 enacted a statute prohibiting noncompetes for certain cate-
gories of employees26 and, in most other cases, imposes notice  
obligations on employers. 27  The Appendix shows all statutory 
changes to state noncompete laws during 2014–2019. Nineteen 
changes reduced enforceability and six enhanced it (although one 
was repealed two years later and the other was offset by other 
provisions that limited enforceability). In enacting its ban on  
noncompetes in the technology industry, Hawaii specifically ref-
erenced academic studies that purportedly supported this policy 
action as being conducive to innovation.28 Additionally, in California, 
some courts have recently adopted expansive understandings of 
the state’s statutory limitation on enforcing noncompetes against 
individuals, applying it to other contractual obligations that have 
long been thought to lie outside the purview of the statute.29 In 
 
 26 The statute primarily captures workers who are “nonexempt under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act,” Mass Gen Laws Ann, ch 149, § 24L, which generally targets salaried 
workers employed on a fixed hourly basis and most likely would not target managerial 
and other professional employees. See US Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division, 
Fact Sheet #17A: Exemption for Executive, Administrative, Professional, Computer & Out-
side Sales Employees Under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) (July 2008), archived 
at https://perma.cc/7VDP-MURT. However, there may be ambiguities in certain cases. For 
further discussion, see Stephen T. Melnick, Chris Kaczmarek, and Melissa L. McDonagh, 
Frequently Asked Questions About the New Massachusetts Noncompetition Agreement Act 
(Littler, Sept 5, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/ER4R-PMZZ. 
 27 Mass Gen Laws Ann, ch 149, § 24L. The statute also requires that a noncompete 
“must be no broader than necessary to protect . . . legitimate business interests of the em-
ployer” and must have a reasonable geographic, temporal, and industry scope, see id; how-
ever, this language simply restates Massachusetts courts’ holdings on this point. For fur-
ther discussion, see notes 150–51 and accompanying text. Note further that the effect of 
the Massachusetts statute is qualified in two respects: (i) the law does not apply to a non-
compete provision in an employer-employee separation agreement (if there is a seven-day 
period during which the employee can rescind acceptance), and (ii) Massachusetts simul-
taneously codified the “inevitable disclosure” doctrine, which entitles employers to seek 
injunctions against departing employees in the case of “threatened misappropriation,” 
Massachusetts Trade Secrets Act, Mass HR 4868, § 19, 190th Sess (July 31, 2018). For 
further discussion, see note 130 and accompanying text. 
 28 The legislature stated: “[A]cademic studies have concluded that embracing em-
ployee mobility is a superior strategy for nurturing an innovation-based economy.” Robert 
B. Milligan, Hawaii Bans Non-Compete and Non-Solicit Agreements with Technology 
Workers (Seyfarth Shaw, July 6, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/TTQ3-Y9G9. 
 29 These decisions purport to apply the California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in 
Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P3d 285 (Cal 2008). See, for example, Barker v  
Insight Global LLC, 2019 WL 176260, *3 (ND Cal) (allowing claim that a nonsolicitation 
clause was illegal under California’s noncompete ban to go forward); AMN Healthcare, Inc 
v Aya Healthcare Services, Inc, 28 Cal App 5th 923, 935–37 (2018) (holding that a firm 
could not enforce a nonsolicitation clause against a former recruiter employed by the firm, 
on the grounds that doing so would violate California’s ban on noncompetes); Golden v 
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2018, a California lower court even applied the statutory limita-
tion to prevent businesses from entering into exclusivity agree-
ments between themselves, which had been traditionally the pur-
view of California’s antitrust provisions, not its statutory 
prohibition against noncompetes.30 While the appellate court re-
versed this ruling, it is nonetheless indicative of an increasingly 
dogmatic approach against the enforcement of noncompetes or 
other contractual provisions deemed to have a comparable  
effect.31 
The vigorous political debate and ongoing legislative activity 
relating to noncompetes encompasses a variety of policy concerns, 
including efficiency-related economic concerns as well as noneco-
nomic concerns involving personal autonomy and distributive jus-
tice.32 In markets for highly skilled technical and managerial la-
bor (as distinguished from lower-income and lower-skilled 
occupations, which has been the focus of some of the proposed leg-
islative bans33), the debate on both sides has principally relied on 
economic arguments. The toolkit of law-and-economics analysis is 
well suited to provide a balanced analysis of efficiency-related ar-
guments for and against proposed policy shifts with respect to 
 
California Emergency Physicians Medical Group, 896 F3d 1018, 1024–26 (9th Cir 2018) 
(refusing to uphold a litigation settlement agreement in which a physician-plaintiff agreed 
not to work at any facility that is owned, managed, or contracted by the medical group 
that had formerly employed the physician, but without imposing any other restrictions on 
the physician’s pursuit of other employment opportunities). Note that the Barker and 
AMN Healthcare decisions depart from long-standing California precedent upholding the 
enforceability of postemployment nonsolicitation covenants subject to a reasonableness 
standard, see Loral Corp v Moyes, 174 Cal App 3d 268, 278–79 (1985). 
 30 See Beckman Coulter, Inc v Quidel Corp, 2018 WL 9943513, *1–2 (Cal Super). 
 31 See Quidel Corp v Superior Court of San Diego County, 39 Cal App 5th 530, 533, 
535–36, 544–45 (2019) (reversing lower court’s ruling based on Edwards invalidating the 
exclusivity agreement, and holding that Edwards does not extend beyond the employment 
context). 
 32 For a critique of noncompetes on distributional grounds, with an emphasis on the 
lack of meaningful negotiation on the part of the employee, see Rachel S. Arnow-Richman, 
Bargaining for Loyalty in the Information Age: A Reconsideration of the Role of Substantive 
Fairness in Enforcing Employee Noncompetes, 80 Or L Rev 1163, 1214–15 (2001). See also 
Christopher T. Wonnell, The Contractual Disempowerment of Employees, 46 Stan L Rev 
87, 106 (1993). Because our Article focuses on the effects of noncompetes on technological 
innovation, we generally ignore the distributional (and autonomy-related) effects of non-
competes, though our intention is not to diminish their importance in the overall policy-
making calculus. 
 33 See, for example, Office of Senator Marco Rubio, Press Release, Rubio Introduces 
Bill to Protect Low-Wage Workers from Non-Compete Agreements (Jan 15, 2019), archived 
at https://perma.cc/JM6P-QPS3 (describing a bill proposed by US Senator Marco Rubio to 
ban noncompetes nationwide for employees who are eligible for protection under federal 
overtime eligibility laws). 
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noncompetes that apply to technical and managerial personnel in 
technology markets. 
In this Article, we undertake that task. Specifically, we look 
closely and broadly at the economic arguments, both theoretical 
and empirical, that have been advanced in support of the “talent 
wants to be free” view. While the details are complex and nu-
anced, our conclusion is simple and modest. Neither economic 
theory nor empirical evidence provides compelling support to 
abandon the common law’s centuries-old reasonableness stand-
ard. Contractual restraints on labor mobility in technology mar-
kets raise complex trade-offs between employers’ training and 
R&D incentives (generally favored by noncompetes) and em-
ployee mobility (generally disfavored by noncompetes).34 While 
the latter is important for innovation, so is the former, and case-
specific application of the reasonableness standard arguably of-
fers the best, albeit imperfect, mechanism for balancing those 
competing considerations. 
The now-popular view that innovation always or usually does 
best when human capital circulates freely relies heavily on a sin-
gle historical example: the divergence in economic fortunes of Sil-
icon Valley in California and Route 128 in Massachusetts and the 
different cultural norms and noncompete enforcement policies at-
tributed to each innovation cluster. The results are surprising. 
Contrary to the standard account, we show that there is little 
compelling ground to attribute Silicon Valley’s ascendance over 
Route 128 in the late 1980s and early 1990s to differences in the 
enforceability of noncompetes.35 
There are multiple reasons. First, during Silicon Valley’s as-
cendance, California’s policy against noncompetes was clouded by 
several important exceptions. Second, California firms could sig-
nificantly mimic noncompetes through trade secret and patent in-
fringement litigation, long-term contracts, deferred compensa-
tion, and other mechanisms. Third, it is not clear that 
Massachusetts law substantially restrained employee turnover 
as an effective matter. Contemporary accounts of Route 128 in the 
heyday of the minicomputer industry in the 1970s and 1980s de-
scribe the same type of job hopping and spin-off formation associ-
ated with Silicon Valley. Fourth, Silicon Valley’s rise over 
Route 128 most likely stemmed far more from technological and 
 
 34 A potential negative secondary effect of noncompetes is to depress employee crea-
tivity and effort. We address this concern below in Part I.B.3. 
 35 See Part II.A. 
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economic fundamentals associated with the “PC revolution,” ra-
ther than fine distinctions in noncompete enforcement. Lastly, 
Route 128’s decline was relatively short lived, and it has re-
mained a significant innovation center, especially in the life sci-
ences and certain information technology markets. 
Our original and comprehensive reexamination of the Silicon 
Valley / Route 128 narrative raises doubts concerning the widely 
accepted causal sequence running from prohibiting noncompetes 
to increased employee mobility to increased innovation. These 
doubts are intensified by a close analysis of recent empirical stud-
ies that are regularly cited as evidence that noncompetes impede 
innovation. Contrary to the characterization of these studies in 
much of the policy commentary by academics and governmental 
agencies,36 these studies suffer from significant methodological 
limitations, deliver statistically weak results, and do not provide 
compelling support for the view that banning noncompetes pro-
motes innovation. 
A fully informed policy position concerning noncompetes 
must reflect the uncertain state of our empirical understanding 
of the effects of these agreements in innovation markets. That is, 
it must reflect the fact that available evidence can neither support 
nor rebut any systematically adverse relationship between non-
competes and innovation outcomes in general. Only this meas-
ured conclusion, rather than the strongly “abolitionist” position 
that scholars and policymakers have increasingly advanced, is 
consistent with theoretical analysis that identifies the counter-
vailing efficiency effects of noncompetes and other constraints on 
employee mobility. The free movement of talent implies efficiency 
 
 36 See, for example, Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free at 67–72 (cited in note 9) (describ-
ing empirical studies that purportedly have confirmed Gilson’s hypothesis attributing the 
rise of Silicon Valley in part to California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes); The White 
House, Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential Issues, and State Re-
sponses *2, 5–7 (May 2016), archived at https://perma.cc/CR5Y-V8JX (discussing empirical 
studies measuring the prevalence and economic effects of noncompetes on employee mo-
bility and start-up formation); US Department of the Treasury, Office of Economic Policy, 
Non-compete Contracts: Economic Effects and Policy Implications *11–13, 18–23, 26 (Mar 
2016), archived at https://perma.cc/V383-QXM7 (reviewing research on use and effects of 
noncompetes and concluding that economic justifications for noncompetes have weak sup-
port); Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in note 19) (same); 
Lobel, 93 Tex L Rev at 827, 839–42 (cited in note 9) (describing empirical studies suggest-
ing that noncompetes reduce employee mobility, depress employee effort, and reduce in-
novation); Benkler, 13 Ann Rev L & Soc Sci at 235 (cited in note 13) (describing empirical 
research purporting to show that enforcing noncompetes depresses employee mobility, re-
duces knowledge spillovers, and undermines innovation); Hyde, 33 Regulation at 9 (cited 
in note 13) (“Study after study shows how much more productive firms will be if they can 
hire, free of lawsuits, someone who worked at a rival.”). 
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gains from knowledge sharing and accelerated “n-mover” innova-
tion. However, a blanket prohibition of noncompetes implies effi-
ciency losses from uncompensated transfers of intellectual capital 
to competitors—which, far from being mere efficiency-neutral 
transfers, may discourage first-mover innovation and employee 
training, which may depress the development of human intellec-
tual capital in the first instance. 
Complex problems deserve complex solutions. Contrary to 
what is hastily becoming conventional wisdom, which is in turn 
being converted into concrete policy actions, there is no one-size-
fits-all solution to this trade-off as a matter of economic analysis. 
Based on available evidence, there is no reason to believe that the 
efficiency gains from freely circulating human capital systemati-
cally outweigh the efficiency losses from uncompensated uses of 
intellectual capital. Rather, the net efficiency effect of noncom-
petes in any particular market depends on the interaction be-
tween multiple factors that vary across industries, firms, and 
types of employees. Even if California’s zero-enforcement policy 
has been locally optimal (or at least, sufficiently workable) from 
an efficiency perspective, it may be suited to a particular type of 
innovation economy at a particular time—an important but ne-
glected qualification that Gilson made when he originally at-
tributed Silicon Valley’s success to California’s refusal to enforce 
noncompetes. 37  At the same time, we emphasize that neither  
theory nor empirics support an unqualified freedom-of-contract 
approach that enforces noncompetes in all circumstances absent 
evidence of fraud or coercion. Rather, we explicitly recognize the 
uncertainty involved in assessing the net efficiency effects of non-
competes. Using the error-cost approach developed in antitrust 
analysis and jurisprudence,38 we embed that uncertainty in our 
policy analysis, concluding that the common law’s reasonableness 
standard remains the best available instrument to reflect, albeit 
imperfectly, the trade-off between efficiency gains and losses in-
herent to limitations on employee mobility in innovation markets. 
 
 37 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 627–29 (cited in note 8). 
 38 For the leading sources, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 
Mich L Rev 1696, 1711 (1986) (“We want to hold to a minimum the sum of the costs of 
harmful activity wrongly condoned and useful activity wrongly condemned (or discour-
aged).”); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 Tex L Rev 1, 16 (1984) (“[W]e 
should prefer the error of tolerating questionable conduct, which imposes losses over a 
part of the range of output, to the error of condemning beneficial conduct, which imposes 
losses over the whole range of output.”). 
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In sum, our Article makes three important contributions to 
the literature. First, it exhaustively reviews the widespread con-
tention that noncompetes thwart innovation. 39  Our detailed  
analysis shows that neither theory nor empirics supports the eco-
nomic arguments commonly wielded in favor of prohibiting non-
competes.40 As a matter of theory, conventional wisdom empha-
sizes that noncompetes impede the circulation of intellectual 
capital while overlooking that noncompetes may encourage firms 
to cultivate employees’ human capital.41 As a matter of empirics, 
we contest the widely accepted view that Silicon Valley surpassed 
Boston because of supposed differences in noncompete enforce-
ment, which tend to be exaggerated.42 A careful examination of 
the evidence shows that the Boston area has remained a signifi-
cant innovation center and that technological and economic fac-
tors better explain Silicon Valley’s exceptional trajectory.43 Sec-
ond, we uncover serious factual and other deficiencies in several 
widely cited empirical studies, which cast substantial doubt on 
those studies’ findings and policy implications.44 Third, based on 
our exhaustive review of the available evidence, we propose an 
original error-cost framework to analyze noncompetes, which pro-
vides a robust economic rationale for the common law’s reasona-
bleness standard.45 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the noncom-
pete debate and, in particular, contrasts newly ascendant views 
favoring the free circulation of human capital with older views 
that recognize that reasonable contractual limitations on em-
ployee mobility may promote social welfare. Part II reexamines 
the standard narrative of the rise of Silicon Valley and the decline 
of Route 128, looking closely at multiple factors that may account 
for Silicon Valley’s exceptional success as an innovation center. 
Additionally, we review more recent empirical studies on the re-
lationship between noncompetes, employee movement, and inno-
vation. Part III revisits the range of policy options with respect to 
noncompetes, using an error-cost approach that has not been pre-
viously applied to the enforcement of noncompetes. We briefly 
conclude. 
 
 39 See Parts I and II. 
 40 See Part II. 
 41 See Part III. 
 42 See Part II.A. 
 43 See Part II.A. 
 44 See Part II.B. 
 45 See Part III. 
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I.  OLD AND NEW VIEWS: FROM AGNOSTICISM TO ABOLITIONISM 
In this Part, we review two key stages in the intellectual his-
tory of the current debate over noncompetes and other restraints 
on employee mobility, and situate that debate within a larger 
body of economic thought relating to the economics of human cap-
ital. First, we review an earlier generation of law-and-economics 
scholarship, which identified the social costs and gains attributa-
ble to noncompetes and generally adopted an agnostic position 
concerning these restraints as a general matter. These scholars 
were therefore sympathetic to the common law’s reasonableness 
standard, which upholds or invalidates noncompetes on a case-
specific basis. Second, we review a more recent school of thought 
that takes the strong view that the social costs associated with 
noncompetes typically or almost always outweigh the social 
gains, and therefore supports ending noncompete enforcement 
following California’s example. 
A. Foundations: Becker and Marshall 
Economically informed analysis of noncompetes and other  
restraints on labor mobility in innovation markets stands at the  
intersection of two foundational bodies of economic thought:  
Gary Becker’s breakthrough work on the economics of human 
capital and Alfred Marshall’s classic writings on the agglomera-
tion economies that derive from the interchange of intellectual 
capital. Contemporary discussions of the legal treatment of non-
competes has relied (sometimes implicitly) almost entirely on the 
work of Marshall, which is a key reference point in the literature 
on innovation policy, while devoting little attention to the insights 
of Becker, widely recognized as the foundational work in the mod-
ern field of labor economics. 46  We review both contributions 
briefly below and will then integrate these classic insights from 
innovation policy and labor policy scholarship throughout our 
analysis of noncompetes and other constraints on the mobility of 
human capital. 
 
 46 On the importance of Becker’s work, see generally Yoram Weiss, Gary Becker on 
Human Capital, 81 J Demographic Econ 27 (2015). 
968 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:953 
1. Becker: Human capital as an economic asset. 
Nobel Prize–winning economist Gary Becker effectively 
founded the economic analysis of human capital with the publica-
tion of his landmark work, Human Capital, in 1962.47  Becker 
showed that economic analysis could be applied to the acquisition 
and cultivation of human capital, whether through education, 
training, or other mechanisms. From an economic point of view, 
human capital acquisition involves the use of scarce resources to 
maximize net expected value, as with any other costly activity. In 
implementing this analysis, Becker drew a key distinction be-
tween general and firm-specific human capital assets.48 General 
human capital refers to technical, managerial, and other skills 
and knowledge that have value across a broad pool of firms or 
industries.49 Firm-specific human capital refers to the narrower 
set of technical, managerial, and other skills and knowledge that 
have value (or have greater value) only at a particular firm.50 The 
scholarly literature that has followed Becker’s work has identified 
an intermediate form of human capital that is specific to an in-
dustry—namely, skills and knowledge that have value within an 
industry but not more generally.51 As discussed below, these dif-
ferent types of human capital give rise to different implications 
when analyzing the efficiency effects of noncompetes and other 
limitations on employee mobility. 
2. Marshall: Industrial districts and agglomeration 
economies. 
In the innovation context, economic analysis of noncompetes 
and other limitations on employee mobility often makes reference 
to the concept of “industrial districts,” originated by Alfred  
Marshall in his landmark treatise, Principles of Economics, first 
 
 47 See generally Gary S. Becker, Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical  
Analysis, with Special Reference to Education (Chicago 3d ed 1993). Subsequent notes re-
fer to this edition, unless otherwise indicated. This is an updated edition of Gary S. Becker, 
Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, with Special Reference to Educa-
tion (National Bureau of Economic Research 1964). Some of the ideas were initially set 
forth in Gary S. Becker, Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis, 70 J Pol 
Econ 9 (1962). 
 48 See Becker, Human Capital at 33–51 (cited in note 47). 
 49 See id at 33–34. 
 50 See id at 40. 
 51 See, for example, Derek Neal, Industry-Specific Human Capital: Evidence from 
Displaced Workers, 13 J Labor Econ 653, 653 (1995) (identifying categories of skills that 
are “specific to firms in a given industry or sector of the economy” and therefore do not fall 
into the existing categories of firm-specific or general human capital). 
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published in 1890.52 In a short passage in that work, Marshall 
proposed that certain industries benefit collectively from a free-
flowing exchange of ideas, even if an individual firm may period-
ically suffer the loss of some portion of its investment in develop-
ing an innovation.53 In Marshall’s famous words: “The mysteries 
of the trade become no mysteries; but are as it were in the air.”54 
The movement of R&D personnel among firms is one of the key 
mechanisms by which the “mysteries of the trade” are dissemi-
nated and, according to Marshall, promote the general long-term 
welfare of all members of that innovation community. This line of 
reasoning is the basis for an extensive literature on the “agglom-
eration economies” that arise in innovation clusters in which ge-
ographically proximate firms and other entities draw from a free-
flowing pool of human and intellectual capital assets to mutual 
advantage.55 
B. The Old View: Restricting Labor Mobility Is Good and Bad 
for Innovation 
The recent wave of academic interest in noncompetes is pre-
dated by scholars who had examined the efficiency of noncompete 
clauses and, explicitly or by implication, other restraints on em-
ployee mobility. Generally speaking, that view identifies both ef-
ficiency gains and losses that in general could arise from the use 
of noncompetes in innovation markets. Without an empirical 
methodology by which to quantify those potentially offsetting ef-
fects, that literature largely concluded that the net efficiency of 
noncompetes is indeterminate as a general matter. 
1.  The credible commitment problem. 
Earlier scholars observed that human capital markets suffer 
from what economists call a credible commitment problem. Spe-
cifically, potential employees cannot provide adequate assurance 
to employers who are reluctant to invest in cultivating the human 
capital of employees who can simply move to another employer, 
 
 52 Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 169 (Palgrave MacMillan 8th ed 1920). 
 53 Id at 225. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See Rainer vom Hofe and Ke Chen, Whither or Not Industrial Cluster: Conclusions 
or Confusions?, 4 Indust Geographer 2, 4–8 (2006) (reviewing the literature on “agglomer-
ation economies”). 
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thereby conferring an advantage on a competitor.56 When an em-
ployee leaves, the employer potentially suffers three costs: (i) it 
loses its training investment, which may involve a combination of 
firm-specific and general human capital; (ii) the employee may 
transmit proprietary information to a competitor; and (iii) the 
firm must incur costs to recruit and train a substitute employee, 
which again involves the transmission of firm-specific and gen-
eral human capital.57 
Without the ability to block employees from moving to a com-
petitor, and without a sufficient up-front payment from employee 
to employer to cover the employer’s expected costs in the event of 
the employee’s departure, an employer faces two choices. Setting 
aside the possibility of various substitutes for deterring employee 
movement (most notably, deferred compensation arrangements 
and long-term employment contracts), the employer can (i) de-
cline to hire the employee or (ii) hire the employee but underin-
vest in training (especially training that involves the cultivation 
of general human capital that has positive postemployment 
value) and the development and transmission of proprietary, of-
ten innovative, information.58 These concerns account for appren-
ticeship systems that predate modern intellectual property re-
gimes: limiting the apprentice’s ability to switch employers 
enabled the master to internalize the gains from the intellectual 
capital transferred to the apprentice.59 Or, put differently, limit-
ing the apprentice’s ability to switch employers enabled the ap-
prentice to credibly commit against expropriating the employer’s 
investment in the apprentice’s human capital. 
 
 56 See Paul H. Rubin and Peter Shedd, Human Capital and Covenants Not to Com-
pete, 10 J Legal Stud 93, 99–102 (1981) (arguing that employers will reduce investment in 
employee training absent noncompetes); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of 
Rights in Valuable Information, 9 J Legal Stud 683, 685 (1980) (asserting that, absent 
noncompetes, poaching employers will free ride on training investments by existing em-
ployers, who will in turn decline to make those investments); Harlan M. Blake, Employee 
Agreements Not to Compete, 73 Harv L Rev 625, 647 (1960) (contending that the objective 
of postemployment restraints is “to prevent competitive use, for a time, of information or 
relationships which pertain peculiarly to the employer and which the employee acquired 
in the course of the employment”). 
 57 See note 56 and accompanying text. 
 58 See Kitch, 9 J Legal Stud at 685 (cited in note 56). 
 59 See Rubin and Shedd, 10 J Legal Stud at 93–99 (cited in note 56) (arguing that 
covenants not to compete do not, as earlier scholars assumed, necessarily reflect an exer-
cise of monopoly power by employers). 
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2. The noncompete solution. 
Just like the apprentice contract, the noncompete clause can 
result in joint efficiency gains by enabling employment transac-
tions (and associated knowledge transfers) that otherwise would 
not take place. This is beneficial not only for the employer but the 
employee and the industry as a whole. This point is overlooked in 
recent discussions of noncompetes that tend to emphasize how 
these clauses block employment opportunities and suppress inno-
vation.60 However, it is important not to overlook the possibility 
that the absence of noncompetes can block certain other employ-
ment opportunities. Assuming the prospective employee is finan-
cially constrained and cannot post a sufficient “bond” against ex-
propriating the employer’s training investment or R&D assets, an 
otherwise efficient employment transaction—and the associated 
cultivation of human capital—may not move forward. In that 
case, both employer and prospective employee are made worse off. 
Even if the absence of noncompetes does not entirely block 
the employment relationship, it may distort the employer’s be-
havior during the term of employment and, as a result, sometimes 
disadvantage both the firm and the employee. At least three dis-
tortions are possible. First, the inability to enforce noncompetes 
may induce an employer to modify the internal allocation of team 
personnel so as to mitigate informational leakage from employee 
departures. For instance, Apple is famous for its secrecy practices 
and separate teams that work on different projects so as to mini-
mize information transfer between them.61 Second, the firm may 
skew the allocation of training resources toward the cultivation of 
firm-specific human capital so as to maximize the employee’s 
value in the internal labor market but minimize the employee’s 
value in the external labor market.62 Third, the firm may under-
invest in R&D by reallocating resources to activities in which it is 
not generating informational assets that an employee can trans-
mit to another employer. In a world in which noncompetes are 
enforceable at some reasonable cost and high probability, these 
distortions are mitigated and the firm can allocate resources more 
efficiently among the available set of innovation and non 
innovation activities. 
 
 60 See note 9 and accompanying text. 
 61 See Adam Lashinsky, This Is How Apple Keeps the Secrets (Fortune, Jan 18, 2012), 
online at https://fortune.com/2012/01/18/the-secrets-apple-keeps (visited Feb 3, 2020) 
(Perma archive unavailable). 
 62 See Nicola Meccheri, A Note on Non-competes, Bargaining and Training by Firms, 
102 Econ Letters 198, 200 (2009). 
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3. A weak objection to noncompetes. 
Some commentators argue that noncompetes may discourage 
employees from cultivating their human capital (or, specifically, 
general or industry-specific human capital)—which in turn may 
depress employees’ effort or creative output—due to the limited 
ability to access postemployment opportunities.63 This objection is 
not especially persuasive. Discouraging employees from acquiring 
human capital would appear to be inconsistent with rational 
profit maximization. Put affirmatively, any employer has an in-
centive to reward employees who enhance their firm-specific hu-
man capital (or some value-maximizing combination of firm- 
specific, industry-specific, and general human capital) and can 
therefore make a greater contribution to firm value. While there 
are inherent measurement and verification difficulties in  
assessing employees’ relative contributions in a team environ-
ment,64 firms clearly use a variety of compensation systems to at 
least approximately reward employee performance, including 
promotion, monetary bonuses, and more tailored compensation 
mechanisms.65 This is unsurprising: in a competitive market, any 
firm that includes noncompete clauses in its employment package 
has a rational self-interest in adopting incentive structures that 
correct for any underperformance effects that could arise as a re-
sult.66 Market forces reward firms who do so successfully and dis-
cipline those who do not. 
 
 63 See On Amir and Orly Lobel, Driving Performance: A Growth Theory of Noncom-
pete Law, 16 Stan Tech L Rev 833, 846 (2013) (“An employee who knows their market 
opportunities are significantly reduced due to an enforceable noncompete restriction will 
be less driven to perform well and to invest in his own human capital.”); Mark Garmaise, 
Ties That Truly Bind: Noncompetition Agreements, Executive Compensation, and Firm In-
vestment, 27 J L Econ & Org 376, 413–14 (2011) (setting forth model in which noncompete 
enforcement can induce employers to invest in managers’ human capital but reduce man-
agers’ incentives to do so, in which case the manager’s human capital may be lower relative 
to a zero-enforcement regime). 
 64 For the classic treatment, see Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz, Production, 
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am Econ Rev 777, 779 (1972) (discuss-
ing the difficulties of determining each individual’s contribution when observing a team’s 
output). 
 65 See Robert P. Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 Harv J 
L & Tech 1, 38–41 (1999) (discussing the “intra-firm appropriability environment” fostered 
by employee reward mechanisms). 
 66 Below, we criticize experimental studies that purport to confirm the depressing 
effects of noncompetes on the cultivation of human capital by noting that they fail to ade-
quately account for the large menu of employee incentive mechanisms used in the actual 
market. See note 305 and accompanying text. 
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4. A better objection to noncompetes. 
It is certainly the case that enforcing noncompetes limits to 
some extent the mobility of R&D personnel, which may impede 
the agglomeration economies that arise from the regular dissem-
ination of knowledge within an industry. To be clear, however, it 
is not precise to say (as is often said) that a noncompete “binds” 
an employee to a firm; rather, a noncompete requires that the em-
ployee or (more typically) a third party pay a fee demanded by the 
employer to obtain a waiver of the noncompete.67 Payments ex-
changed for waiver of a noncompete are mere wealth transfers 
without efficiency consequences from a short-term static perspec-
tive. Precisely understood, a noncompete is simply a mechanism 
by which resource-constrained employees can credibly commit to 
indirectly compensate their employer for training and knowledge 
leakage costs in the event employees depart for a competitor.68 
The employee’s commitment is made credible by providing the 
employer with a contractual right that can be “sold” to the em-
ployee’s next employer. 
This is not to say that there is no circumstance in which non-
competes can frustrate the efficiency gains associated with the 
circulation of human capital from one firm to another. First, even 
when an employer permits an employee otherwise under a non-
compete to move to a new firm, the transaction costs of negotiat-
ing and executing a waiver of the noncompete generate static 
costs that would not be incurred if noncompetes were wholly un-
enforceable. Of course, like all contracting costs, such costs are 
tolerable when the social gains from contracting (here, for a non-
compete) outweigh these costs. 
 
 67 For example, in 2005, Nortel paid Motorola $11.5 million to release its chief oper-
ating officer from a noncompete agreement. See Robert McMillan, Nortel Appoints Ex-
Motorola Exec as Operations Chief (Network World, Jan 19, 2006), archived at 
https://perma.cc/B4MJ-YTFC. 
 68 Noncompetes may also relieve an employer from having to increase existing em-
ployees’ compensation to match alternative employment opportunities, given the depar-
ture costs imposed by the noncompete. For a theoretical model reaching this result, see 
Natarajan Balasubramanian, et al, Locked In? The Enforceability of Covenants Not to 
Compete and the Careers of High-Tech Workers *9–11 (Ross School of Business Working 
Paper No 1339, Jan 2017), archived at https://perma.cc/3SBZ-UJD8. It should be noted, 
however, that available evidence is generally inconsistent with this model. The most com-
prehensive empirical study finds that employees who sign noncompetes earn 6.6 percent 
more on average than employees who do not sign noncompetes (controlling for various 
other factors), although this wage differential is limited to employees who are presented 
with a noncompete prior to accepting a job offer. See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Non-
competes in the U.S. Labor Force at *28 (cited in note 11). 
974 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:953 
Second, when the costs of negotiating and executing the 
waiver of a noncompete are sufficiently great so as to impede em-
ployee turnover, this may generate long-term dynamic efficiency 
losses to the extent that slowing down employee turnover im-
pedes the transmission of intellectual capital that benefits the in-
dustry as a whole. These dynamic efficiency costs present a po-
tential collective action problem because these costs may not be 
fully internalized by an individual firm in a given industry when 
that firm makes a decision whether to adopt and enforce a non-
compete for a particular employee. 
5. Evaluation. 
The welfare effects of noncompete agreements can now be 
summarized. On the one hand, noncompetes support employers’ 
incentives to invest in employees’ human capital and R&D pro-
jects that would otherwise be subject to expropriation by depart-
ing employees. On the other hand, noncompetes raise the trans-
action costs involved in the circulation of human capital, which 
may impede the innovation process in the industry as a whole. 
Given these offsetting effects, earlier scholars generally concluded 
that economic analysis does not support a definitive position 
against or in favor of enforcing noncompetes in all circum-
stances.69 If noncompetes enable firms to secure gains from train-
ing and R&D investments, then barring noncompetes may reduce 
the common pool of technological knowledge that is available for 
circulation through employee movement. A ban on noncompetes 
would yield a net social gain over time only if the disincentive 
effects arising from uncompensated human capital transfers were 
exceeded by the agglomeration economies and other benefits as-
sociated with the unimpeded circulation of human capital. With-
out empirical evidence in any particular case, this analytical 
framework is agnostic in general with respect to the net long-term 
efficiency of those restraints. However, it does recognize a mean-
ingful range of circumstances in which enforcing noncompetes 
could make firms and employees better off by resolving the cred-






 69 See note 56 and accompanying text. 
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C. The New View: Restricting Labor Mobility is Bad for 
Innovation 
The traditional approach is intellectually modest in taking 
the view that enforcing noncompetes may have a net positive ef-
fect on innovation. By contrast, the new view on noncompetes 
tends to take the bolder view that enforcing noncompetes usually, 
if not always, discourages innovation by slowing down the flow of 
intellectual capital and impeding the agglomeration economies 
and similar benefits that fuel the innovation process. This new 
view consists of a two-part logical sequence. In step one, it claims 
that barring noncompetes accelerates employee movement. 
Stated precisely, this assertion reflects the assumption that non-
competes increase the transaction costs of human capital move-
ments. In step two, the new view makes the stronger assertion 
that increased circulation of R&D personnel promotes innovation 
by facilitating knowledge spillovers that benefit the industry as a 
whole. The normative implication is simple and clear: the law 
should decline to enforce noncompetes in all circumstances. 
1. Background: Saxenian and Gilson. 
The new view relies on the work of AnnaLee Saxenian, a so-
ciologist, and Ronald Gilson, a law professor, both of whom apply 
the Marshallian concept of agglomeration economies to interpret 
a key episode in the history of US technology markets. Both 
Saxenian and Gilson contrasted Silicon Valley with Boston’s 
Route 128 area to argue that institutional mechanisms—cultural 
norms and organizational forms in Saxenian’s analysis70 and a le-
gal ban on noncompetes in Gilson’s analysis71—that promote em-
ployee mobility can promote innovation by facilitating the flow of 
intellectual capital among competitors. Both authors identify 
these institutional differences as key factors in accounting for Sil-
icon Valley’s rise over Route 128 as the country’s leading innova-
tion center starting in the late 1980s. 
More specifically, Gilson argued that California’s ban on non-
competes represented a solution to a collective-action problem. 
While no firm individually would agree not to adopt a noncompete 
and thereby expose its human and intellectual capital to compet-
itors, it may be in all firms’ collective long-term interest to refrain 
from adopting noncompetes and thereby enjoy the resulting flow 
 
 70 See Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 1–9, 29–30, 59–60 (cited in note 8). 
 71 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 578–79, 602–09 (cited in note 8). 
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of knowledge spillovers. 72  By implication, Massachusetts firms 
were caught in a collectively irrational equilibrium in which all 
firms imposed noncompetes and could not enjoy the collective 
gains that would result from a more fluid circulation of human 
capital. Gilson cautioned that this explanation may be specific to 
Silicon Valley and would not necessarily generalize to other con-
texts.73 Nonetheless, a significant body of commentary by legal 
scholars and economists has endorsed this proposition in stronger 
formulations and has made largely unqualified policy assertions 
that enforcing noncompetes and other restraints on employee mo-
bility depresses innovation.74 For these scholars, California’s ap-
proach should be the rule, not the exception. 
2. An initial critique. 
The new view on noncompetes reflects a coherent and 
straightforward application of the standard collective-action 
problem in economic analysis. However, it is incomplete in signif-
icant respects. Specifically, the new view makes little effort to ad-
dress the efficiency losses inherent to a legal regime in which a 
voluntary restraint on the mobility of talent is removed from the 
table of contracting options. Earlier analysis of noncompetes had 
recognized that an efficiency loss would arise in any circumstance 
in which an employee could not credibly commit against expropri-
ating the employer’s human capital investment and R&D assets. 
The employer would respond by distorting the terms of employ-
ment to limit its training investments or the employees’ exposure 
to R&D assets or by declining to enter into an employment rela-
tionship at all. 
 
 72 See id at 596. 
 73 See id at 629. 
 74 See Lobel, Talent Wants to Be Free at 67–72 (cited in note 9) (arguing that empir-
ical evidence supports California’s “zero tolerance” policy for noncompetes); Lobel, Com-
panies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in note 19) (same); Benkler, 13 Ann 
Rev L & Soc Sci at 235 (cited in note 13) (arguing that empirical evidence suggests that 
contractual and other legal constraints on employee mobility undermine innovation); 
Hyde, 33 Regulation at 10–11 (cited in note 13) (arguing that balance of evidence supports 
adopting California’s policy of zero enforcement toward noncompetes); Moffat, 54 Ariz L 
Rev at 965 (cited in note 9) (advocating for a zero-enforcement policy toward noncompetes); 
Moffat, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev at 918–21 (cited in note 9) (same). 
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A recent economic model formulated by Professor James 
Rauch shows that this loss can extend well beyond just one em-
ployment transaction.75 Consider a sequence of transactions con-
sisting of (i) an initial employment transaction involving a parent 
firm and an individual employee, followed by (ii) a series of spin-
off transactions involving employees who depart from the parent 
firm to form or join a spin-off firm, and then depart from the spin-
off to form a new entity, and so forth. Noncompetes may raise the 
transaction costs relating to, and even frustrate, some portion, or 
even all, of the potential spin-off transactions. That is the focus of 
the “talent wants to be free” literature. However, it is important 
not to ignore the possibility that the inability to enforce a non-
compete may preclude the initial hire by restoring the credible 
commitment problem, in which case the subsequent stream of 
spin-off transactions could be stunted or blocked entirely.76 More-
over, if noncompetes are not enforceable, even a certain portion of 
the set of spin-offs may face the same credible commitment di-
lemma and may be wholly precluded or move forward under dis-
torted terms.77 If that is the case, then compared to a regime in 
which noncompetes are enforced, talent may be freer but it could 
well be worse off. 
3. The empirical challenge. 
As a theoretical matter, the new view on noncompetes, and 
the accompanying policy arguments in favor of a total or near-
total ban, provide no reason to arbitrarily value the social costs 
attributable to noncompetes—primarily, potentially reduced cir-
culation of intellectual capital (the focus of Marshall’s analysis)—
more heavily than the social gains—primarily, potentially in-
creased investment in employee training and R&D (the focus of 
Becker’s analysis). Given this uncertainty, we can only make pro-
gress toward assessing the relative intellectual strength of the 
new view based on empirical inquiry. Commentary by scholars 
and policymakers in favor of a ban on noncompetes often asserts 
that empirical data shows that noncompetes depress innovation.78 
 
 75 See James Rauch, Dynastic Entrepreneurship, Entry, and Non-Compete Enforce-
ment *1–2, 19 (National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 21067, Apr 
2015), archived at https://perma.cc/TP8G-3372. 
 76 See id at *1–2, 9–11 (showing formally that the efficiency of noncompetes depends 
in part on a trade-off between these two countervailing effects on the parent firm and spin-
off firms). 
 77 See id at *10.  
 78 See note 36. 
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In the next Part, we look closely at that body of evidence, finding 
that nearly all of these studies are badly flawed and, even so, com-
mon characterizations of their findings often dramatically over-
state the policy conclusions that the data can reasonably support. 
II.  THE EVIDENCE AGAINST NONCOMPETES: A CLOSE LOOK 
In this Part, we undertake the most comprehensive examina-
tion to date of the two principal bodies of empirical evidence that 
are commonly referenced in support of the “talent wants to be 
free” school of thought. First, we review in detail the explanation 
provided by Saxenian and in particular, Gilson, to account for Sil-
icon Valley’s dramatic rise over Route 128 as the world’s leading 
innovation center. We find significant reason to doubt that this 
fundamental shift in economic trajectories can be traced back to 
relatively fine differences in the enforceability of noncompetes be-
tween California and Massachusetts. Second, we review some of 
the most highly cited empirical studies that purport to show a 
three-step causal link between bans on noncompetes, increased 
employee turnover, and increased innovation. This exercise iden-
tifies important methodological and other limitations that cast se-
rious doubt on the policy positions for which those studies have 
been cited. 
A. Reasons to Doubt the Standard Account of the Rise of 
Silicon Valley 
As of the mid-1970s, Silicon Valley and Route 128 were both 
viewed as key centers for innovation in the electronics industry, 
but with different strengths.79 Silicon Valley excelled in semicon-
ductor chips while Route 128 excelled in minicomputers, a cate-
gory situated between the supercomputer (or mainframe) seg-
ment dominated by IBM and the nascent “microcomputer” (in 
today’s terms, PC) segment pioneered by Apple.80 Starting in the 
 
 79 See Willem Hulsink, Dick Manuel, and Harry Bouwman, Clustering in ICT, in 
Willem Hulsink and Hans Dons, eds, Pathways to High-Tech Valleys and Research Trian-
gles: Innovative Entrepreneurship, Knowledge Transfer and Cluster Formation in Europe 
and the United States 53, 53–55 (Springer 2008) (stating that Route 128 predated the Sil-
icon Valley technology cluster, which started growing in the 1950s and 1960s and overtook 
Route 128 in the 1970s); Nancy S. Dorfman, Route 128: The Development of a Regional 
High Technology Economy, 12 Rsrch Pol 299, 300, 313 (1983) (observing that, as of the 
late 1970s, the Boston area and Silicon Valley had the same number of high-tech employ-
ees while the greater San Francisco Bay Area had “about 30 percent more”). 
 80 See Hulsink, Manuel, and Bouwman, Clustering in ICT at 59 (cited in note 79) 
(describing how the “minicomputer manufacturers of Route 128 quickly lost ground to the 
manufacturers of the fast-emerging PCs and workstations in Silicon Valley”). 
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early 1980s, Silicon Valley overtook Route 128 and secured its 
place as the world’s preeminent information technology center. 
Saxenian attributes the ascendance of Silicon Valley, and the de-
cline of Route 128, to differences in industrial organization and 
cultural norms.81 The West Coast environment was characterized 
by a constant flow of technical personnel among a network of 
loosely connected firms, which spawned spin-offs that accelerated 
the innovation process. This structure was supported by industry 
norms that promoted information sharing and employee mobility. 
By contrast, the East Coast environment was characterized 
by a small number of vertically integrated firms and exhibited 
little employee turnover. This structure was purportedly sup-
ported by industry norms that promoted loyalty to a single em-
ployer and discouraged information sharing. Building on 
Saxenian’s narrative, Gilson argued that the free flow of human 
capital could be attributed in part to California’s refusal to en-
force noncompetes, while Massachusetts’s insistence on enforcing 
noncompetes may have stagnated the flow of human capital, re-
sulting in a slowdown in innovation.82 Put together, Saxenian and 
Gilson’s work identifies certain informal and formal institutional 
characteristics that purportedly set Route 128 on a path to de-
cline, while sending Silicon Valley on an upward trajectory. 
Both Saxenian’s and Gilson’s accounts of the rise of Silicon 
Valley and decline of Route 128 have been widely adopted in the 
academic literature.83 In the discussion below, we identify several 
considerations that cast doubt on this now-standard account. 
These include: (i) there were several exceptions (and other legal 
causes of action) that substantially qualified California’s “ban” on 
noncompetes during this period; (ii) firms could substantially 
mimic the effect of a noncompete through compensation and other 
mechanisms; (iii) it is not clear that differences in Massachusetts 
law on noncompetes and trade secrets resulted in substantial dif-
ferences in employee mobility as a practical matter; (iv) there are 
fundamental technological and economic factors that more plau-
sibly account for Silicon Valley’s ascendance; and (v) Route 128 
has continued to exhibit robust innovative performance. 
 
 81 See Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 1–9 (cited in note 8).  
 82 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 602–09 (cited in note 8). 
 83 As of February 19, 2020, Google Scholar estimates that Saxenian’s leading contri-
bution in the area, the book-length Regional Advantage, has been cited more than 13,200 
times and Gilson’s 1999 NYU article on Silicon Valley and Route 128 has been cited more 
than 900 times. See also note 9 (listing several scholarly publications that refer to and rely 
on Saxenian’s or Gilson’s work). 
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1. Did California courts really never enforce noncompetes? 
Scholars have not adequately questioned whether California 
courts in actuality declined to enforce noncompetes during the pe-
riod in which Silicon Valley overtook Route 128. That seems to be 
the case based on the California statute, which declares void 
“every contract by which anyone is restrained from engaging in a 
lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind.”84 Given that 
blanket prohibition, however, it is curious that California firms 
often insert noncompete clauses in executive employment agree-
ments. Two studies that focus on adoption rates of noncompetes 
in executive employment agreements at large publicly traded 
firms find these clauses in 58–62 percent of agreements with 
firms headquartered in California, as compared to rates of 70–
84 percent at the same types of firms headquartered in other 
states (which generally enforce noncompetes subject to the rea-
sonableness standard).85 Even more surprisingly, a broader study 
involving all types of employees finds that the incidence of non-
competes in California (19 percent) is approximately the same as 
observed in states that enforce noncompetes.86 
This discrepancy between law and practice might be at-
tributed to the possibility that technical personnel are unaware 
 
 84 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16600. 
 85 Specifically, from a sample of 874 CEO employment contracts at S&P 1500 firms 
executed during 1996–2010, Norman Bishara, Kenneth Martin, and Randall Thomas 
found that California firms include noncompetes at a rate of 62 percent (compared to 
84 percent for firms in other states). See Norman D. Bishara, Kenneth J. Martin, and 
Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of Noncompetition Clauses and Other Restric-
tive Postemployment Covenants, 68 Vand L Rev 1, 34 (2015). Garmaise finds that, in a 
sample of large, publicly traded firms, approximately 70 percent of firms used noncom-
petes, including 58 percent of California-based firms. Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396 
(cited in note 63). Garmaise does not specifically identify the rate of noncompete adoption 
among firms located in the forty-eight enforcing states, although it would be expected that 
that rate would be somewhat higher than the 70 percent rate reported for the full sample 
of all firms in all states. See id. 
 86 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *19 (cited 
in note 11). We note two additional points concerning the methodology and findings of the 
Starr, Prescott, and Bishara study. On methodology, we note that the paper carefully dis-
tinguishes in its survey methodology between noncompetes and other related provisions 
such as nondisclosure or nonsolicitation covenants. This is important because it provides 
confidence that the findings relate specifically to noncompetes rather than other related 
provisions in employment agreements. See id at *3–4. On substance, we note that the 
authors do not find any meaningful change in the incidence of noncompetes in comparing 
“multi-unit” firms, which have operations in California and other states, and “single-unit” 
firms, which operate only in California. See id at *19. This is a noteworthy result because 
it might have been expected that large national firms in particular might include noncom-
pete clauses as a “default” provision in their employment agreements since they  
mostly operate in states that uphold noncompetes under the common-law reasonableness 
standard. 
2020] The Case for Noncompetes 981 
of California law and firms include a noncompete clause as an in 
terrorem device to be used against departing employees. That ex-
planation assumes that these personnel do not consult legal advi-
sors, particularly a potential new employer’s legal counsel, or re-
view publicly available information about a basic point of law. 
Alternatively, one might argue that, because knowledgeable em-
ployees understand that noncompetes are generally not enforcea-
ble in California, it is not worth the transaction costs of negotiat-
ing with an employer to remove these clauses. At a minimum,  
it is worth inquiring whether the standard understanding of  
California law is entirely precise during the period in which  
Silicon Valley overtook Route 128. 
In fact, it is not. Writing in 1989, a treatise on trade secrets 
law observed: “Despite the clear language of” California’s statute, 
“the California courts do not regard all covenants not to compete 
. . . invalid per se.” 87  Specifically, there were at least five im-
portant circumstances in which California employers could have 
had some expectation of being able to enforce a noncompete dur-
ing the period in which Silicon Valley overtook Route 128. While 
it remains the case that California courts did not generally en-
force noncompetes against individuals during this period, it is in-
correct to assume that a sufficiently motivated employer would 
never rationally invest resources in enforcing (and therefore could 
never credibly threaten to seek) enforcement of a noncompete 
against a departing employee. 
 a) Narrow restraints.  In 1987, the Ninth Circuit held that 
noncompetes were enforceable under California law if the non-
compete narrowly restrained postemployment opportunities, as 
distinguished from a general restraint that barred entry into an 
entire profession.88 From the 1970s through the 2000s, litigants 
that pursued variants of the narrow restraint exception achieved 
 
 87 See Melvin F. Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 13.01[2] (1989). 
 88 Campbell v Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 817 F2d 499, 
502 (9th Cir 1987) (citing California law for the proposition that the statutory ban on non-
competes precludes only contractual restraints on entering an “entire business, trade or 
profession,” as distinguished from “only a small or limited part of the business, trade or 
profession”), quoting Boughton v Socony Mobil Oil Co, 231 Cal App 2d 188, 192 (1964). 
The court purported to apply state law precedent, as set forth in Boughton, 231 Cal App 
2d at 192, which in turn relied on King v Gerold, 240 P2d 710 (Cal App 1952). An earlier 
Ninth Circuit decision had upheld a clause in a collective bargaining agreement involving 
the partial forfeiture of certain pension and profit-sharing benefits in the event a retired 
employee took employment with another firm in the same industry. The court’s decision 
relied on the view that California law does not prohibit an alleged restraint on employee 
mobility that is “limited in nature and furthers sound public policies.” See Smith v CMTA-
IAM Pension Trust, 654 F2d 650, 660 (9th Cir 1981). 
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mixed results, sometimes achieving success in (mostly) federal 
courts but usually not faring well in California state courts.89 In 
1997 and 1999, the Ninth Circuit again applied the exception to 
uphold a noncompete covenant.90 Only in 2008, well after Silicon 
Valley had established its place as the world’s technology center, 
did the California Supreme Court resolve this uncertainty by re-
jecting the narrow restraint exception.91 
 b) Sale of a business.  Based on a statutory exception,92 
both federal and state courts typically enforced (and continue to 
enforce) noncompetes executed in connection with the sale of a 
business. The exception applies to noncompetes entered into by 
majority target shareholders and possibly other target employees 
with smaller equity interests.93 This exception provides some of 
the legal logic behind the now-popular “acqui-hire” transactional 
structure, in which a large firm acquires a start-up firm primarily 
for purposes of retaining the services of its founders and senior 
managerial and technical personnel. Without a commitment from 
key personnel that they will remain with or at least not compete 
with the acquirer for some reasonable period of time, the transac-
tion is not viable. This partially explains why exempting business 
 
 89 For cases recognizing the exception, see Centeno v Roseville Community Hospital, 
107 Cal App 3d 62, 68–71 (1979); Latona v Aetna US Healthcare Inc, 82 F Supp 2d 1089, 
1094 (CD Cal 1999); Cin-Med Associates, Inc v Hemocue, Inc, 2001 WL 1117562, *3–4 (CD 
Cal). In Scott v Snelling & Snelling, Inc, 732 F Supp 1034, 1042–43 (ND Cal 1990), the 
court recognized that “California courts may, in some circumstances apply a ‘rule of rea-
son’ to only partial restrictions on competition” but declined to apply it in the case of a 
noncompete that imposed postemployment geographic and temporal restrictions. For 
cases rejecting the exception, see Golden State Linen Service, Inc v Vidalin, 69 Cal App 3d 
1, 13 (1977); Liberty Mutual Insurance Co v Arthur J. Gallagher & Co, 1994 WL 715613, 
*3 (ND Cal); Arrowhead Financial Group, Inc v Welty, 2002 WL 31661269, *6–7 (Cal App); 
Jan Marini Skin Research, Inc v Allure Cosmetic USA, Inc, 2007 WL 1508686, *16 (Cal 
App); Thompson v Impaxx, Inc, 113 Cal App 4th 1425, 1430–31 (2003). 
 90 General Commercial Packaging, Inc v TPS Package Engineering, Inc, 126 F3d 
1131, 1132–33 (9th Cir 1997) (enforcing a one-year noncompete between a contractor and 
subcontractor with respect to the contractor’s clients); International Business Machines 
Corp v Bajorek, 191 F3d 1033, 1040–41 (9th Cir 1999) (holding that noncompete obligation 
in stock option agreement did not violate the California statutory ban on noncompetes). 
 91 Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P3d 285, 293 (Cal 2008). 
 92 Cal Bus & Prof Code § 16601. 
 93 It is not clear how large that equity interest must be. Rulings have been mixed. 
See Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Insurance Services of Orange County, Inc v Robb, 33 Cal App 
4th 1812, 1816, 1822–25 (1995) (in connection with the merger of an insurance company, 
upholding a noncompete with an employee of the merged company, who had held a 35 per-
cent ownership interest in the merged company, on ground that a sufficient transfer of 
goodwill had taken place); Vacco Industries, Inc v Van Den Berg, 5 Cal App 4th 34, 48–49 
(1992) (finding that a 3 percent interest, which was the ninth largest  
shareholder interest, in conjunction with an officer position, constituted a substantial 
shareholder). 
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acquisitions from noncompete enforcement limitations, which is 
the rule even in California, is likely to be, and is widely viewed 
as, efficient. 
 c) Protection of trade secrets.  Since a California Supreme 
Court decision in 1958,94 California law has recognized that the 
statutory bar against noncompetes does not extend to certain 
postemployment restrictions—most typically, nondisclosure and 
nonsolicitation covenants—that are enforced for the purpose of 
protecting an employer’s trade secrets or confidential infor-
mation.95 Since the 1980s, California courts have periodically ap-
plied the trade secret exception to enforce nonsolicitation and 
nondisclosure obligations (and, in one recent case, even a noncom-
pete clause “construed to bar only the use of confidential source 
code, software, or techniques”96) that were found to be narrowly 
tailored to protect a trade secret.97 
 
 94 Gordon v Landau, 321 P2d 456, 459 (Cal 1958) (upholding a nonsolicitation clause 
because “it did not prevent defendant from” engaging in the same or similar business as 
his former employer). 
 95 See Jager, Trade Secrets Law § 13:4 at 13-13 (cited in note 87) (observing that 
California courts sometimes enforce noncompetes to protect trade secrets or other confi-
dential information). For cases stating this principle, see Muggill v Reuben H. Donnelley 
Corp, 398 P2d 147, 149 (Cal 1965) (stating that § 16600 invalidates noncompete provisions 
“unless they are necessary to protect the employer’s trade secrets”); Gordon Termite  
Control v Terrones, 84 Cal App 3d 176, 178 (1978) (stating that § 16600 “has been con-
strued by the Supreme Court as invalidating contracts not to compete, except where their 
enforcement is necessary to protect the trade secrets of an employer”); Loral Corp v Moyes, 
174 Cal App 3d 268, 276 (1985) (stating that § 16600 “does not invalidate an employee’s 
agreement not to disclose his former employer’s . . . trade secrets”); Moss Adams Co v  
Shilling, 179 Cal App 3d 124, 130 (1986); American Paper & Packaging Products, Inc v 
Kirgan, 183 Cal App 3d 1318, 1322 (1986) (Section 16600 invalidates noncompetes “unless 
their enforcement is necessary to protect an employer’s confidential information or trade 
secrets”); Scott, 732 F Supp at 1043 (recognizing a judicially created exception to § 16600 
to the extent necessary to protect trade secrets). 
 96 Richmond Technologies, Inc v Aumtech Business Solutions, 2011 WL 2607158, 
*18–19 (ND Cal) (finding the nonsolicitation clause and noninterference clauses “are likely 
to be found unenforceable” because they “are more broadly drafted than necessary to pro-
tect . . . trade secrets,” but a noncompete clause and related clause barring the use of con-
fidential information are “likely enforceable as necessary to protect . . . trade secrets”). 
 97 See Hollingsworth Solderless Terminal Co v Turley, 622 F2d 1324, 1338 (9th Cir 
1980) (vacating and remanding the lower court’s invalidation of a postemployment cove-
nants involving nondisclosure of customer lists and nonsolicitation of a former employer’s 
customers); John F. Matull & Associates, Inc v Cloutier, 194 Cal App 3d 1049, 1054–55 
(1987) (upholding a nonsolicitation obligation); Morlife, Inc v Perry, 56 Cal App 4th 1514 
(1997) (affirming a nonsolicitation covenant against former employees); Asset Marketing 
Systems, Inc v Gagnon, 542 F3d 748, 758 (9th Cir 2008) (observing that “non-competition 
agreements are unenforceable [under California law] unless necessary to protect an em-
ployer’s trade secret”); Lindzy v Q-Railing USA Co, 2013 WL 4437164, *6 (Cal App) (find-
ing a nondisclosure clause and a nonsolicitation clause valid). 
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In 2008, the Supreme Court of California specifically declined 
to affirm or reject the trade secret exception.98 A recent federal 
court opinion summarizes the current state of California law on 
this point: “Although California courts have consistently ‘con-
demned’ agreements that place restraints on the pursuit of a busi-
ness or profession . . . ‘an equally lengthy line of cases has con-
sistently held former employees may not misappropriate the 
former employer’s trade secrets to unfairly compete with the for-
mer employer.’”99 Simply put: Section 16600 does not preclude an 
employer from preventing a departing employee via injunctive re-
lief from joining a new employer by enforcing nondisclosure, non-
solicitation, or other similar postemployment obligations when 
doing so promotes the employer’s interest in protecting its trade 
secrets. 
 d) ERISA.  A California employer can avoid the statutory 
ban on noncompetes by embedding the noncompete in a deferred 
compensation or severance pay arrangement governed by the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974100 (ERISA). These 
clauses operate as a forfeiture mechanism that conditions entitle-
ment to certain benefits under the plan upon compliance with the 
noncompete obligation. As observed in practitioner commentary, 
this exception typically arises in litigation concerning deferred 
benefit plans for highly compensated executives.101 In 1981 and 
1987, the Ninth Circuit held that ERISA preempts state law, spe-
cifically including noncompete restrictions. 102  California state 
courts have adopted the same position.103 This enforcement strat-
egy is limited only by the ERISA requirement that a noncompete 
 
 98 Edwards, 189 P3d at 289 n 4. 
 99 Richmond Technologies, 2011 WL 2607158 at *18 (internal brackets omitted), cit-
ing Edwards, 189 P3d at 290–91 and Retirement Group v Galante, 176 Cal App 4th 1226, 
1237 (2009). 
 100 Pub L No 93-406, 88 Stat 829, codified as amended in various sections of Title 26 
and Title 29. 
 101 See Amy L. Blaisdell and Wendy S. Menghini, Pulling Tricks Out of a Top Hat: 
Preemption of Non-Compete Laws Applicable to “Top Hat” Plans *1 (DRI: The Voice of the 
Defense Bar, Dec 29, 2010), archived at https://perma.cc/4SYD-PEAV. 
 102 See Clark v Lauren Young Tire Center Profit Sharing Trust, 816 F2d 480, 481 (9th 
Cir 1987) (involving a noncompete under Oregon law); Lojek v Thomas, 716 F2d 675, 678, 
679–80 (9th Cir 1983) (involving a noncompete under Idaho law). Gilson cites a 1965  
California Supreme Court decision that invalidated this type of forfeiture provision in a 
retirement plan. See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 607 n 100 (cited in note 8), citing Muggill, 
398 P2d at 149. However, Muggill would not appear to survive the Ninth Circuit’s inter-
pretation of ERISA, which was enacted in 1974. 
 103 See, for example, Weinfurther v Source Services Corp Employees Profit Sharing 
Plan and Trust, 759 F Supp 599, 602 (ND Cal 1991). 
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forfeiture clause cannot be applied to deprive the employee of ben-
efits accrued after ten years of service.104 
 e) Choice-of-forum clauses.  California courts will not en-
force a noncompete entered into under the law of another state 
that generally enforces noncompetes. However, prior to 2017, if 
an employer and former employee were subject to the jurisdiction 
of an out-of-state court that enforces noncompetes, and the deci-
sion was final in that state before any decision in a parallel  
California action, then a noncompete agreement was typically en-
forceable within California. In general, the two key factors at is-
sue in such situations were whether (1) the agreement selected 
another state’s courts as the forum for disputes; and (2) whether 
the employee is now a California resident employed by a  
California employer. Although California courts will generally 
not enforce an out-of-state choice-of-law clause, especially if the 
defendant-employee is a California resident employed by a  
California firm,105 prior to 2017, they often respected an out-of-
state choice-of-forum clause, even if the other state potentially 
applied its own law.106 In practice, this meant that California em-
ployees employed by a firm with corporate headquarters out of 
state—or out-of-state employees moving to California—could be 
subject to enforceable noncompete restrictions under a properly 
drafted agreement prior to 2017.107 
 
 104 29 USC § 1053(a)(2)(A). 
 105 See Application Group, Inc v Hunter Group, Inc, 61 Cal App 4th 881, 894–905 (1998). 
 106 Compare Davis v Advanced Care Technologies, Inc, 2007 WL 2288298, *4–9 (ED 
Cal) (finding California law applicable to the case despite a Connecticut choice-of-law pro-
vision because California had a materially greater interest; the employee was a California 
resident, the former employer was based in Connecticut, and the new employer was a 
California-based employer), with Universal Operations Risk Management, LLC v Global 
Rescue LLC, 2012 WL 2792444, *6–7 (ND Cal) (enforcing a forum selection clause despite 
the strong possibility that the forum state would uphold the covenant not to compete). 
 107 See, for example, Meyer v Howmedica Osteonics Corp, 2015 WL 728631, *11–12 
(SD Cal) (ordering a transfer of forum to New Jersey consistent with the forum selection 
clause, when there was also a choice of law provision for New Jersey law), citing Swenson 
v T–Mobile USA, Inc, 415 F Supp 2d 1101 (SD Cal 2006) (dismissing a California declara-
tory relief action in the presence of forum selection clause when the previous action was 
pending out-of-state); Universal Operations Risk Management, LLC, 2012 WL 2792444 at 
*6–7; Advanced Bionics Corp v Medtronic, Inc, 59 P3d 231, 232–34 (Cal 2002) (vacating a 
lower court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order that had blocked the former em-
ployer from pursuing a noncompete action it had filed out of state); Biosense Webster, Inc 
v Superior Court, 135 Cal App 4th 827, 830 (2006) (extending the holding of Advanced 
Bionics to circumstances in which no previous action had been filed out of state); Google, 
Inc v Microsoft Corp, 415 F Supp 2d 1018, 1021–22, 1026 (ND Cal 2005) (staying noncom-
pete proceedings pending those in Washington in order to prevent forum shopping). But 
see Manchester v Arista Records, Inc, 1981 US Dist LEXIS 18642, *13–17 (CD Cal) (up-
holding a choice-of-forum clause in a case involving Cal Labor Code § 2855, which limits 
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2. Substitutes for noncompetes. 
In addition to the five exceptions described above, California 
firms could elect (and still can elect) from a large menu of substi-
tute legal and economic instruments to deter employee mobility. 
To illustrate these alternatives concretely, we can return to the 
case involving the former Google engineer who took a new posi-
tion with Uber. As noted previously, the employee had been in-
volved in developing Google’s autonomous driving technologies.108 
Under California law, Google would appear to be powerless to pre-
vent the employee from working for Uber. Even assuming that 
Google cannot wield a noncompete covenant, however, Google has 
several other credible legal threats at its disposal. Given the ex-
istence of these additional legal instruments, any marginal pre-
clusive effect that can be reasonably attributed to noncompetes 
appears to be significantly attenuated, and would need to at least 
be accounted for in any empirical analysis comparing the differ-
ential effects of noncompetes on innovation between California 
and out-of-state firms. 
 a) Patents.  A firm may use patents to protect against 
knowledge leakage resulting from employee movement. Although 
a patent may not cover tacit knowledge per se, it may cover a 
product or method incorporating that tacit knowledge. Assuming 
the firm can bear the anticipated enforcement costs, the expropri-
ation risk posed by a departing employee would then be limited 
to informational assets that fall outside the firm’s patent portfo-
lio. A patenting strategy makes any departing employee less at-
tractive to competitors, which implies that the employee will re-
ceive fewer or lower offers from other firms and is less likely to 
leave the current employer. Hence, even in a jurisdiction that is 
hostile to noncompetes, there may be significant patent-based ob-
stacles that discourage employee movement. Consistent with 
these expectations, a 2009 empirical study found a deterrent ef-
fect on labor mobility in the US semiconductor industry propor-
tional to a firm’s propensity to bring patent infringement suits.109 
Another study finds that, while the likelihood of an acquisition 
increases when a target’s employees are subject to noncompetes, 
that effect weakens in the case of targets that hold strong patent 
 
personal service employment contracts to a term of seven years, because the court deter-
mined that § 2855 did not apply to the contracts at issue). 
 108 See notes 1 and 4. 
 109 See Rajshree Agarwal, Martin Ganco, and Rosemarie H. Ziedonis, Reputations for 
Toughness in Patent Enforcement: Implications for Knowledge Spillovers via Inventor Mo-
bility, 30 Strategic Mgmt J 1349, 1366–67 (2009). 
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portfolios, suggesting that patents substitute in part for noncom-
petes as a device for protecting against knowledge leakage after 
consummation of the acquisition.110 
 b) Breach of contract.  If the employee had signed a non-
disclosure agreement (NDA) and then took a position with a com-
peting enterprise, Google could potentially bring (or threaten to 
bring) a breach of contract claim against the employee. As noted 
earlier, there is no plausible legal challenge under § 16600 to the 
enforcement of an NDA so long as it is sufficiently tailored to pro-
mote the employer’s interest in protecting its trade secrets.111 The 
credibility of Google’s threat to sue to enforce an NDA would de-
pend on the negotiated scope of the definition of “confidential in-
formation” in the NDA and the ease with which Google could 
demonstrate that the employee had actually breached the NDA’s 
confidentiality provisions at his or her new position. In certain 
jurisdictions, courts are willing to enforce NDAs that encompass 
information that would not otherwise qualify as a trade secret;112 
in other jurisdictions (including California), Google may be re-
quired to show that enforcement of the NDA targets only nonpub-
lic information that would be protected under trade secret law.113 
Alternatively, Google could bring (or threaten to bring) a 
breach-of-contract claim if it had entered into a long-term employ-
ment contract or a shorter-term employment contract with peri-
odic renewal at the employer’s option. (The former option may be 
unattractive to both employers and employees because it locks 
each party into a potentially unwanted long-term commitment 
that is difficult to mitigate even through the most carefully 
 
 110 See Kenneth A. Younge, Tony W. Tong, and Lee Fleming, How Anticipated Em-
ployee Mobility Affects Acquisition Likelihood: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 36 
Strategic Mgmt J 686, 691–92 (2015). 
 111 See Part II.A.1.c. 
 112 See Richard F. Dole Jr, The Contract Exception to the Uniform Trade Secrets Act 
and Its Implications for the Federal Defend Trade Secrets Act, 34 Santa Clara High Tech 
L J 362, 377 n 80 (2018) (observing that courts in some jurisdictions will enforce NDAs 
that encompass information that would not qualify as a trade secret, subject to a reason-
ableness standard); Bishara, Martin, and Thomas, 68 Vand L Rev at 21–23 (cited in note 
85) (stating that courts will sometimes enforce an NDA that applies to information that 
might not otherwise be protected under trade secret law, so long as the NDA is limited in 
time). 
 113 See, for example, Richmond Technologies, 2011 WL 2607158 at *19 (noting that a 
“clause prohibiting use of confidential information is likely enforceable to the extent that 
the claimed information is protectable as a trade secret”). On this point with respect to 
California law in particular, see Charles T. Graves, Nonpublic Information and California 
Tort Law: A Proposal for Harmonizing California’s Employee Mobility and Intellectual 
Property Regimes Under the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 2006 UCLA J L & Tech 1, 37–43. 
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crafted provisions for early separation under certain circum-
stances.) In yet another variation, Google could bring a tortious 
interference with contract claim against Uber, on the ground that 
Uber was aware of the long-term contract to which the departing 
engineer was then bound.114 
 c) Invention assignment agreements.  In the technology in-
dustries, it is typical for employees to enter into invention assign-
ment agreements, under which an employee agrees in advance 
that all “inventions” (as defined in the governing agreement) de-
veloped by the employee during the course of his or her employ-
ment are deemed to belong to the employer.115 Under such an 
agreement, Google could bring a claim against the departing em-
ployee if the employee is using an “invention” that the employee 
made while employed by Google. As long as Google’s claim could 
at least survive a motion to dismiss, it could credibly threaten  
to impose significant discovery and other litigation costs on the 
employee-defendant (or, more typically, the new employer who 
may have agreed to indemnify the employee-defendant). In a 
widely followed litigation over ownership of the “Bratz” line of 
dolls, involving Mattel (as plaintiff), Mattel’s former employee (as 
codefendant), and a smaller toy manufacturer (as codefendant), 
an invention assignment agreement provided the basis for several 
years of protracted litigation that burdened the defendant with 
substantial legal fees.116 
Alternatively, Google and its former employee may have en-
tered into an invention assignment agreement with a “trailer” 
clause, which would grant Google ownership over any inventions 
that the former employee developed within a certain amount of 
time following termination.117 That too may limit the employee’s 
attractiveness to any potential outside employer. The doctrine of 
assignor estoppel can have a similar effect in a departing em-
ployee scenario. Under that doctrine, some courts have held that 
 
 114 In the actual litigation between Google and Uber, this would not have been a fea-
sible claim because Google and the departing employee were apparently not parties to a 
long-term contract. 
 115 See Victoria Lee and Mark Lehberg, Employee Proprietary Information and Inven-
tions Assignment Agreements: What They Do, and What Could Happen Without Them 
(DLA Piper, 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/J5QD-3FXX. 
 116 See Mattel, Inc v MGA Entertainment, Inc, 616 F3d 904, 909 (9th Cir 2010) (ob-
serving that Mattel’s ownership interest in the Bratz line of dolls “turns on the interpre-
tation of Bryant’s [the former employee’s] 1999 employment agreement,” which included 
an invention assignment clause). For a summary of the litigation, see Barbie and Bratz: 
The Feud Continues (WIPO Magazine, Aug 2011), archived at https://perma.cc/6RM2 
-W45Y. 
 117 For discussion, see Merges, 13 Harv J L & Tech at 52–53 (cited in note 65). 
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not only is the employee precluded from arguing against the va-
lidity of a patent that the employee assigned to the former em-
ployer, but also any new employer of the employee is similarly 
precluded from doing so. The practical consequence: if the old em-
ployer brings a patent infringement suit against the new em-
ployer, the latter may be unable to argue in defense that the un-
derlying patent is invalid. Like a trailer clause, this expansive 
understanding of the assignor estoppel doctrine may limit the at-
tractiveness of an employee to any potential new employer.118 
 d) Trade secret misappropriation.  Google could (and did) 
bring a trade secret misappropriation claim against the employee 
and Uber as the new employer, alleging that the employee or 
Uber had used or disclosed trade secrets belonging to Google.119 
In certain states (although not California today), even absent ev-
idence of use or disclosure, Google could seek an injunction to pre-
vent its former employee from joining Uber if the court found that 
the employee would inevitably disclose the employer’s trade se-
crets in his new position.120 Trade secret litigation in a departing 
employee scenario is not an uncommon occurrence in Silicon Val-
ley. Intel, Broadcom, Cisco, Apple, and other Silicon Valley com-
panies have been involved in prominent trade secret disputes in-
volving former employees.121 Depending on the credibility of any 
 
 118 See Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Assignor Estoppel, 54 Houston L Rev 513, 537 
(2016) (“[T]he doctrine of assignor estoppel serves effectively as a partial noncompete 
agreement, preventing inventors from starting new companies or moving to competitors 
in many circumstances and at least raising the costs of doing so.”). 
 119 Waymo Complaint at *2–5 (cited in note 1). 
 120 Based on a survey of twenty-four states (current as of 2012), courts in only a hand-
ful of states explicitly reject the doctrine while the remainder either explicitly recognize 
the doctrine or, more commonly, apply it occasionally. See Ryan M. Wiesner, A State-by-
State Analysis of Inevitable Disclosure: A Need for Uniformity and a Workable Standard, 
16 Marq Intell Prop L Rev 211, 217–28 (2012). See also M. Claire Flowers, Facing the 
Inevitable: The Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine and the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 
75 Wash & Lee L Rev 2207, 2223 (2018) (finding that not all states bar application of 
inevitable disclosure doctrine entirely; only those in the Eighth Circuit, California,  
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, and Massachusetts expressly refused to adopt the  
doctrine). During the period in which Silicon Valley overtook Route 128 as a technology 
center, it was uncertain whether a California court could issue injunctive relief under the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine. See Part II.A.3. 
 121 These headline disputes include: Cisco’s lawsuit against Arista, a company 
founded by departing Cisco employees, see Rachael King, Cisco’s Feud with Former Star 
Executive Turns Personal—and Costly (Wall St J, Aug 17, 2017), online at https:// 
www.wsj.com/articles/ciscos-feud-with-former-star-executive-turns-personaland-costly 
-1502980362 (visited Feb 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable); Intel’s suit against 
Broadcom involving the departure of former Intel employees, see Karen Alexander, Intel, 
Broadcom Settle Suit over Trade Secrets (LA Times, Nov 22, 2000), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/MQ9J-KEZA; and Apple’s suit against Steve Jobs and Next, see Andrew Pollack, 
Steven Jobs Settles Suit Filed by Apple (NY Times, Jan 18, 1986), archived at 
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such legal threat, and the potential injunction, damages, and lit-
igation costs to which the employee and future employer could be 
exposed,122 Google may be able to dissuade Uber from hiring its 
employee. This effectively occurred in the Google-Uber litigation: 
first, Levandowski was barred by court order from working on 
certain projects at Uber; and, second, Uber fired Levandowski in 
connection with Google’s litigation and related allegations of 
trade-secret theft.123 Effectively, this approaches the result that 
would have been achieved if Google had been able to enforce a 
noncompete covenant against a departing employee. 
Aside from these clearly legal mechanisms, Google and Uber 
might enter into a mutual “no-hire” (also known as antipoaching) 
agreement. Beginning in 2005, Apple, Google, and other Silicon 
Valley–based companies reportedly entered into unwritten “no-
hire” agreements to protect their trade secrets and to suppress 
wage competition among one another.124 Although these arrange-
ments were ultimately dissolved following a settlement with the 
Department of Justice for alleged antitrust violations,125 they il-
lustrate how firms that are precluded from using noncompetes 
 
https://perma.cc/5LRN-VK4T. For discussion of other trade secret suits involving depart-
ing employees, see Everett M. Rogers and Judith K. Larsen, Silicon Valley Fever: Growth 
of High-Technology Culture 91–94 (Basic Books 1984). 
 122 Gilson argues that trade secrecy claims are difficult to win (outside of blatant mis-
appropriation) and, as a result, are not typically effective substitutes for noncompetes. 
Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 597–601 (cited in note 8). We feel this understates certain prac-
tical and legal realities. Although trade secrecy claims are certainly not as strong as an 
absolute bar on postemployment opportunities at competitors, they have considerable le-
gal and in terrorem force (as Gilson acknowledges to some extent, see id at 600), especially 
given that, at least during 1984–2002, California law enabled courts to award relief in 
trade secret cases even in cases of merely “threatened” (rather than actual) misappropri-
ation. See notes 132–34 and accompanying text. For similar views on the potency of  
California trade secret suits in certain circumstances, see Michael Risch, Comments on 
Trade Secret Sharing in High Velocity Labor Markets, 12 Empl Rts & Empl Pol J 339, 
340–42 (2009) (arguing that California trade secret law provides a potent remedy in cases 
involving the misappropriation of “core” informational assets). 
 123  Mullin, Judge’s Order Bars Uber Engineer from Lidar Work (cited in note 5);  
Marshall, Uber Fired Its Robocar Guru (cited in note 6). 
 124 See Lobel, 93 Tex L Rev at 831–35 (cited in note 9) (describing antipoaching cartels 
entered into by leading Silicon Valley technology firms); Jeff Elder, Silicon Valley Compa-
nies Agree to Pay $415 Million to Settle Wage Case (Wall St J, Jan 15, 2015), online at 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/silicon-valley-companies-agree-to-pay-415-million-to-settle 
-wage-case-1421363288 (visited Feb 17, 2020) (Perma archive unavailable) (describing set-
tlement of class-action antitrust lawsuit against major technology companies alleging “an-
tipoaching” agreements). 
 125 US Department of Justice, Press Release, Justice Department Requires Six High 
Tech Companies to Stop Entering into Anticompetitive Employee Solicitation Agreements: 
Settlement Preserves Competition for High-Tech Employees (Sept 24, 2010), archived at 
https://perma.cc/RYG6-VEE5. 
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may have strong incentives to use other mechanisms to dampen 
labor mobility. 
 e) Economic alternatives to noncompetes.  Even in the ab-
sence of any alternative legal instrument, employers have an-
other potent mechanism by which to discourage employee move-
ment: they can use deferred compensation mechanisms to 
encourage employees to remain with the firm.126 There are multi-
ple methods. Employers can set the vesting schedules of deferred 
equity compensation (often a substantial portion of an employee’s 
compensation at high-tech firms) so that departing employees 
suffer an implicit financial penalty by departing prior to the date 
on which all their options to acquire stock in the company have 
been triggered. Cisco, a Silicon Valley incumbent and repeat ac-
quirer of startups, typically requires that a target’s employees 
waive vesting rights (in the target’s stock) that accelerate upon 
an acquisition and adopt a new graduated vesting schedule (in 
Cisco’s stock), precisely in order to deter departures by the tar-
get’s key employees for a certain period of time following the ac-
quisition.127 Alternatively, an acquisition agreement can skew the 
division of deal consideration such that a small portion is allo-
cated to the up-front purchase price and the remainder is allo-
cated to a future postacquisition date, contingent on the founders 
and certain other employees remaining with the acquiror post-
closing for a certain period of time.128 In yet another variation, a 
recent empirical study shows that S&P 500 firms often pay sev-
erance to California-based executives in discretionary install-
ments following separation (as contrasted with lump-sum 
amounts that the same firms usually pay to non-California-based 
executives immediately upon separation), subject to compliance 
 
 126 See Richard A. Booth, Give Me Equity or Give Me Death—the Role of Competition 
and Compensation in Building Silicon Valley, 1 Entrepreneurial Bus L J 265, 271 (2006) 
(arguing that deferred equity compensation is used as a replacement for noncompete 
agreements for purposes of retaining employees). For empirical evidence that stock options 
promote employee retention, see Paul Oyer and Scott Schaefer, Why Do Some Firms Give 
Stock Options to All Employees?: An Empirical Examination of Alternative Theories, 76 J 
Fin Econ 99, 109–10, 131–32 (2005) (based on data on firms’ stock option grants to middle 
managers, finding that this practice is primarily used for purposes of retaining employees 
and “sorting” between higher- and lower-quality employees). 
 127 See David Mayer and Martin Kenney, Economic Action Does Not Take Place in a 
Vacuum: Understanding Cisco’s Acquisition and Development Strategy, 11 Indust & Inno-
vation 299, 312 (2004). 
 128 See Marita A. Makinen, David B. Haber, and Anthony W. Raymundo, Acqui-Hires 
for Growth: Planning for Success *35 (Lowenstein Sandler PC, 2012), archived at 
https://perma.cc/5XBD-2Q76 (noting that certain acquisitions allocate more than 40 per-
cent of the deal consideration to “incentive pool payments” and “equity grant roll overs . . . 
contingent on key employees staying with the buyer post-closing”). 
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with noncompete provisions in the executives’ employment agree-
ments that are not directly enforceable through breach-of- 
contract suits.129 
3. Was Massachusetts’s noncompete and trade secret law 
significantly different from California’s? 
The traditional narrative relies on a significant difference in 
legal treatment between Massachusetts and California with re-
spect to the enforcement of noncompetes and related doctrines 
that impact employee mobility. Below we look more carefully at 
comparative differences between Massachusetts and California 
law in the enforcement of noncompetes and trade secret law. We 
do not discern any meaningful differences with respect to trade 
secret claims. Although we do not contest that there were mate-
rial differences in the enforceability of noncompetes between the 
two states during the historical period in question, the compari-
son is more nuanced than commonly explained, especially taking 
into account the above-noted exceptions to California’s oft- 
described “ban” on noncompetes. 
 a) Trade secrets; inevitable disclosure.  In general, there 
are few substantial differences in the trade secret doctrines fol-
lowed by California and Massachusetts courts.130 Where there are 
fine differences, these do not necessarily support the conventional 
expectation that Massachusetts provides stronger trade secret 
protections. To illustrate these tendencies, we look more closely 
at the inevitable disclosure doctrine and its evolution in California 
and Massachusetts during the period in which Silicon Valley rose 
to preeminence. Under this doctrine, a court can enjoin an indi-
vidual from working for a new employer on the ground that the 
individual will inevitably disclose trade secrets belonging to the 
former employer.131 This represents a plaintiff-favorable exten-
sion of trade secret law, which typically requires that the plaintiff 
show that the defendant has actually used or disclosed the trade 
secret after having misappropriated it. 
 
 129 See Sarath Sanga, Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Approach, 34 J L Econ & 
Org 650, 654, 670–77 (2018) (using a data sample consisting of 852 executive contracts 
disclosed in SEC filings during 1996–2016 by 75 S&P 500 firms that had employees in 
California and at least one state other than California). 
 130 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 602 (cited in note 8) (stating that “[t]he scope of 
protection provided by trade secret law in California and Massachusetts appears to be 
roughly the same”). See also Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine 
in Search of Justification, 86 Cal L Rev 241, 247 (1998) (“Although trade secret doctrine 
varies from state to state, the general rules are substantially similar in all jurisdictions.”). 
 131 See Flowers, 75 Wash & Lee L Rev at 2217 (cited in note 120). 
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As of the late 1970s and early 1980s, we are not aware of any 
indication in California or Massachusetts case or statutory law 
that either jurisdiction had explicitly recognized or rejected the 
inevitable disclosure doctrine or any equivalent under trade secret 
law. In 1984, however, it was California—not Massachusetts—that 
signaled openness to the inevitable disclosure doctrine by adopt-
ing the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA), which became effec-
tive the following year. California’s version of the UTSA, the  
California Uniform Trade Secrets Act (CUTSA), follows the lan-
guage of the model statute and provides that a plaintiff can obtain 
injunctive relief under trade secret law if the court finds there is 
“threatened misappropriation.”132 Those two words mattered: in 
1996, AMD, a leading California semiconductor manufacturer, 
successfully relied on the inevitable disclosure doctrine to secure 
a preliminary injunction preventing more than twelve of its for-
mer employees from taking certain positions at their new em-
ployer, Hyundai.133 Given the language in the CUTSA, and the 
outcome in the AMD-Hyundai litigation, it can be understood why 
a Silicon Valley practitioner observed in 1997 that it was unclear 
whether the inevitable disclosure remedy was available under 
California law.134 
In 1998, the author of a leading treatise on trade secret law 
observed that California law authorized courts generally to inter-
vene to protect against “threatened harm” and concluded:  
“California has never rejected the fundamental idea that under-
lies the [inevitable disclosure] doctrine.”135 In 1999, a California 
intermediate appellate court even explicitly adopted the doctrine 
(although it ruled against the trade secret claimant and the 
court’s opinion was subsequently “depublished” by the California 
Supreme Court).136 Commentators observed that the court’s opin-
ion reflected the actual law on the ground in some California 
 
 132 Cal Civ Code § 3426.2. 
 133 See Benjamin A. Emmert, Keeping Confidence with Former Employees: California 
Court Apply the Inevitable Disclosure Doctrine to California Trade Secret Law, 40 Santa 
Clara L Rev 1171, 1192–95. The case subsequently settled. See AMD, Hyundai Unit Settle 
Trade-Secrets Case (LA Times, Nov 19, 1996), archived at https://perma.cc/45XY-GMP8. 
 134 Terrence P. McMahon, Gary E. Weiss, and Sean A. Lincoln, Inevitable Disclosure: 
Not So Sure in the West, Natl L J C35–36 (May 12, 1997). 
 135 James Pooley, When It Comes to Trade Secrets and Employee Mobility, a Little 
Inevitable Disclosure Is Not Such a Bad Thing, The Recorder 41 (Nov 1998). 
 136 See generally Electro Optical Industries, Inc v White, 90 Cal Rptr 2d 680 (Cal App 
1999), ordered not to be officially published, 2000 Cal LEXIS 3536 (Cal). Specifically, the 
Court of Appeal stated: “Although no California court has yet adopted it, the inevitable 
disclosure rule is rooted in common sense and calls for a fact specific inquiry. We adopt 
the rule here.” 90 Cal Rptr 2d at 684. 
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lower courts: “The . . . decision now makes explicit what many 
trade secret practitioners have known for years: California courts 
will grant narrowly tailored injunctions in appropriate circum-
stances to prevent a former employee from performing certain 
tasks for a new employer to minimize the threat to a former em-
ployer’s trade secrets.”137 
In the immediately ensuing years, the case law shifted in a 
more defendant-friendly direction, as several federal district 
courts applying California law138—and, in 2002, a California in-
termediate appellate court—rejected the inevitable disclosure 
remedy,139 specifically distinguishing in the latter case between 
“inevitable disclosure” and the “threatened misappropriation” 
language in the CUTSA.140 Nonetheless, a contemporary observer 
wrote that it remained uncertain whether a California court 
might apply the inevitable disclosure doctrine, given that the 
2002 case was a ruling by an intermediate appellate court.141 Re-
flecting this lingering uncertainty, a California court in 2008 rec-
ognized the continuing possibility of bringing a trade secret claim 
based on the “threatened misappropriation” language in the 
CUTSA.142 Although it is almost certain today that the inevitable 
disclosure doctrine is no longer viable in California in view of  
Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP, 143  during the ascendance of  
Silicon Valley in the 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s, this was not 
the case. 
During approximately the same period, the development of 
the law in Massachusetts concerning the inevitable disclosure 
 
 137 Gary E. Weiss and Sean A. Lincoln, Accepting the Inevitable: The California Court 
of Appeal Has Finally Adopted the Doctrine of Inevitable Disclosure (Supplement to the 
Recorder, Feb 2000). 
 138 GlobeSpan, Inc v O’Neill, 151 F Supp 2d 1229, 1229 (CD Cal 2001); Danjaq, LLC 
v Sony Corp, 1999 WL 317629, *1 n 1 (CD Cal); Computer Sciences Corp v Computer As-
sociates International, Inc, 1999 WL 675446, *5 (CD Cal); Bayer Corp v Roche Molecular 
Systems, Inc, 72 F Supp 2d 1111, 1119–20 (ND Cal 1999). 
 139 Whyte v Schlage Lock Co, 101 Cal App 4th 1443, 1462–64 (2002). 
 140 See id. 
 141 See Hyde, Working in Silicon Valley at 33–35 (cited in note 9). 
 142 See Central Valley General Hospital v Smith, 162 Cal App 4th 501, 524–26 (2008) 
(stating that the rejection of the inevitable disclosure doctrine in Whyte does not imply 
rejection of trade secret claims based on threatened misappropriation, given that the  
California code explicitly recognizes such claims). 
 143 189 P3d 285 (Cal 2008). Reflecting the post-Edwards approach toward noncom-
petes and employee mobility more generally, a California court in 2009 awarded attorneys’ 
fees as sanctions against a party that sought an injunction based on the inevitable disclo-
sure doctrine (together with other evidence of bad faith). See FLIR Systems, Inc v Parrish, 
174 Cal App 4th 1270, 1273–74, 1277 (2009). For further discussion, see Charles T. Graves, 
Is There an Empirical Basis for Predictions of Inevitable Disclosure?, 18 Wake Forest J 
Bus & Intell Prop L 190, 194–96 (2018). 
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doctrine followed a remarkably similar trajectory, with the only 
potential difference being that Massachusetts common law pro-
vided an even weaker basis for asserting the inevitable disclosure 
doctrine. Given that Massachusetts (unlike California) had not 
adopted the UTSA and therefore required that a trade secret 
claimant show actual use or disclosure by the defendant, there 
was arguably no basis under Massachusetts common law to issue 
injunctive relief under a theory of inevitable disclosure. In 1995, 
a federal district court (applying Massachusetts law) found that 
it was “inevitable” that a software developer would use his former 
employer’s information in his new position; however, the case in-
volved a noncompete agreement and therefore it was not neces-
sary for the court to address the inevitable disclosure doctrine.144 
In 2002, a federal district court did address the doctrine directly 
and rejected it, stating: “Massachusetts law provides no basis for 
an injunction without a showing of actual disclosure.” 145  As of 
2003, a commentator summed up the state of the law by observing 
that “no Massachusetts appellate court has ruled on the viability 
of the inevitable disclosure doctrine, and the few Massachusetts 
trial court decisions dealing with the doctrine have been decidedly 
lukewarm about it.”146 
Consistent with our general view stated at the outset of this 
discussion, with respect to the inevitable disclosure doctrine, it 
was actually California that was more protective of trade secret 
holders. Any current differences can be dated either to 2008, the 
year of the Edwards v Arthur Andersen LLP decision (insofar as 
it signaled California courts’ likely rejection of any effort by plain-
tiffs to seek injunctive relief under the inevitable disclosure doc-
trine), or 2018, when the Massachusetts legislature adopted its 
version of the UTSA. This gave rise to the same uncertainty that 
arose following California’s adoption of the UTSA in 1984. Fol-
lowing the model statute, the Massachusetts version refers to 
“threatened misappropriation,”147 which could provide a basis for 
Massachusetts courts to adopt the inevitable disclosure doctrine, 
although they may adopt California courts’ now-prevailing under-
standing that the “threatened misappropriation” language does 
 
 144 Marcam Corp v Orchard, 885 F Supp 294, 296–97 (D Mass 1995). 
 145 Safety-Kleen Systems, Inc v McGinn, 233 F Supp 2d 121, 124 (D Mass 2002). 
 146 See Laurence H. Reece III, Employee Noncompetition Agreements: Recent Develop-
ments and Trends, 88 Mass L Rev 24, 36 (2003). 
 147 Massachusetts Trade Secrets Act, Mass HR 4868, § 19 (cited in note 27) (providing 
that “threatened misappropriation may be enjoined upon principles of equity, including 
but not limited to consideration of prior party conduct and circumstances of potential use”). 
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not imply endorsement of the inevitable disclosure doctrine.148 
While that particular point remains unresolved today, it is nota-
ble that practitioners have commented that acceptance by  
Massachusetts courts of the inevitable disclosure doctrine would 
run counter to those courts’ historical tendency to reject or at least 
resist application of the doctrine.149 
 b) Noncompetes.  During the time in which Silicon Valley 
overtook Route 128, and continuing through the present, it is cer-
tainly the case that Massachusetts law, as compared to California 
law, provided employers with a higher level of confidence in the 
enforceability of noncompetes. But the differences should not be 
exaggerated nor should it be assumed that Massachusetts em-
ployers have had unfettered ability to enforce noncompetes with-
out constraint. Like almost all states, Massachusetts applies the 
common-law reasonableness standard. This standard limits the 
enforceable scope of a noncompete by duration, scope and geogra-
phy, provided in all cases that the noncompete is deemed neces-
sary to protect the employer’s legitimate business interests.150 For 
this purpose, Massachusetts courts have defined the employer’s 
legitimate interest narrowly. In a trilogy of cases decided in 1974, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Court emphasized that noncompetes 
were enforceable only to the extent required to protect the em-
ployer’s goodwill, trade secrets, or confidential information. 151 
Massachusetts courts apparently took these constraints seri-
ously: writing in 1991, a leading practitioner of trade secret law 
observed that “Massachusetts courts have often refused to enforce 
non-competition agreements on the ground that no trade secrets 
or confidential business information were involved” and that “[i]n 
 
 148 For discussion, see Yekaterina Reyzis, One Step Away from Uniform: Taking a 
Closer Look at Massachusetts’ New Trade Secrets Law (JDSupra, Nov 21, 2018), archived 
at https://perma.cc/M472-MVPY. 
 149 See id (noting that Massachusetts courts “have long held that the inevitable dis-
closure doctrine hurts employer mobility and competition”); Andrew T. O’Connor, New 
Massachusetts Trade Secret Laws Effective October 1, 2018 (In-House, Sept 12, 2018),  
archived at https://perma.cc/834P-GUAN (noting that Massachusetts courts “were consid-
ered to have effectively rejected (or at least discredited) the ‘inevitable disclosure’  
doctrine”). 
 150 Alexander & Alexander, Inc v Danahy, 488 NE2d 22, 29–30 (Mass App 1986); New 
England Canteen Service, Inc v Ashley, 363 NE2d 526, 528 (Mass 1977); Analogic Corp v 
Data Translation, Inc, 358 NE2d 804, 807 (Mass 1976); Marine Contractors Co, Inc v  
Hurley, 310 NE2d 915, 920–21 (Mass 1974). 
 151 See All Stainless Inc v Colby, 308 NE2d 481, 485–86 (Mass 1974); Marine Contrac-
tors Co, 310 NE2d at 920; National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc v Avers, 311 NE2d 573, 576–
77 (Mass App 1974). 
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numerous cases, Massachusetts courts have cut back restrictions 
to make them reasonable.”152 
Other obstacles stood in the way of a Massachusetts employer 
who sought to enforce a noncompete. Since 1968, Massachusetts 
courts have recognized the material change doctrine, which bars 
enforcement of noncompetes if the employee’s position and salary 
changed significantly since starting employment.153 In 1979 and 
1982, the Massachusetts courts extended the reasonableness 
standard to employment contracts that required employees to for-
feit certain deferred compensation upon termination, on the 
ground that these provisions implicitly operated as noncom-
petes.154 Additionally, Massachusetts courts have held that non-
compete agreements are to be construed strictly in favor of the 
employee and, relatedly, have declined to enforce noncompetes if 
the contractual language has been deemed to be excessively am-
biguous. 155  Contrary to the standard narrative, Massachusetts 
courts during the decline of Route 128 were far from enthusiastic 
about noncompetes and applied the common-law reasonableness 
standard to limit their enforceability. 
4. Did weak enforcement of noncompetes really cause the 
Valley to rise? 
The standard narrative correctly observes that Massachusetts 
was an early pioneer of technological innovation. Ironically, the 
Boston area essentially originated what is now viewed as the  
Silicon Valley model consisting of a strong academic research 
complex coupled with a robust venture capital community and 
substantial movement of human capital among academia, 
startups, and large firms. In 1946, a Boston firm (the American 
 
 152 Laurence H. Reece III, Employee Non-Competition Agreements and Related Re-
strictive Covenants: A Review and Analysis of Massachusetts Law, 76 Mass L Rev 2, 11–
12 (1991), citing National Hearing Aid Centers, 311 NE2d at 576–77 (denying injunctive 
relief on ground that employee had not used any confidential information belonging to the 
employer); Richmond Brothers, Inc v Westinghouse Broadcasting Co, Inc, 256 NE2d 304, 
305–06 (Mass 1970) (declining to enforce noncompete on ground that employee’s success 
was not attributable to employer’s trade secrets or confidential information). 
 153 F.A. Bartlett Tree Expert Co v Barrington, 233 NE2d 756, 758 (Mass 1968). 
 154 Kroeger v Stop & Shop Companies, Inc, 432 NE2d 566, 568, 571–72 (Mass App 
1982); Cheney v Automatic Sprinkler Corp of America, 385 NE2d 961, 965 & n 7  
(Mass 1979). 
 155 See, for example, Lanier Services, Inc v Ricci, 192 F3d 1, 4–5 (1st Cir 1999) (finding 
that the term, “facilities management services,” was ambiguous as a matter of law, inter-
preting the phrase against the former employer as the drafting party, and declining to 
enforce the noncompete). For discussion of additional cases during 1999–2002, see Reece, 
88 Mass L Rev at 26 (cited in note 146). 
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Research and Development Corporation, or ARD) established the 
first major successful venture capital enterprise.156 Supported by 
federal defense funding and local VC investors, MIT and Harvard 
University labs spawned hundreds of spin-offs throughout the 
1960s and 1970s.157 Those spin-offs included firms that later pio-
neered the “minicomputer”158 market such as Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) (founded in 1957 as a MIT startup with fund-
ing from ARD), Wang (founded by a Harvard physicist in the 
1950s), Data General (founded in 1968 by ex-DEC engineers), and 
Prime (founded in 1972 by engineers from Honeywell).159 
Contrary to Saxenian’s account of cultural norms, Paul  
Ceruzzi describes the most important Route 128 firm, DEC, as 
having been characterized by a nonhierarchical engineer-driven 
culture that dispensed with the formalities and bureaucracy of 
incumbents such as IBM.160 Certainly, as DEC and other large 
Route 128 firms grew, they tended to adopt vertically integrated 
structures.161 But it would be inaccurate to describe the Route 128 
environment in its heyday as a monolithic industry consisting of 
 
 156 Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 15 (cited in note 8). 
 157 See id at 16–17; Martin Kenney and Urs von Burg, Technology, Entrepreneurship 
and Path Dependence: Industrial Clustering in Silicon Valley and Route 128, 8 Indust & 
Corp Change 67, 85–87 (1999); Edward B. Roberts, A Basic Study of Innovators; How to 
Keep and Capitalize on Their Talents, 11 Rsrch Mgmt 249, 254–55 (1968). 
 158 The minicomputer refers to a class of computing devices that delivered computing 
power at a significantly reduced cost (and physical size) relative to the mainframe market 
(dominated by IBM). Advances in miniaturization and the development of the micropro-
cessor yielded the “microcomputer” (equivalent to the modern PC), which delivered sub-
stantial computer power with a small physical “footprint,” thereby rendering obsolete the 
minicomputer category. For discussion, see Paul E. Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Compu-
ting 124–26 (MIT 2d ed 2003). 
 159 See id at 127 (noting that DEC was founded in 1957 by former MIT researchers 
with funding from ARD); id at 195 (stating that Data General was founded in 1968 by 
three former DEC engineers); Saxenian, Regional Advantage at 18–19 (cited in note 8) 
(noting that in 1951, An Wang, a scientist at Harvard, founded Wang Laboratories; in 
1957, three scientists left Lincoln Labs to found DEC; in 1968, Edson DeCastro left DEC 
to found Data General; in 1972, William Poduska left Honeywell to found Prime); Kenney 
and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 85–86 (cited in note 157) (noting that in 1957, 
Kenneth Olsen, a former MIT researcher, founded DEC with a capital investment from 
ARD); Lynn E. Browne and Steven Sass, The Transition from a Mill-Based to a Knowledge-
Based Economy: New England, 1940–2000, in Peter Temin, ed, Engines of Enterprise: An 
Economic History of New England 211–12 (Harvard 2000). 
 160 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 138 (cited in note 158) (“DEC rep-
resented everything that was liberating about computers, while IBM, with its dress code 
and above all its punched card, represented everything that had gone wrong.”). 
 161 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 86–87 (cited in note 157) 
(stating that many minicomputer pioneers in the Route 128 area integrated vertically in 
order to reduce turnaround time and protect chip designs); Sarah Kuhn, Computer Man-
ufacturing in New England: Structure, Location and Labor in a Growing Industry 29–33 
(Joint Center for Urban Studies of MIT and Harvard University 1982). 
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a handful of vertically integrated incumbents. Although DEC and 
three other Route 128 firms (plus IBM) dominated the minicom-
puter segment in the late 1970s and early 1980s,162 observers and 
studies systematically documented that those firms spawned a 
continuing flow of small-firm spin-offs. 163  An interview-based 
study of twenty-two Massachusetts-based computer firms be-
tween 1965 and 1975 found that half of the firms’ products “were 
the result of direct technology transfer from previous employers 
and another quarter indirect transfer.”164 A study of patent coau-
thoring patterns found similarly that Boston innovators were reg-
ularly involved in information exchange networks that were com-
parable in robustness (but not size) to those in Silicon Valley.165 
In a manner akin to accounts of Silicon Valley, qualitative  
histories observe that Route 128 spin-offs could procure neces-
sary inputs from a disaggregated network of small- to medium-
size component producers and suppliers, assemblers, and distrib-
utors.166 A history of the period concludes: “[C]ompanies spinning 
 
 162 See Nancy S. Dorfman, Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective: An 
Investigation of Its Dimensions, Causes and of the Role of New Firms 2–4 (MIT Center for 
Policy Alternatives 1982). 
 163 See Michael H. Best, The New Competitive Advantage: The Renewal of American 
Industry 129–30 (Oxford 2001) (describing “genealogies” of firm spin-offs from entrepre-
neurial “parent” firms in various technology segments of the Route 128 area); Susan  
Rosegrant and David R. Lampe, Route 128: Lessons from Boston’s High-Tech Community 
153–57 (Basic Books 1992); Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol at 310–11 (cited in note 79) (noting 
that DEC, the leading technology firm in the Boston area, had spawned multiple spin-offs, 
and that most new technology firms in the Boston area were founded by former employees 
of other firms or research laboratories); Elaine Romanelli, New Venture Strategies in the 
Minicomputer Industry, 30 Cal Mgmt Rev 160, 167 (1987) (observing that, during the 
1960s and 1970s, almost sixty new minicomputer firms were formed, principally by engi-
neers who had worked for DEC and other major minicomputer manufacturers); Roberts, 
11 Rsrch Mgmt at 252 (cited in note 157) (observing that thirty-nine companies had been 
formed during the 1960s by forty-four former employees of one Boston area electronics firm). 
 164  See Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol at 310, 316 n 40 (cited in note 79) (describing a 1977 
study by the MIT Center for Policy Alternatives). 
 165 See Lee Fleming, et al, Why the Valley Went First: Agglomeration and Emergence 
in Regional Inventor Networks *29–30 (working paper, Feb 2003), archived at https:// 
perma.cc/4MA2-KZ5U. 
 166 See Franz Tödtling, Regional Networks of High-Technology Firms—The Case of 
the Greater Boston Region, 14 Technovation 323, 330 (1994) (describing regional network 
in Boston area comprising electronics, component and software firms, some of which act 
as “suppliers or subcontractors to the [large] minicomputer firms”); AnnaLee Saxenian, In 
Search of Power: The Organization of Business Interests in Silicon Valley and Route 128, 
18 Econ & Society 25, 45 (1989) (stating that “research laboratories and firms producing 
components and services for each other co-located, and cross-fertilizations between the 
academic world, the federal government and local industry fuelled an ongoing expansion 
of technologically innovative activity in the [Route 128] region”); Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol 
at 306 (cited in note 79) (stating that the Boston area provides technology firms with ac-
cess to a network of parts and components suppliers, “all particularly critical to new  
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off from other companies were at the very heart of the monumen-
tal growth that the Route 128 area experienced from the 1960s 
through the 1980s.”167 
On the West Coast, Silicon Valley pioneered innovations in 
the semiconductor field and, by the late 1970s, was the recognized 
leader.168 Historical accounts of Silicon Valley’s semiconductor in-
dustry typically attribute its origins to the departure in 1957 of 
leading engineers from Shockley Transistors to form Fairchild 
Semiconductor, which generated a sequence of leading semicon-
ductor firms.169 Semiconductor chips are a critical component in a 
wide array of computing and electronics products and operated as 
a launching pad for Silicon Valley to achieve dominance in infor-
mation technology more generally.170 Even after lower-cost Japa-
nese producers in the 1980s undermined the local memory chip 
production industry, Silicon Valley adapted by shifting resources 
to the design and development of customized chips171 and devel-
oping strengths in hardware and software markets. By contrast, 
the Massachusetts minicomputer industry did not recover as 
quickly from the entry of lower-cost workstations and personal 
computers.172 Massachusetts had bet on the wrong horse and was 
unable to recover the lead. 
Unlike the legal literature, the economic history and business 
management literature shows no consensus view as to the factors 
that best explain why Silicon Valley overtook Route 128 as an in-
formation technology center. Starting with Gilson, the legal liter-
ature has focused on the explanation advocated by Saxenian, who 
 
start-ups that are developing prototypes and to manufacturers of customized equipment 
for small markets”). 
 167 See Rosegrant and Lampe, Route 128 at 154 (cited in note 163). 
 168 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 68, 80–85 (cited in note 157). 
 169 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 198 (cited in note 158). 
 170 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 78 (cited in note 157) (“In 
the postwar electronics industry, transistors and then integrated circuits were an enabling 
technology for nearly every important electronic innovation.”). 
 171 See AnnaLee Saxenian, Regional Networks and the Resurgence of Silicon Valley, 
33 Cal Mgmt Rev 89, 89–95 (1990) (describing how firms that specialize in the design of 
customized chips and outsource production enabled Silicon Valley to recover after Japa-
nese firms entered the general-purpose semiconductor markets). 
 172 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 304–06 (cited in note 158) (de-
scribing how minicomputer companies based in the Boston area failed to adapt to the PC 
revolution); Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 87 (cited in note 157) (stat-
ing that the minicomputer industry could not compete with “workstations” that offered 
comparable computing power at a substantially lower price); Richard N. Langlois, Organ-
izing the Electronic Century, in Giovanni Dosi and Louis Galambos, eds, The Third Indus-
trial Revolution in Global Business 119, 155 (Cambridge 2013) (same). 
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attributed this development to cultural norms and vertically in-
tegrated structures that constrained the flow of intellectual capi-
tal.173 However, the business management and economic history 
literature is far less monolithic and identifies other salient rea-
sons why Silicon Valley may have overtaken Massachusetts. Most 
commonly, these scholars identify factors such as the draw of 
warm weather, luck (in particular, Shockley Transistors’ choice 
to locate in the Bay Area, which then gave rise to the Fairchild 
spin-off),174 and, most compellingly, the fact that Silicon Valley 
had achieved leadership in a general-purpose technology 
(namely, the microprocessor pioneered by Intel in the 1970s) that 
could be applied to a wide variety of industrial, business, and con-
sumer markets.175 By contrast, the leading Massachusetts firms 
in the late 1970s and early 1980s had focused on developing spe-
cialized minicomputer and other technologies targeted for tech-
nical and industrial users.176 Hence, once-pioneering Massachusetts 
firms such as DEC tended to focus on technologies that would ser-
vice existing markets for technical and industrial users, rather 
than developing innovations—such as the personal computer—
that would open up new and much larger markets in the corpo-
rate, small business, and home segments.177 
This is not to say that East Coast firms were innovation lag-
gards as compared to their West Coast counterparts. After all, it 
was IBM, headquartered in New York State, that in 1981 
launched the personal computer, which precipitated the move-
ment from closed “end-to-end” hardware systems to modular 
 
 173 See note 8. 
 174 In the words of Intel’s cofounder: “[L]uck played a role in nearly every component 
of this story of semiconductors and the birth of Silicon Valley.” See Gordon Moore and 
Kevin Davis, Learning the Silicon Valley Way, in Timothy Bresnahan and Alfonso  
Gambardella, eds, Building High-Tech Clusters: Silicon Valley and Beyond 7, 36  
(Cambridge 2004). 
 175 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 80 (cited in note 157) (noting 
that “the semiconductor found a far greater variety of applications than did the minicom-
puter” and “the semiconductor was important because it made so many other products 
possible”). 
 176 See id (noting that Route 128 specialized in the minicomputer, which was a fin-
ished product, rather than a component that could be used to assemble other products); 
Dorfman, Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective at 2–4 (cited in note 162). 
 177 See Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 87 (cited in note 157) (noting 
the common observation that Route 128 firms such as DEC failed to appreciate the threat 
posed by workstations and microcomputers, the precursors to the desktop personal com-
puter); Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 243–45 (cited in note 158) (noting 
DEC’s choice to focus on high-performance and larger computers rather than smaller and 
less expensive personal computers). 
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“plug-and-play” hardware systems as the standard product archi-
tecture in the computing market.178 That East Coast innovation 
in turn led to the aforementioned decline of DEC, Wang, and 
other leading Massachusetts minicomputer firms that operated 
under closed models in which customers purchased all compo-
nents from a single firm.179 IBM’s success is attributable in part 
to its then-novel decision to outsource design and production of 
many of the PC’s components—most notably, the operating sys-
tem (to Microsoft) and the microprocessor (to Intel)—as well as 
its inadvertent commoditization of the PC’s hardware. 180  But 
these were strategies that could have been taken by a firm like 
DEC, which had previously made pioneering contributions to 
computing technology. In fact, DEC attempted to do just that. In 
1988, IBM and DEC collaborated to establish the Open Software 
Foundation, an effort to develop OS/2, a nonproprietary operating 
system intended to challenge Microsoft’s Windows system.181 Sim-
ilarly, some of DEC’s Route 128 peers responded (albeit, some-
what belatedly) to the decline of the minicomputer by adopting 
alternative organizational structures.182 Moreover, two Route 128 
firms launched the first commercially successful spreadsheet ap-
plications (Visicalc, released in 1979, and Lotus 1-2-3, released in 
1984),183 which are recognized as key factors in the widespread 
adoption of the Mac and PC, respectively.184 Hence, there does not 
seem to be any compelling reason to attribute the decline of DEC 
and other leading Massachusetts firms substantially to cultural 
norms or vertically integrated forms of industrial organization. 
A similar observation complicates Gilson’s argument that 
Massachusetts’s willingness to enforce noncompetes suppressed 
labor mobility, which hindered the region’s innovative perfor-
mance. Critically, this argument fails to contemplate that 
 
 178 See Langlois, Organizing the Electronic Century at 153–54 (cited in note 172). 
 179 See Best, The New Competitive Advantage at 122 (cited in note 163) (observing 
that dominant Route 128 firms such as DEC and Wang offered “closed architecture” sys-
tems). See also Kenney and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 87 (cited in note 157) 
(noting that Wang had dismissed the commercial importance of personal computers). 
 180 See Ceruzzi, A History of Modern Computing at 277–78 (cited in note 158); Kenney 
and von Burg, 8 Indust & Corp Change at 96 (cited in note 157). 
 181 See Glenn Rifkin and George Harrar, The Ultimate Entrepreneur: The Story of Ken 
Olsen and Digital Equipment Corporation chs 24–25 (Contemporary Books 1988); John 
Steffens, Newgames: Strategic Competition in the PC Revolution 183–84, 222–23  
(Pergamon 1994). 
 182 See Tödtling, 14 Technovation at 332 (cited in note 166). 
 183 See M. Mitchell Waldrop, The Origins of Personal Computing, 285 Scientific Am 
84, 90 (Dec 2001). 
 184 See James A. Sena, The PC Evolution and Diaspora, CrossTalk 23 (Mar/Apr 2012); 
Langlois, Organizing the Electronic Century at 152 (cited in note 172). 
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Route 128 firms could have chosen not to request or enforce  
noncompetes if competitive pressures in the labor market drove 
them to do so. Gilson argues that collective-action pressures pre-
cluded that possibility.185 But there is compelling evidence that 
Route 128 firms sometimes, if not typically, elected to forgo adop-
tion and enforcement of noncompetes. Contemporary accounts in 
the early 1980s observed that Route 128 was characterized by fre-
quent spin-offs,186 talented engineers often left their employees to 
form start-ups, and large incumbents were typically parents of 
multiple spin-off firms.187 One observer records that Route 128 
firms tolerated or even welcomed the movement of technical per-
sonnel because they “value[d] the knowledge they obtain[ed] by 
hiring employees from other firms more than they fear[ed] the 
loss of proprietary information,”188 and that entrepreneurs often 
conceived of ideas “in the lab of an employer.” 189  That same  
observer noted that “[n]ew and expanding firms hire[d] their 
‘know how’ by bidding experienced employees away from compet-
ing firms.”190 
These accounts make no mention of the use of noncompetes 
to restrain employee turnover. Rather, firms attempted to retain 
valued employees by offering superior terms and more interesting 
work191—something that would have been unnecessary if noncom-
petes were legally potent. The lesson seems clear: when technical 
 
 185 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 596 (cited in note 8). 
 186 See David A. Garvin, Spin-Offs and the New Firm Formation Process, 25 Cal Mgmt 
Rev 3, 3 (1983) (observing that, as of the early 1980s, in both Silicon Valley and Route 128, 
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 187 See Rosegrant and Lampe, Route 128 at 29, 153–57 (cited in note 163); Dorfman, 
Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective at 69 (cited in note 162). Professor 
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 188 See Dorfman, Massachusetts’ High Technology Boom in Perspective at 9 (cited in 
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 189 See id at 69. 
 190 See Dorfman, 12 Rsrch Pol at 308 (cited in note 79). 
 191 See Kuhn, Computer Manufacturing in New England at 125 (cited in note 161). 
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talent is scarce and market demand for that talent is high, bar-
gaining leverage shifts to employees and differences in the en-
forceability of noncompetes make little practical difference. Any 
employer who sought to enforce a noncompete would be punished 
in the labor market.192 
To be certain, there is no comprehensive quantitative evi-
dence on noncompete usage and enforcement during this histori-
cal period. However, in more recent times—notably, after California 
substantially ratcheted up its aversion to noncompetes in 2008 in 
Edwards—Massachusetts and California have exhibited similar 
rates of employee noncompete usage, even among wholly in-state 
firms, according to the most comprehensive survey conducted to 
date.193 Thus, it seems unlikely that during the historical period 
in question—when Massachusetts and California noncompete 
law were more similar than today—that the rate of noncompete 
usage and enforcement between the two states substantially  
differed. 
There may be an additional material factor behind Silicon 
Valley’s ascendance, which existing scholarship has overlooked. 
In 1979, the Department of Labor modified the “prudence rule” to 
permit pension fund trustees to invest in venture capital.194 Based 
on this signal from federal regulators, state pension fund trustees 
took the view that it would be consistent with their fiduciary ob-
ligations to invest an appropriate portion of a fund’s assets in ven-
ture capital and other high-risk “alternative” investments.195 This 
change triggered a dramatic inflow of capital into VC investments 
 
 192 Of course, monopsonistic labor markets exist, and assuming the predicate condi-
tions for firm coordination in this context are satisfied—small number of employers with 
large market share, comparable employment positions, observable compensation, and a 
credible mechanism to punish defections—employers can credibly impose and enforce non-
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frequent spin-offs during this period. See notes 163–67 and accompanying text. 
 193 Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *45 fig 8 
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 194 Department of Labor, Rules and Regulations for Fiduciary Responsibility; Invest-
ment of Plan Assets Under the “Prudence” Rule, 44 Fed Reg 37221–22 (1979), amending 
29 CFR § 2550.404a-1. 
 195 See Paul A. Gompers and Josh Lerner, What Drives Venture Capital Fundraising? 
155 (Brookings Institution 1998). 
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and, by the late 1980s, the emergence of pension funds as the sin-
gle largest investor class in VC funds.196 Presumably, the same is 
true of California pension funds’ increase in VC investment at  
approximately the same time, given that CalPERS, the principal 
California state pension fund, followed the lead of the  
Department of Labor and directed assets toward venture capital 
funds, formally establishing an Alternative Investment Manage-
ment program for this purpose in 1990.197 Like other state pension 
funds (including Massachusetts), California state pension funds 
exhibit a significant in-state bias in their investments in VC and 
private equity funds.198 VC funds in turn exhibit an in-state bias 
in the selection of portfolio firms.199 The much larger size of the 
California pension system, combined with the in-state biases of 
California state pension fund managers and California VC prin-
cipals, implies that Silicon Valley startups likely had access to a 
much larger pool of capital than Boston-based startups.200 
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5. Did Massachusetts really decline? 
The traditional narrative relies both on the rise of Silicon Val-
ley as a center of innovation in the electronics industry and the 
decline of Route 128. While it is correct that Silicon Valley has 
achieved a uniquely preeminent position, this narrative over-
states both Massachusetts’s relative historical prominence as a 
technology center and its relative retreat from that position in 
more recent decades. 
While Route 128 was an historical pioneer in the IT industry 
since World War II, the period during which it was clearly a dom-
inant center was a short period limited to the height of the mini-
computer market during the late 1970s and early 1980s.201 Even 
during that time, there was no single, overwhelmingly dominant 
innovation center akin to Silicon Valley’s place today. Relative to 
the Boston area’s important, but less than preeminent, position 
as of the early 1980s, it does not appear to have suffered a perma-
nent decline in innovative performance since the collapse of the 
minicomputer industry.202 Rather, the Boston area has recovered 
its place as a leading regional innovation center, even if it no 
longer rivals Silicon Valley in the IT market. Multiple innovation 
metrics provide suggestive evidence in support of this view. Dur-
ing 1985–2013, the Bay Area held and expanded its lead in the 
volume of VC investments while the New England region consist-
ently occupied the second- or third-place position.203 From 1987 
through 2011, Massachusetts maintained consistently high levels 
of business-funded R&D intensity (defined as R&D funded by 
businesses as a percentage of “gross state product”) in a range of 
approximately 3–4 percent, outperforming California in all years 
but one.204 From 1997 through 2016, California and Massachusetts 
 
unlikely that Massachusetts pension fund managers invested more capital in Massachu-
setts-based VC firms, as compared to CalPERS’s investments in California-based VC 
firms. 
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 202 See id at 126–27. 
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have appeared every year among the top three states in terms of 
business-performed R&D intensity (defined as R&D performed by 
businesses as a percentage of “private-industry output”).205 After 
the San Francisco area, the Boston area is the second-most popu-
lar location in the US that companies select for their primary 
R&D center (selected by 230 firms as of 2011, compared to 380 
firms for San Francisco).206 
The Boston area has preserved or regained a significant pres-
ence in biotechnology and the life sciences, computer systems de-
sign, telecommunications equipment, data storage, technical in-
struments, and industry-oriented software tools.207 In fact, the 
success of the Boston area as a technology cluster since the col-
lapse of the minicomputer industry has now lasted longer than 
the period during which DEC and its peers were dominant.208 Not-
withstanding Massachusetts’s formal tolerance of noncompetes, 
multiple leading firms in various information technology sectors 
have spawned a steady flow of new firms providing complemen-
tary products and services.209 In the life sciences (including bio-
technology) and medical devices sector in particular, the Boston 
area is especially prominent (in 2015, biotech firms based in New 
England raised approximately $10.6 billion from outside inves-
tors, while biotech firms based in the San Francisco Bay Area 
raised approximately $6.5 billion).210 Trade and scholarly com-
mentary typically situates the Boston area among a triplet of 
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leading biotechnology clusters along with the Bay Area and San 
Diego,211 in some cases ranking it as the leader among those three 
locations.212 As of 2015, the Massachusetts Biotechnology Council 
stated that Massachusetts employed more personnel in biotech-
nology R&D than any other state and an MIT report found that, 
on a per capita basis, Massachusetts received significantly more 
funding ($351 per capita) from the National Institutes of Health 
than California ($88 per capita).213 During 2012–2014, San Fran-
cisco firms received each quarter approximately 30–50 percent of 
funding in the national life sciences industry, while Boston firms 
received each quarter approximately 20–40 percent of funding.214 
On a state-to-state level comparison, it may be surprising to 
learn that Massachusetts and California do not materially differ 
by multiple measures of innovative health. The State Technology 
and Science Index, which ranks states’ innovation capacities by 
various objective measures, has ranked Massachusetts in first 
place since the index was inaugurated in 2002 and through its 
latest release in 2018.215 In 2018, California ranked fourth, after 
having held fourth, third, and third places in 2016, 2014, and 
2012, respectively.216 According to the State New Economy Index, 
both California and Massachusetts are among the country’s lead-
ing states on multiple innovation measures (reflecting data as of 
the years 2012 through 2016), including: 
(i) industry-funded R&D as a percentage of total state GDP (CA: 
2.5 percent (ranked third); MA: 2.1 percent (ranked fourth));  
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(ii) patents awarded to companies per one thousand private-
sector workers (CA: 14.6 (ranked thirteenth); MA: 15.7 
(ranked ninth));  
(iii) venture capital invested as a percentage of state GDP 
(CA: 1.28 percent (ranked first); MA: 1.27 percent (ranked 
second)); and  
(iv) employment in high-technology industries as a percentage 
of total private-sector employment (CA: 6.8 percent 
(ranked fifth); MA: 7.9 percent (ranked first)).217 
B. Empirical Studies: Noncompetes, Mobility, and Innovation 
Even if the Silicon Valley / Route 128 narrative were more 
robust, it would be imprudent to base any policy conclusions on a 
single historical example. While Japan was once widely viewed as 
a model of a successful innovation economy, a regime character-
ized by lifetime job security and oligopolistic market structures 
would hardly be viewed today as an attractive innovation ecosys-
tem.218  Recently, empirical and experimental researchers have 
sought to move beyond the Silicon Valley example and, in doing 
so, have produced a sizeable body of studies concerning the effect 
of noncompetes on labor mobility and, in some cases, innovation. 
Unlike the literature that relies on the Silicon Valley / Route 128 
narrative, these studies usefully apply formal methods to a broad 
sample of state jurisdictions, seeking to exploit interstate differ-
ences, or intrastate changes in, the legal treatment of noncom-
petes to identify the effects of such differences and changes on 
employee turnover and certain innovation indicators. 
These studies fall into two categories. The larger category ad-
dresses only or principally whether noncompetes (or specifically, 
the enforceability of noncompetes) reduce labor mobility. In a 
companion paper, we review these studies comprehensively and 
provide a detailed discussion of the contributions and limitations 
of the most widely cited studies.219 In that review, we describe sig-
nificant methodological limitations and identify factual errors 
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concerning important points of state law. These shortcomings 
cast serious doubt on these studies’ claims purporting to show a 
broad causal relationship between the enforcement of noncom-
petes and reduced labor mobility. For purposes of the review be-
low, however, we will accept as given the findings of this first cat-
egory of studies—that is, we will assume that the enforceability 
of noncompetes has some significant incremental effect on labor 
mobility. This assumption will enable us to focus our review below 
on a second and smaller group of studies that address the more 
fundamental question whether the enforceability of noncompetes 
has a detrimental effect on innovation. 
1. Nonexperimental studies. 
Several empirical studies have sought to test for a relation-
ship between noncompetes, employee mobility, and innovation. 
Here, we address in detail four of the studies that scholars and 
policymakers have most heavily cited and relied upon. First, a 
2003 study by Professors Toby Stuart and Olav Sorenson (the 
“Stuart and Sorenson study”) examined biotechnology startups 
founded in the wake of an initial public offering (IPO) or acquisi-
tion of a previous company, finding a significant inverse relation-
ship between in-state noncompete enforceability and overall 
startup formation. Specifically, in the absence of state-level fixed 
effects, the authors find that “states with weak non-compete re-
gimes realize 217 percent higher founding rates than those that 
enforce non-compete covenants.”220 Additionally, taking account 
for state-fixed effects, Stuart and Sorenson find that the median 
IPO “occurring in . . . a weak enforcement state increases the 
founding rate [of new biotech firms] . . . by 26 percent.”221 Second, 
a 2011 study by Professor Mark Garmaise (the “Garmaise study”) 
found that stronger noncompete enforceability, interacted with a 
measure of in-state competition, tends to suppress R&D spending 
and that increased enforceability reduces capital investment per 
 
Our analysis in that paper focuses on the most widely cited studies, which include: Matt 
Marx, Jasjit Singh, and Lee Fleming, Regional Disadvantage? Employee Non-compete 
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 220 See Toby Stuart and Olav Sorenson, Liquidity Events and the Geographic Distri-
bution of Entrepreneurial Activity, 48 Admin Sci Q 175, 193 (2003). 
 221 Id at 195. 
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employee.222 Third, a 2011 study by Professors Sampsa Samila 
and Olav Sorenson (the “Samila and Sorenson study”) found that 
states that enforce noncompetes dampen the effects of venture 
capital investment on firm formation and patenting rates. 223 
Based on these findings, Samila and Sorenson conclude that the 
enforceability of noncompetes “significantly impedes entrepre-
neurship and employment growth.”224 Fourth, a 2015 study by 
Professors Matt Marx, Jasjit Singh, and Lee Fleming (the “Marx 
et al. study”) found a “brain drain” of inventors from Michigan to 
states that do not enforce noncompetes after 1985, the year in 
which Michigan law restored the enforceability of noncompetes.225 
Moreover, the Marx et al. study found that this effect was strong-
est for more highly skilled inventors.226 We now address substan-
tial limitations and, in some cases, outright flaws of these studies. 
Although we do not have space to address every study examining 
the relationship between noncompetes and innovation, our cri-
tique applies to the vast majority of lesser-cited studies on the 
issue. 
 a) Improper characterization of how strongly states enforce 
noncompetes.  First, all four of these studies, as well as many 
other studies, oversimplify and largely misjudge the variation in 
the strength of state-by-state enforcement of noncompetes. Spe-
cifically, these studies classify strength of enforcement either 
(1) in a binary fashion as “enforcing” or “non-enforcing” states, 
developed from the study by Stuart and Sorenson; or (2) according 
to a twelve-factor scale developed by Garmaise.227 
Specifically, Stuart and Sorenson classify each state as “non-
enforcing” or “enforcing.”228 They identify six states that, during 
the period 1985–1996, purportedly “preclude[d] the enforcement 
of all noncompete agreements” and five states that “only  
enforce[d] non-compete covenants under very specific circum-
stances.”229 These eleven states are considered nonenforcing.230 In 
 
 222 See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 408–10 (cited in note 63). 
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contrast, they identify twenty-six enforcing states that purport-
edly placed “no restrictions” on the enforcement of noncompetes, 
as well as thirteen other nonenforcing states that followed a “rea-
sonable[ness]” approach or enforced noncompetes limited in time 
or space.231 The Samila and Sorenson study as well as the Marx 
et al. study both rely on Stuart and Sorenson’s classification sys-
tem for their analyses.232 
This binary approach is inherently inaccurate—all states en-
force some noncompete provisions and no states enforce all non-
compete provisions. Other than California, North Dakota, and 
Oklahoma (until 1989), all states during that time period essen-
tially adopted a reasonableness approach to the enforcement of 
noncompetes, subject to variation in application.233 
Even if one were to draw an arbitrary line between states, it 
would result in at most two nonenforcing states during this time 
period. Consistent with both Professor Norman Bishara’s compre-
hensive state-by-state review234 and our own independent review, 
we find that during the relevant time periods, other than California 
and North Dakota, none of the purported nonenforcing states in 
the Stuart and Sorenson study—namely, Alaska, Connecticut, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma, Washington, 
and West Virginia—can plausibly be classified in this manner. 
It appears that Stuart and Sorenson primarily examined the 
language of specific state statutes as reproduced in the 1996 edi-
tion of the Malsberger treatise on state enforcement of covenants 
not to compete,235 without carefully reviewing the descriptions of 
actual case law in the same treatise. Critically, any state’s effec-
tive noncompete regime cannot be accurately described without 
taking into account both applicable statutes and judicial interpre-
tation of those statutes. Montana is a case in point. Apparently 
on the basis of the Montana statute voiding “contracts in restraint 
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of trade,”236 which has common origins with California’s statute, 
Stuart and Sorenson classify it as a state that “precludes the en-
forcement of all noncompete agreements.”237 Yet, the Malsberger 
treatise expressly states that “[d]espite subsection 703, Montana 
courts have upheld restrictive covenants in employment con-
tracts” under a general reasonableness standard.238 
For states without statutes, Stuart and Sorenson’s summary 
of the Malsberger treatise is also inaccurate. Our detailed review 
of the treatise, including cases cited therein, shows that all of 
their study’s supposed nonenforcing states lacking statutes—
Alaska, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Washington—are misclassi-
fied. 239  Again, these states essentially enforce noncompetes  
under a reasonableness standard. Indeed, Bishara—completely  
contrary to Stuart and Sorenson—classifies Connecticut and  
Washington as the fourth and eighth strongest enforcing states in 
1991, respectively.240 
In response to an earlier draft of this Article, Sorenson ran 
robustness checks to the main estimates in the initial study with 
Stuart using the Bishara measure of enforceability as well as a 
separate binary coding scheme in which North Dakota and  
California are the only nonenforcing states.241 In these revised 
models, the results are substantially similar to, and in some cases 
stronger than, Stuart and Sorenson’s initial results.242 
We are heartened by the fact that Sorenson—unlike Marx et 
al. or Garmaise—chose to revise his study’s initial model to take 
into account our criticisms. However, even these new results are 
subject to substantial limitations. First, the major result—that 
the states with weak noncompete enforcement regimes experi-
ence higher absolute founding rates than states with strong  
regimes that abstract away from state fixed effects—is not deter-
minative because other regional factors may correlate between 
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the weak regime and the level of new firm foundings in the re-
gion.243 Second, for the models that take into account state fixed 
effects by examining new firm foundings following IPOs and ac-
quisitions, the effects with the greatest magnitude are centered 
in California.244 This may reflect the fact that California operates 
in a unique environment not applicable to other states. Third, 
even though weak enforcement states other than California 
showed significant declines in new firm foundings following IPOs 
and interindustry acquisitions, this does not account for the qual-
ity of the new firms.245 As we note below, a more recent study by 
Starr and others finds that firms founded in strong enforcement 
states are of higher quality than those in weak enforcement 
states.246 Fourth, even the Bishara scale faces significant method-
ological limitations and has not been independently verified.247 
The Garmaise study replaces the oversimplified binary ap-
proach of Stuart and Sorenson with a graduated twelve-point 
scale that assigns equal weight (one or zero) to the answers (yes 
or no) to twelve questions based on those in a later version of the 
Malsberger treatise248 regarding the strength and scope of non-
compete law in various states.249 While this is an improvement, 
this scale is still problematic because there is no legitimate legal 
or other basis to equally weight each of the twelve factors. Com-
paring two of the factors as an example, it is arguably much more 
important how a plaintiff must prove the existence of an enforce-
able covenant not to compete than what counts as sufficient 
postemployment consideration in considering the strength of a 
state’s noncompete regime. 
There are other problems with the Garmaise scale.250 Garmaise’s 
initial factor—whether the state has a statute bearing on the en-
forceability of noncompetes (as opposed to mere common law)—
does not strike us as indicative one way or the other as to whether 
the state more strongly enforces noncompete law. 251  Although 
some very strict states (for example, California and North Dakota) 
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have adopted statutes, so have some states following the flexible, 
common law reasonableness standard (for example, North  
Carolina and Ohio). 
Next, arbitrary thresholds—such as whether a state has up-
held a statewide three-year restriction versus only a two-year 
one—are not particularly meaningful in the overall scheme of 
noncompete enforcement. The Malsberger treatise does not of 
course catalog all the noncompete opinions in a given state—thus, 
Garmaise could not even answer correctly whether “3-year 
statewide restrictions have [ever] been upheld” in a particular 
state.252 For instance, the applicable Malsberger treatise lists no 
cases in Wisconsin in which a three-year statewide noncompete 
was upheld;253 rather, the treatise cites only a case in Wisconsin 
for which a three-year noncompete was found unreasonable.254 
But, contrary to Garmaise’s scoring, Wisconsin courts in fact had 
upheld a six-year noncompete and suggested that a three-year 
noncompete would be reasonable.255 
Last, for perhaps the most important question—“What is an 
employer’s protectable interest and how is it defined?”—instead 
of examining the full range of protectable interests, Garmaise cu-
riously focuses on whether an “employer can prevent the em-
ployee from future independent dealings with all the firm’s cus-
tomers, not merely with the customers with whom the employee 
had direct contact.”256 Besides omitting important protectable in-
terests—such as trade secrets, training and development, and or-
dinary competition—customer relationships are not the type of 
interest that would typically be of great concern to the top execu-
tives at the large, publicly traded firms examined in Garmaise’s 
study. Rather, customer relationships and list restrictions—at 
least at a large public firm—are more likely to apply to sales per-
sonnel, who have direct relationships with the firm’s customers, 
but these personnel were not examined by Garmaise. Variation 
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among states in a factor not relevant to the examined class of em-
ployees may of course—like Stuart and Sorenson’s scale—produce 
spurious results. 
Ultimately, the ideal metric for evaluating a state’s noncom-
pete regime is the probability that a typical employee move that 
would be allowed in a hypothetical nonenforcing state would not 
be allowed in any given state. Although it is clearly impossible to 
achieve such accuracy, neither Stuart and Sorenson nor  
Garmaise provide sufficient verification for the legitimacy of their 
indices, such as an empirical analysis of actual cases. Such un-
tested and rough assessments do not make for valid studies.257 
This concern is confirmed by examining the correlations be-
tween the available enforcement scales. The correlation between 
the Stuart and Sorenson binary scale and the Garmaise twelve-
point scale is only 0.43. Bishara constructs an alternate scale258—
using seven of the twelve questions in the 1991 Richey and  
Malsberger treatise and the 2009 Malsberger treatise259—which, 
although it raises similar issues as the Garmaise scale, in our 
opinion is somewhat more likely to be accurate because it uses a 
graduated scale (unlike Stuart and Sorenson) and differentially 
weights different factors in the scale (unlike Garmaise). The cor-
relation between the Bishara and Garmaise scales is 0.66, and 
the correlation between the Bishara and Stuart and Sorenson 
scales is 0.42.260 
We recognize that some type of quantitative ranking is a nec-
essary precondition to undertake systematic analysis of the eco-
nomic effects of noncompete laws. However, given the clear errors 
in categorization and relatively low correlations among different 
scales, we are doubtful that the results of studies using the Stuart 
 
 257 Garmaise additionally examines individual changes in law in three states by using 
time-series estimations, see Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 390–93 (cited in note 63), the 
limitations of which we address in Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility in 
Innovation Markets at *24, Part 3.2.7 (cited in note 219). 
 258 See Bishara, 13 U Pa J Bus L at 771, 786–87 (cited in note 233). For an alternate 
scale modeled on the Bishara scale, see Evan Starr, Natarajan Balasubramanian, and 
Mariko Sakakibara, Screening Spinouts? How Noncompete Enforceability Affects the Cre-
ation, Growth, and Survival of New Firms, 64 Mgmt Sci 552, 558 (2018). The Starr and 
Bishara scales are correlated at 0.94; hence, we ignore the Starr scale. 
 259 See Brian Malsberger, Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey xvii–
xviii (BNA Books 2009) (“Malsberger 2009”); P. Jerome Richey and Brian M. Malsberger, 
Covenants Not to Compete: A State-by-State Survey xvi–xvii (BNA 1991). 
 260 We thank Norman Bishara for providing the data underlying his scale. 
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and Sorenson261 or Garmaise262 scales to measure the effects of 
noncompetes on labor mobility can be properly relied upon for em-
pirical study.263 
A better approach to construct an enforcement scale in our 
view would be to undertake a comprehensive assessment of the 
actual extent and conditions in which courts enforce (or not) non-
competes. A large number of actual cases should be randomly se-
lected in each state across a time period of interest. The assess-
ment would identify the outcome in the case along with key 
factors in each case, including occupation, at-will vs. contract em-
ployee, employer- vs. employee-driven termination, industry, 
term of the noncompete, geographic scope of the noncompete, and 
other key circumstances, such as whether trade secrets, sale of a 
business, dissolution of a partnership, choice of law or forum, and 
substantial employee training were present. Multivariate, logistic 
regressions could then be constructed to compare how different 
factors affect outcomes across states. These results could then be 
substituted, where appropriate, for factors like those in Bishara 
to construct more accurate scales. 
 b) Failure to properly reflect cross-border enforcement of 
noncompetes.  Garmaise and Marx et al. include cross-state bor-
der job changes in their datasets.264 The Marx et al. study focuses 
on the supposed “brain drain” from Michigan to “non-enforcing” 
states following its decision to enforce noncompetes.265 Such cross-
border moves are complex from a legal perspective, because, as 
 
 261 Studies that rely on the Stuart and Sorenson scale include: Kenneth A. Younge 
and Matt Marx, The Value of Employee Retention: Evidence from a Natural Experiment, 
25 J Econ & Mgmt Strategy 652, 658–70 (2016); Younge, Tong, and Fleming, 36 Strategic 
Mgmt J at 692 (cited in note 110).  
 262 Studies that rely on the Garmaise scale include: I.P.L. Png and Sampsa Samila, 
Trade Secrets Law and Mobility: Evidence from “Inevitable Disclosure” *20 appx 2 (work-
ing paper, Feb 14, 2015), archived at https://perma.cc/MH8D-VWYS; Raffaele Conti, Do 
Non-competition Agreements Lead Firms to Pursue Risky R&D Projects?, 35 Strategic 
Mgmt J 1230, 1234–35 (2014); Bill Francis, et al, When Finding a New Job Is Not Easy: 
The Influence of the State Law of Non-Competition Agreements on the Characteristics of 
M&As *9 (working paper, Dec 2007), archived at https://perma.cc/U7JW-3V7A; Sharon 
Belenzon and Mark Schankerman, Spreading the Word: Geography, Policy, and 
Knowledge Spillovers, 95 Rev Econ & Stat 884, 895 (2013). 
 263 Even Sorenson’s revised results are subject to substantial qualifications. See notes 
241–47 and accompanying text. Nor, as far we know, have these revised results been pub-
lished in any form. 
 264 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 394–95 (cited in note 219);  
Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396–97 (cited in note 63). 
 265 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 394 (cited in note 219). 
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Garmaise properly notes, the law of the state of the former em-
ployer will sometimes apply and, in other instances, the law of 
the state of the new employer will apply.266 
Marx et al., however, overlook this complexity and errone-
ously assume that nonenforcing states always apply their own 
law so as to void a noncompete agreement that falls under the law 
of another state.267 Even assuming that Marx et al.’s list of ten 
“nonenforcing” states is correct—which it is not, as we discussed 
above—the only nonenforcing states that generally refuse to  
enforce out-of-state noncompetes on public policy grounds are 
California and North Dakota.268 Yet, even California does not al-
ways void out-of-state noncompete agreements. California courts 
sometimes transfer cases to another state or stay proceedings so 
those in another state can proceed, particularly when the employ-
ment agreement selects that other state’s law and courts.269 
Furthermore, and perhaps more importantly, all states—in-
cluding California—will generally enforce a prior judgment of an-
other state that afforded the parties a full and fair opportunity to 
litigate the matter. Thus, if an employee is subject to jurisdiction 
in the state of the former employer, which often will be the case, 
then the former employer can sue the employee in its home state. 
If the employee is not subject to an exclusive choice-of-forum 
clause, the employee may then sue for a declaratory judgment in 
 
 266 The law of the state of the former employer may either be the state in which the 
employee was located or some other state, to the extent the employer uses a choice-of-law 
provision specifying the law of a different state (for example, its state of incorporation or 
headquarters). See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 390 n 9 (cited in note 63); Gillian 
Lester and Elizabeth Ryan, Choice of Law and Employee Restrictive Covenants: An Amer-
ican Perspective, 31 Comp Labor L & Pol J 389, 396–97 (2009) (discussing the situation in 
which the choice-of-law clauses select the employer’s place of incorporation). 
 267 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 395, 403 (cited in note 219). 
 268 We use the 1996 Malsberger treatise to make this determination, see Malsberger 
1996 at 102, 136–37, 156–57, 201–02, 618, 684, 719, 857–58, 907, 1147, 1160 (cited in note 
233) (citing various cases), as the 2015 Marx, Singh, and Fleming study relies on the same 
treatise to classify state enforcement regimes. See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch 
Pol at 396 n 2 (cited in note 219), citing Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited 
in note 220) (relying on the 1996 Malsberger treatise for data on states that do not enforce 
noncompetes). 
 269 California substantially restricted the situations in which it will enforce out-of-
state noncompetes starting in 2017, but during the time periods in question of these stud-
ies, California courts were sometimes amenable to enforcing, directly or indirectly, out-of-
state noncompetes. See notes 105–06 and accompanying text. 
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the state of the new employer. Although there are important nu-
ances, essentially, whichever court enforces judgment first will 
typically bind the employee.270 
The simplification of these doctrinal complexities in the Marx 
et al. study renders that study’s key assumption—namely, that 
nonenforcing states always apply their own law—flawed, and 
thus confounds its causal identification strategy. As we explain 
below, given the small number of annual employee moves out of 
Michigan to nonenforcing states measured in the Marx et al. 
study, this flaw could lead to substantial overestimates of the 
measured effects of noncompetes. 
The Garmaise study also suffers from difficulties relating to 
the treatment of out-of-state moves. Specifically, Garmaise in-
cludes within his analysis out-of-state moves, and, unlike the 
Marx et al. study, assumes for simplicity that these moves are 
always governed by the law of the state of the former employer.271 
Because Garmaise’s dataset contains only a little over six hun-
dred within-industry transfers (out-of-industry transfers would 
generally not be governed by noncompetes), it is essential to know 
what percentage of those transfers were out-of-state (and  
Garmaise does not disclose as much). If the percentage is large, 
then some results in the Garmaise study may not be accurate. 
 c) No data on actual usage of noncompete agreements by 
state.  Even if one believes these studies accurately categorize 
strength of enforcement, no study—other than Garmaise’s—pro-
vides any measure of the actual usage of noncompete agreements 
within their sample set or how often employers actually enforce 
noncompetes. Available evidence suggests widely varying use of 
noncompete agreements among various executive and technical 
employee groups,272 and while there is new evidence regarding 
 
 270 See Lester and Ryan, 31 Comp Labor L & Pol J at 405–20 (cited in note 266); 
Timothy P. Glynn, Interjurisdictional Competition in Enforcing Noncompetition Agree-
ments: Regulatory Risk Management and the Race to the Bottom, 65 Wash & Lee L Rev 
1381, 1385–86, 1418–28 (2008). 
 271 See Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396 n 15 (cited in note 63). 
 272 Based on a sample of top-level executives, Garmaise finds a roughly 70 percent 
usage rate, see Garmaise, 27 J L Econ & Org at 396 (cited in note 63). Based on a sample 
of CEOs at S&P 1500 companies, Bishara, Martin, and Thomas, 68 Vand L Rev at 2 (cited 
in note 85), find an 80 percent rate. Based on a sample of founders of VC-backed firms, 
Professors Steven Kaplan and Per Strömberg find a roughly 70 percent rate. Steven N. 
Kaplan and Per Strömberg, Financial Contracting Theory Meets the Real World: An Em-
pirical Analysis of Venture Capital Contracts, 70 Rev Econ Stud 281, 289 (2003). An IEEE 
study of engineers reports a 47 percent rate. See Matt Marx, The Firm Strikes Back: Non-
compete Agreements and the Mobility of Technical Professionals, 76 Am Sociological Rev 
695, 702 (2011). A 2015 study finds lower usage rates, reporting about 30 percent for man-
agers and about 35 percent in the engineering, computer, and mathematical fields, see 
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noncompete usage (which we discuss below),273 there is no evi-
dence to our knowledge of the rate of enforcement across states. 
This inability to differentiate firm-level usage and enforcement 
behavior among states introduces the possibility that the ob-
served variation in mobility is not the result of differing state-
level enforcement regimes but rather unobserved variation of 
firm-level usage and enforcement of noncompete agreements and 
substitutes for noncompetes, such as trade secret actions.274  If 
firms in different states substantially vary in their propensity to 
use and enforce noncompetes and noncompete substitutes, and 
this variance is not highly correlated with enforcement strength, 
regressing on enforcement indices may yield spurious results. 
Relatedly, none of these studies attempted to control for the 
variation in state-level enforceability, much less usage and en-
forcement of noncompete substitutes, such as patents, trade se-
crets, stock options, long-term contracts, invention assignments, 
and the like, which we described earlier.275 This omission alone 
can substantially confound any possible causal link between re-
sults and noncompete enforceability, usage, and enforcement.276 
 d) Measurement errors are exacerbated by small data sets.  
The previous criticisms are especially salient for the Marx et al. 
study (as well as a previous study performed by Marx and others 
in 2009) given the relatively small incremental decrease in abso-
lute terms in labor mobility in Michigan identified in the 2009 
and 2015 Marx et al. studies. The 2009 Marx et al. study consid-
ers 98,468 inventors and 27,478 inventor moves within Michigan 
 
Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *43 fig 4 (cited in 
note 11). These differences are arguably explained by the different datasets—the studies 
by Kaplan and Strömberg; Garmaise; and Bishara, Martin, and Thomas focus on the most 
sophisticated companies, while Starr, Prescott, and Bishara’s findings are likely more re-
flective of firms as a whole. Additionally, Garmaise and Bishara, Martin, and Thomas 
focus on top-level executives. 
 273 See Part III.C. 
 274 See Robert W. Gomulkiewicz, Leaky Covenants-Not-to-Compete as the Legal Infra-
structure for Innovation, 49 UC Davis L Rev 251, 256–57, 277–80 (2015) (arguing that 
Washington technology firms rarely enforce noncompetes); Risch, 12 Empl Rts & Empl Pol 
J at 346 (cited in note 122) (acknowledging Gilson’s theory that trade secret actions might 
be substitutes for noncompete actions for firms). 
 275 See Part II.A.2. Although some of these instruments fall under federal law, there 
remains effective variation in state-level enforcement of these instruments due to differing 
applications of the law at a regional level. See, for example, Mark A. Lemley, Where to File 
Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q J 1, 28–37 (2010). 
 276 See Part II.A.2 (noting that any empirical study examining the marginal effects of 
noncompetes would need to take into account these substitute mechanisms). 
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over the period 1963–2006.277 Labor mobility actually increased 
following the enactment of the Michigan Antitrust Reform Act278 
(MARA) over the full time period from 7.18 percent to 8.98 per-
cent, whereas in other nonenforcing states there was a larger in-
crease, from 7.95 percent to 10.80 percent.279 
While the Marx et al. studies never report these differences 
in absolute numbers, they are easy to calculate. Specifically, the 
difference of in-state mobility in Michigan versus nonenforcing 
states in absolute terms was roughly 1 percent, equating to an 
absolute difference of about 100–200 moves per year purportedly 
lost within Michigan due to the enforcement of noncompetes. For 
inventors moving out of Michigan, the numbers are much lower—
the purported difference of inventors moving out of Michigan to 
nonenforcing states pre- and post-MARA is in the range of merely 
twenty to twenty-five inventor moves per year. Given the very 
small number of job changes upon which the results of these stud-
ies are premised, the potentially negating effects of the shortcom-
ings identified above cannot be easily dismissed.280 
 e) Unique problems of the Michigan studies.  The 2009 and 
2015 Marx et al. studies281 have attracted particular attention be-
cause they exploit an apparently exogenous change to the legal 
treatment of noncompetes in a particular jurisdiction, which 
therefore provides an opportunity to study the effect of noncom-
pete enforceability on inventor mobility and, potentially, innova-
tion. As noted earlier, the legal change was effected by enactment 
of MARA, which restored the enforceability of noncompetes under 
Michigan law. 
 
 277 See Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 880 (cited in note 219). The 
2015 Marx, Singh, and Fleming study examines the period 1975–2005. See Marx, Singh, 
and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 (cited in note 219). 
 278 Michigan Antitrust Reform Act § 4a (1987), codified at Mich Comp Laws 
§ 445.774a. 
 279 See Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 884 (cited in note 219). 
 280 Moreover, the Marx et al. studies track the mobility of employees to any firm, ra-
ther than mobility to competing firms. No state enforces noncompetes that purport to pro-
scribe employment at noncompeting firms. Thus, in order to isolate the effects of noncom-
petes, it is essential to track labor mobility solely among competing firms. In empirical 
terms, an employee who makes an out-of-industry move to a noncompeting firm is, con-
trary to the implicit assumption of the Marx et al. study, not effectively subject to a non-
compete restriction, and hence should not be classified within a “treatment” group. Thus, 
the number of inventor “moves” of interest to these studies is even lower than the numbers 
we calculate in the text. 
 281 Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol 394 (cited in note 219); Marx, Strumsky, 
and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci 875 (cited in note 219). 
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The striking results of the Marx studies—a state restores the 
enforceability of dormant noncompete provisions, inventor mobil-
ity slows down, and inventors flee the jurisdiction for states with-
out enforceable noncompetes (essentially, California)—are com-
monly cited, including in federal government reports, 282  to 
support the view that noncompetes are unwise public policy for 
jurisdictions that seek to cultivate the next Silicon Valley. 
However, beyond the serious shortcomings we have already 
described in these studies, the Marx et al. studies make an erro-
neous assumption that wholly undermines their identification 
methodology and hence, their results. Specifically, both the 2009 
and 2015 studies assume that, following Michigan’s regime 
change in 1985, preexisting noncompete provisions automatically 
became enforceable.283 This is not the case. The study authors ap-
pear to overlook that MARA included a savings clause providing 
that the statute repealed by MARA would “remain in force for the 
purpose” of enforcing any liability under the repealed act.284 Con-
sistent with this saving clause, Michigan courts declined to en-
force noncompetes that were entered into prior to MARA.285 
In other words, no existing employee with noncompete 
clauses in employment agreements governed by Michigan law be-
came bound by those clauses following MARA. Rather, any em-
ployer seeking to bind an existing employee would need to have 
that employee sign a new agreement or affirmatively assent to a 
prior agreement, which would generally result in employers in-
curring transaction costs and possibly providing additional com-
pensation. As a result, one would expect that the number of em-
ployees in Michigan actually subject to enforceable noncompetes 
 
 282 See, for example, Office of Economic Policy, Non-compete Contracts at *18 (cited 
in note 36); White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *7 (cited in note 36). While relying 
on the Marx et al. “Michigan” studies to support the view that noncompetes depress “labor 
market dynamism,” the White House report did mention that “other authors dispute these 
findings.” White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *7 (cited in note 36). This is most 
likely a somewhat oblique reference to our companion paper on noncompetes. See gener-
ally Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility (cited in note 219). 
 283 For instance, the Marx et al. 2015 study states: “Given that the repeal of Public 
Act No. 05 merely removed the ban and did not stipulate any governing timeframe, all 
such contracts [i.e., preexisting noncompetes] would have become immediately enforcea-
ble.” Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 (cited in note 219). 
 284 Michigan Antitrust Reform Act § 18 (1985), codified at Mich Comp Laws § 445.788. 
For a detailed description of the history leading up to the passage of MARA, see Bristol 
Window and Door, Inc v Hoogenstyn, 650 NW2d 670, 673–79 (Mich App 2002). 
 285 See, for example, Compton v Joseph Lepak, DDS, PC, 397 NW2d 311, 316 (Mich 
App 1986) (“When an agreement or contract is entered into in violation of the statute, 
repeal of that statute does not make the agreement valid because the Legislature cannot 
validate a contract which never had a legal existence.”). 
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would be quite low for a considerable period following MARA’s 
passage. 
During this transition period, one cannot legitimately con-
sider all Michigan inventors as being subject to enforceable non-
competes—a critical assumption in both papers. The true regime 
change (that is, taking into account both nominal and effective 
changes to noncompete enforceability) most likely took consider-
able time to impact contracting behavior in the market. As a re-
sult, the number of inventors who were immediately affected by 
MARA was small (which impacts the statistical force of the stud-
ies’ results),286 and a sizable portion of the studies’ results are un-
likely to be causally linked to the legal change effected by MARA. 
Yet, the 2009 Marx et al. study finds the exact opposite of the 
effects one would expect from a gradual adoption of noncompetes 
after the enactment of the MARA statute, stating that “the effect 
of the policy reversal remained strong for several years and then 
weakened, both in terms of the magnitude and statistical signifi-
cance of the coefficient on the interaction variable.”287 Thus, it is 
extremely likely in our view that factors unrelated to the change 
in noncompete law in Michigan explain the results, if they are at 
all correct, of the 2009 study. At a bare minimum, the factual mis-
understanding of the nonretroactive effect of the MARA change 
casts great doubt on the reliability of using the Marx et al. studies 
as a basis for substantive policy recommendations. 
 f) Correlation, not causality.  Even if the results in these 
studies were somehow correct, none of these studies can show 
causation between noncompete enforcement and their findings of 
reduced innovation (as indicated by various proxy measures). 
Other than the Marx et al. study, they are all cross-sectional re-
gressions and cannot rule out omitted variables to explain the ob-
served variation. Additionally, Stuart and Sorenson’s major find-
ing (including, as noted earlier, Sorenson’s revised major finding) 
abstracts away from state-level fixed effects, and they properly 
note that they “must interpret this result cautiously, as a number 
of omitted regional factors might correlate with both the weak 
non-compete enforcement dummy and the level of entrepreneur-
ial activity in the region.”288 Stuart and Sorenson’s models that 
take account of state-level fixed effects do not account for unique 
 
 286 For further discussion, see Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility at 
*22 (cited in note 219). 
 287 See Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 883 (cited in note 219). 
 288 See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 194 (cited in note 220). 
1024 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:953 
within-state, regional omitted variables that may explain the ob-
served patterns, plus are subject to a number of additional limi-
tations.289 The Samila and Sorenson study is subject to similar 
limitations, as well as another endogeneity concern. Specifically, 
this study uses the number of patents to measure innovative  
output, but patenting is in part a substitute for noncompete en-
forcement. 290  Thus, finding increased patenting in states with 
weak nonenforcement, such as California, is not necessarily 
meaningful. The Marx et al. study, despite the fact that it exam-
ines a seemingly exogenous shock to Michigan law, also suffers 
from causality concerns because—as explained in the previous 
Section—the regime change did not apply retroactively. 
Aside from causality, some of the studies use rough proxies 
for innovative activity. Stuart and Sorenson merely examine the 
relationship of noncompetes to the absolute number of spin-offs 
following IPOs and acquisitions. Studies on patent value have in-
dicated that a small number of high-quality innovations dispro-
portionately account for the total value of all innovations; in other 
words, not all innovations—and, hence, not all innovative compa-
nies—are created equally.291 Thus, it is not surprising that a more 
recent study finds that, while noncompetes may depress the ab-
solute number of same-industry spin-offs, increased enforcement 
is associated with the founding of higher quality firms, particu-
larly ones that began and continued with more employees and 
survived for longer periods. 292  Relatedly, another recent study 
finds that, while noncompetes reduce employee mobility and de-
press certain indicators of entrepreneurship, increased enforcea-
bility is associated with an increase in capital investment  
at existing “knowledge-intensive” firms,293 suggesting that non-
competes sometimes support investment incentives consistent 
with theoretical expectations. 
 
 289 See notes 241–47 and accompanying text. 
 290 Samila and Sorenson, 57 Mgmt Sci at 430 (cited in note 9). As noted previously, 
Agarwal and coauthors found that aggressive patent litigation by US semiconductor firms 
discourages labor mobility (presumably, because potential new employers fear litigation 
and elect not to hire from those firms). See note 109 and accompanying text. 
 291 See John R. Allison, et al, Valuable Patents, 92 Georgetown L J 435, 448–65 (2004). 
 292 See Starr, Balasubramanian, and Sakakibara, 64 Mgmt Sci at 567 (cited in 
note 258). Although this Starr study does not compare the total innovative activity of the 
startups in nonenforcing and enforcing states, a smaller number of highly innovative 
startups in enforcing states could outweigh the innovative activity of a larger number of 
less innovative startups in nonenforcing states. 
 293 See Jessica S. Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility on Corporate In-
vestment and Entrepreneurship *3–5, 20–21 (working paper, Jan 3, 2018), archived at 
https://perma.cc/9EQX-GDTU. 
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 g) Why the limitations of these studies likely affect the va-
lidity of their results.  To be certain, the limitations we have dis-
cussed above do not mandate that the results in these studies are 
incorrect. It may be the case that some studies suffer from ordi-
nary measurement error, which would underestimate the size of 
the effects found in those studies, or the errors we have identified 
are too minor to plausibly change these studies’ results. However, 
there are strong reasons to doubt that the limitations described 
above are ordinary measurement errors or essentially trivial, im-
plying that they are likely to alter these studies’ results—either 
their size or significance, or even the direction and nature of the 
effects measured. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Stuart and 
Sorenson scale misclassifies eight of ten states as “nonenforcing” 
but does not misclassify any of the “enforcing” states.294 Such mis-
classification is not random, but rather is a one-way systemic er-
ror. Stuart and Sorenson’s misclassification of “enforcing” and 
“nonenforcing” states lies at the heart of the empirical instru-
ments in the Marx et al. studies used to measure worker mobility 
and the potential effects on innovative activity.295 
Although Garmaise’s scale appears to suffer more from ran-
dom error than systemic error—because in our view, there is no 
scale, even Bishara’s scale, 296  that has been definitively vali-
dated—it may be the case that Garmaise’s results are subject to 
the same limitations as the Marx et al. studies. So while the re-
sults set forth in the Garmaise study and the Marx et al. studies 
may be statistically significant, they are not necessarily meaning-
ful when determining the role noncompetes play in suppressing 
innovative activity. 
Second, the failure to properly take account of the nonretro-
activity of Michigan’s change in law via MARA also casts consid-
erable doubt on the reliability of the differences-in-differences 
methodology employed by the Marx et al. studies. Specifically, it 
confounds these studies’ claims to causal identification, because 
the only Michigan employees not entering entirely new jobs sub-
ject to enforceable noncompetes post-MARA were those selected 
by their employers for “treatment,” in other words, the signing of 
a noncompete provision. Such selection would not be random, but 
instead would turn on factors such as whether the employee was 
 
 294 See Stuart and Sorenson, 48 Admin Sci Q at 190 (cited in note 220). 
 295 See Marx, Singh, and Fleming, 44 Rsrch Pol at 396 n 2, 396–97 (cited in note 219); 
Marx, Strumsky, and Fleming, 55 Mgmt Sci at 880 (cited in note 219). 
 296 See Bishara, 13 U Pa J Bus L at 786–87 (cited in note 233). 
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at-will, had knowledge of company trade secrets, was highly 
skilled, and the like. 
Third, the failure of the Garmaise study and the Marx et al. 
studies to properly take account of cross-border moves, as we note 
above, may systematically overestimate the effects of noncom-
petes on labor mobility because in some situations these moves 
would have been governed by a contrary set of laws than assumed 
in the empirical approaches in these studies. 
Fourth, even if these studies’ findings are nominally correct, 
because of various implicit assumptions about the law and exter-
nal factors that are certainly or very likely inaccurate, one cannot 
casually attribute decreases in labor mobility wholly to noncom-
pete enforcement trends. For instance, one or more of these stud-
ies wrongly assumes that noncompetes govern moves outside of 
an industry, that firm-level usage and enforcement of noncom-
petes is constant across states, that high-level executives’ mobil-
ity would be prone to court decisions regarding the role of cus-
tomer lists, and that nonretroactive changes in certain laws were 
exogenous “shocks.” 
In sum, of the four major nonexperimental studies examining 
the effects of noncompetes on innovation that we reviewed in de-
tail, all suffer from multiple infirmities. In our view, these infir-
mities cast substantial doubt on the validity of the findings in 
these studies. In other words, there is a strong possibility that 
these errors would reduce the size of the effects in these studies, 
result in opposite effects, or potentially eliminate statistically sig-
nificant effects entirely. Although Sorenson’s revision of his ear-
lier study nominally confirmed his earlier results, it remains sub-
ject to substantial limitations.297 As such, none of these studies 
can be relied upon for a general assessment of the role noncom-
petes play in the innovative process. 
All of the additional studies we could locate that find a nega-
tive effect on innovation from noncompetes appear to suffer from 
one or more of these limitations.298 Given the theoretical reasons 
to doubt that noncompetes always have a negative effect on inno-
vation, we believe that there is little to no empirical evidence that 
noncompetes necessarily retard innovation. 299  Rather, as ex-
plained later in the Article, noncompetes will sometimes hinder 
and sometimes foster innovative activity depending on a variety 
of contextual circumstances.  
 
 297 See notes 241–47 and accompanying text. 
 298 See notes 261–62 (listing studies relying on flawed scales). 
 299 See Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility at *29 (cited in note 219). 
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2. Experimental studies. 
Professors On Amir and Orly Lobel conducted an experi-
mental study that found that participants in simulated noncom-
pete treatment groups exerted less effort and made more errors 
than a restriction-free control group.300 The study’s experimental 
design abstracts away from the limitations of the empirical stud-
ies but introduces its own concerns that cast serious doubt on its 
applicability to any actual technology environment. 
In the experimental setup, participants are informed that 
they will potentially complete two rounds of a given task. Each 
participant is paid $0.50 for the completion of each task plus a 
potential bonus. However, individuals in the “full noncompete” 
group are told they cannot participate in the second round. Indi-
viduals in the “partial noncompete” group are told they will re-
ceive 20 percent less payment in the second round. Individuals in 
the “no noncompete” group are given no restrictions. Participants 
either perform a creative, word association task or an effort-
based, matrix addition task. Each participant performs only the 
first round.301 Amir and Lobel find a large negative effect on com-
pleting the first round of tasks in the full noncompete group, but 
not the partial noncompete group, for both the creative and effort-
based tasks. Additionally, they find a significantly larger error 
rate on the effort-based task for the full and partial noncompete 
group. 
Based on this experimental result, Amir and Lobel conclude 
that “[o]ur behavioral experiment demonstrates that certain 
postemployment contractual restrictions may negatively impact 
motivation and performance, as evidenced by the greater rates at 
which individuals abandon tasks.”302 Although we agree that non-
competes may provide some incentives for employees to underin-
vest in their own human capital, Amir and Lobel’s experimental 
setup does not take into account important real-world mecha-
nisms to offset these effects. 
First, as we discussed earlier, one of the major reasons for the 
use of noncompetes is to provide incentives for firms to invest in 
the human capital of their employees. 303  Consistent with that  
theoretical expectation, a study by Starr finds that stronger  
noncompete enforcement regimes are associated with increased 
 
 300 See Amir and Lobel, 16 Stan Tech L Rev at 866 (cited in note 63).  
 301 See id at 852–53, 870–74. 
 302 Id at 863. 
 303 See Part I.B.2. 
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employee training.304 Amir and Lobel’s setup does not allow for 
any firm-sponsored training. 
Second, the flat payment scheme of $0.50 per task plus a bo-
nus in Amir and Lobel abstracts away from the numerous other 
performance incentive mechanisms we discussed above—such as 
vesting options, deferred compensation, and the simple ability for 
star employees to renegotiate—that are present in a typical em-
ployment situation.305 
Third, contrary to Amir and Lobel’s setup, a noncompete 
agreement never means that there is no second round of perfor-
mance. Employees are engaged in a repeat-play game with em-
ployers, who rationally reward high-performing employees and 
penalize low-performing employees. Simultaneously, employees 
are engaged in a repeat-play game with potential outside employ-
ers. Given the discipline imposed by the common-law reasonable-
ness constraint and competitive labor markets, noncompetes are 
always limited in duration, geography, and industry scope. As a 
result, employees may port their industry-specific skills to com-
petitors after a certain amount of time and may port their non-
industry-specific skills to noncompetitors at any time. Even dur-
ing the term of a noncompete, an employee can move to any firm 
that is willing to pay the price demanded by the existing employer 
to waive the noncompete. 
These three reasons are likely to substantially dampen, if not 
eliminate, any incentives that noncompetes might otherwise cre-
ate for employees to underinvest in their own human capital. In-
deed, a more recent experimental study performed a similar ex-
periment but found that those in the noncompete group exerted 
no less effort than those in the control group.306 Using a more re-
alistic setup, this experiment paid the noncompete group more to 
compensate for any disincentives created in the noncompete 
treatment—which is precisely what would be expected to occur in 
any rational employer-employee bargaining situation. 
 
 304 See Evan Starr, Consider This: Training, Wages and the Enforceability of Cove-
nants Not to Compete, 72 Indust & Labor Rel Rev 783, 785, 814 (2019). 
 305 See Norman D. Bishara and Evan Starr, The Incomplete Non-compete Picture, 20 
Lewis & Clark L Rev 497, 522–23 (2015). 
 306 See Guido Bünstorf, et al, Win Shift Lose Stay—An Experimental Test of Non-
Compete Clauses *18–19 (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods Preprint 
No 2013/17, Sept 2013), archived at https://perma.cc/K2NM-4L4V. 
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3. Evaluation. 
In current policy discussions concerning noncompetes, it is 
common to find statements referring to empirical studies “show-
ing” that noncompetes depress inventor mobility and, as a result, 
reduce innovation in general. This interpretation is simply not 
supported by a close examination of the methodologies and sub-
stance of the empirical studies upon which these statements typ-
ically rely.307 Even assuming without further examination that 
noncompetes have some appreciable marginal effect on inventor 
mobility—a proposition as to which there is considerable 
doubt308—there is no compelling basis to conclude that any such 
effect results in reduced innovation compared to a legal environ-
ment in which noncompetes had no legal force. 
The most recent empirical research on the effects of noncom-
petes provides even more ground to doubt the conventional char-
acterization of the evidence. That research has reached more  
nuanced results that are consistent with the older law-and- 
economics analysis that, as discussed earlier, had emphasized 
how noncompetes have the potential both to impede employee mo-
bility and enhance firms’ incentives to invest in cultivating em-
ployee capital.309 In particular, these recent studies have found 
that the ability to enforce noncompetes can increase incentives at 
medical practices to make intrafirm client referrals (and thereby in-
crease overall returns),310 increase capital investment at knowledge- 
intensive firms while reducing the entry of new firms,311 and re-
sult in the establishment of fewer but higher quality spin-offs 
from parent firms.312 Another study finds that legal limitations on 
 
 307 For a similar view, see Bishara and Starr, 20 Lewis & Clark L Rev at 498–502, 
534–40 (cited in note 305) (finding that existing empirical literature suffers from method-
ological imperfections and cannot currently support policy actions to impose limitations or 
outright bans on the use of noncompetes). 
 308 See Barnett and Sichelman, Revisiting Labor Mobility at *29 (cited in note 219) 
(stating that, due to methodological and other shortcomings, no existing empirical study 
can “be relied upon for a general assessment of the role noncompetes play in restricting 
labor mobility”). 
 309 See Part I.B. 
 310 See Kurt Lavetti, Carol Simon, and William D. White, The Impacts of Restricting 
Mobility of Skilled Service Workers: Evidence from Physicians *21, 34 (working paper, 
June 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/4CU3-LZE5. Specifically, the authors find that 
practices that used noncompetes for physicians enjoyed greater overall returns, even con-
trolling for physician quality and other potentially relevant factors, which the authors 
attribute to stronger incentives to invest in advertising and making intrafirm client refer-
rals (given the reduced risk of losing clients in the event of a physician departure). 
 311 See Jeffers, The Impact of Restricting Labor Mobility at *22–23 (cited in note 293). 
 312 See Starr, Balasubramanian, and Sakakibara, 64 Mgmt Sci at 563 (cited in 
note 258). 
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worker mobility can increase investment at firms that rely on 
higher-skill workers.313 While we do not separately review these 
more recent studies, it would not be surprising if the empirical 
literature on noncompetes ultimately established that they result 
in a mixed bag of welfare effects that vary across firms and indus-
tries. That would be fully consistent with theoretical expectations 
that noncompetes can both promote and dampen overall innova-
tion, and it is therefore indeterminate as to which effect will dom-
inate in any particular case. 
III.  MAKING NONCOMPETE POLICY UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
The substantial theoretical and empirical literature on non-
competes (and, by implication, other restraints on employee mo-
bility in innovation markets) appears to arrive at a dead end. 
Even if it were conceded that noncompetes have some marginal 
effect on labor mobility, neither the canonical Silicon  
Valley / Route 128 narrative nor the empirical literature provides 
support for then drawing an adverse connection between noncom-
petes and innovation outcomes in general. As a practical matter, 
however, the law cannot be neutral: it must take some position on 
whether noncompetes should be enforced. In this Part, we offer 
some tentative conclusions concerning the appropriate legal 
treatment of noncompetes, applying the error-cost approach from 
antitrust law that explicitly embeds uncertainty into policy  
analysis and the adjudicative process.314 
In the course of this exercise, we identify certain variables 
that may impact the use and efficiency effects of noncompetes 
across different industries, firms, and even employee types. While 
this analysis is preliminary, it conforms to evidence on the rates 
of use of noncompetes, which suggests that markets tailor the use 
of noncompetes across employee categories, rather than chroni-
cally overusing them as assumed in the collective-action problem 
that drives Gilson’s and the follow-on literature’s laudatory char-
acterization of California’s noncompete policy. Given that this 
critical assumption appears to have a limited scope of application 
as an empirical matter, and in light of the material uncertainties 
that we identified in the empirical studies that are routinely cited 
 
 313 See Ali Sanati, How Does Labor Mobility Affect Corporate Leverage and Invest-
ment? *3–4 (working paper, Mar 2018), archived at https://perma.cc/NU6M-6DNR. 
 314 For the leading statements of this approach in the antitrust literature, see note 38. 
2020] The Case for Noncompetes 1031 
in support of precluding noncompetes more broadly (and, by im-
plication, other constraints on employee mobility), 315  we ulti-
mately conclude that the reasonableness standard, applied on a 
case-specific basis through common law adjudication, is likely the 
best approach of all. 
A. Policy Continuum 
Throughout our discussion, we keep in mind three categories 
of policy options. As shown in the graphic below, these options can 
be located on a continuum extending from full enforcement (Op-
tion I), which we call the “per se legal” option, to zero enforcement 
(Option III), which we call the “per se illegal” option. Note that 
Option II, which corresponds to the common law’s reasonableness 
standard, encompasses in practical terms a range of more and 
less stringent variants, which push the option closer toward the 
full- or zero-enforcement poles of the policy continuum. In practi-
cal terms, this intermediate range could encompass a number of 
different principles under which courts could adjudicate the en-
forceability of a particular noncompete provision and, in doing so, 
reflect the complex policy trade-off implicated by the enforcement 
of these provisions. To take just one example, a state may elect to 
enforce noncompetes subject to a reasonableness limitation but 
apply that limitation so that noncompetes are enforced only when 
the plaintiff shows that the noncompete promoted either the pro-
tection of trade secrets or the recovery of a training investment.316 
Such an approach would tend to push the law closer toward zero 
enforcement (at least in the case of noncompetes that do not gen-
erate any offsetting social advantage in the form of increased 
R&D or training incentives). Alternatively, a state may elect to 
enforce noncompetes subject to a “blue pencil” rule, according to 
which a court can “rescue” an otherwise invalid noncompete 
clause by restricting its durational, geographic or industry scope 
so that it falls within the boundaries of what the court determines 
to be reasonable.317 Such an approach would tend to push the law 
closer toward full enforcement. 
 
 315 See Part II.B. 
 316 For example, New York courts will enforce a noncompete if it “(1) is no greater 
than is required for the protection of the legitimate interest of the employer, (2) does not 
impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to the public.” BDO  
Seidman v Hirshberg, 712 NE2d 1220, 1223 (NY 1999). 
 317 See, for example, Coates v Heat Wagons, Inc, 942 NE2d 905, 914–15 (Ind App 2011) 
(endorsing the blue pencil doctrine). 
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B. The “Free Contracting” Baseline 
From an economic point of view, a noncompete is a voluntary 
transaction involving a human capital asset being exchanged for 
some form of monetary or other compensation. As such, any effi-
ciency analysis must start from the free contracting baseline—
that is, the well-established view that voluntary exchanges result 
in mutual welfare gains for the contracting parties, absent evi-
dence of market failure, such as fraud, coercion, or information 
asymmetries. Those private welfare gains represent social wel-
fare gains so long as the parties’ exchange transaction does not 
generate negative third-party externalities. The presumptive ef-
ficiency of voluntary exchange transactions accounts for the com-
mon law’s traditional indifference to the substantive fairness of 
contracts; rather, courts generally determine enforceability based 
on whether an agreement meets certain formal procedural crite-
ria.318  While there are limited exceptions to this principle (for  
example, the unconscionability doctrine, although courts rarely 
accept it as a defense319), it holds true across contract law as a 
general matter.320 
From this starting point, the per se legal option is the default 
policy approach, and California’s refusal to enforce the noncom-
pete clause demands justification from an efficiency or other per-
spective. In fact, based on the free contracting benchmark, even 
 
 318 See Alan Schwartz and Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 Yale L J 541, 546, 556 (2003) (arguing that “efficiency is the only institutionally 
feasible and normatively attractive goal for a contract law that regulates deals between 
firms”); id at 555 (rejecting the “externality objection” to restricting commercial contract 
law to the pursuit of welfare-maximization, on the ground that “most commercial contracts 
affect only the parties to them”). 
 319 See Colleen McCullough, Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U 
Pa L Rev 779, 785–87 (2016). 
 320 See Schwartz and Scott, 113 Yale L J at 555 (cited in note 318) (noting that con-
tract law rarely creates “systematic distributional benefits for particular classes of  
parties”). 
Option I: 
Per Se Legal 
Option III: 
Per Se Illegal 
Option II: Conditionally Legal  
“Reasonableness” 
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the reasonableness principle used by the common law to assess 
the enforceability of noncompetes is suspect. Ignoring circum-
stances involving fraud, coercion, information asymmetries, or 
similar market defects, any economic justification for even quali-
fied enforcement of noncompete clauses—let alone a blanket re-
fusal to enforce—must identify significant third-party externali-
ties that are not reflected in the terms of the noncompete clause 
and the broader employment agreement of which it is typically a 
part. Efficiency-based arguments for California’s aversion toward 
enforcing noncompetes therefore rely on the reduction in 
knowledge spillovers, and collective reduction in innovative vigor 
in general, that would potentially result if noncompetes were en-
forced. This was precisely the basis for Gilson’s characterization 
of California’s refusal to enforce noncompetes as an efficient legal 
solution to a collective-action problem. 
As we have discussed in detail, it is not clear that this theory 
has a sound basis in fact. Specifically, the extent to which non-
competes actually impede efficient human capital transfers and 
associated knowledge spillovers is empirically contestable and de-
pends on the transaction costs involved in negotiating waivers of 
noncompetes, the extent to which noncompetes are actually en-
forced, and the availability of alternative mechanisms to regulate 
human capital flows. At a minimum, however, it is at least rea-
sonable to assume that noncompetes impose some incremental 
transaction-cost burden relative to a zero-enforcement regime 
and thereby may have some incremental adverse effect on imped-
ing the agglomeration economies and similar benefits that can 
promote innovation activity. Additionally, noneconomic consider-
ations of personal autonomy and distributive justice that play an 
important role in real-world policy debates over noncompetes 
strongly disfavor a rule of per se legality. Consequently, we set 
aside per se legal as a policy option and consider the remaining 
possibilities that efficiency would be maximized by treating non-
competes as either (i) per se illegal (Option III) or (ii) condition-
ally legal subject to the reasonableness standard (Option II). 
C. Is There Really a Collective Action Problem? 
Any argument in favor of zero enforcement must rest on  
Gilson’s justification for California’s general refusal to enforce the 
noncompete clause (the closest real-world approximation of the 
per se illegal policy option), taking note that Gilson himself cau-
tioned against reflexive application of the California model to all 
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states and industries.321  Recall that this argument supposes a 
world in which all (or at least most) firms would be better off if 
noncompetes were deemed unenforceable. Without coordination, 
it is in each firm’s individual interest to include a noncompete 
clause (since it would otherwise unilaterally forfeit human capital 
assets to its competitors), which ultimately operates to all firms’ 
collective detriment by impeding the flow of human capital and 
the innovation process in general. Under those assumptions, abol-
ishing noncompetes saves firms from this collectively irrational 
outcome, which in turn enhances knowledge spillovers, fosters ag-
glomeration economies, and accelerates innovation in the indus-
try as a whole. 
This line of argument relies heavily on a single assumption: 
namely, that when the law enforces noncompetes, firms widely, if 
not universally, adopt noncompetes, resulting in socially exces-
sive constraints on the circulation of human capital. That is a the-
oretically plausible but empirically untested assumption, espe-
cially given the fact that almost all empirical studies compare 
mobility and innovation outcomes as a function of noncompete en-
forceability rather than use. Fortunately, recent empirical work 
has supplied data that can provide some insight into actual use of 
noncompetes in real-world technology markets. 
Available data on the actual use of noncompetes in employ-
ment agreements demonstrate significant variation across differ-
ent subsets of the labor market. As noted previously, two studies 
that survey CEOs and other top-level executives find usage rates 
ranging from 70–84 percent.322 Another study finds comparable 
usage rates among venture capital-backed firms: in a sample of 
213 venture capital investments in 119 firms during 1987–1999, 
founders were subject to noncompetes in 70.4 percent (or 
73.5 percent excluding California firms) of total investments.323 
Those figures are compatible with the assumption that underlies 
the efficiency argument against noncompetes: without legal inter-
vention, markets tend toward high, and potentially excessive, use 
of noncompetes. However, a survey study of engineers in the  
information technology industry report a lower rate of  
almost 47 percent.324 A recent and much larger study by Professor 
 
 321 See Gilson, 74 NYU L Rev at 629 (cited in note 8). 
 322 See note 85 and accompanying text. 
 323 Kaplan and Strömberg, 70 Rev Fin Stud at 289 (cited in note 272).  
 324 See Marx, 76 Am Sociological Rev at 702 (cited in note 272). The sample consisted 
of 1,029 technical personnel (all members of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers) from a variety of industries. 
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Evan Starr and colleagues that surveys 11,505 workers across a 
broader range of industries finds even lower usage rates, report-
ing usage rates ranging from 31–36 percent in engineering posi-
tions, computer and mathematical positions, information indus-
tries, and professional and scientific industries.325 The Starr et al. 
study further finds significant variation based on the relevant 
business interest that the employer may have in a noncompete 
with respect to a particular employee. For example, about one-
third of employees subject to noncompetes work with trade se-
crets, as compared to about 15 percent of employees who only 
“work with clients or who have client-specific information.”326 
These data have been cited by scholars and policymakers who 
argue that significant numbers of employees are encumbered by 
these provisions.327 One scholar claims that employees are now 
stuck in a “thicket” and that “[n]oncompete agreements are now 
required in almost every industry and position.”328 We interpret 
the data differently. The variation in reported usage rates across 
occupational and industry categories raises serious doubt as to 
whether it is reasonable to assume that, when noncompetes are 
enforceable, employers blindly use them in all circumstances. 
Consider the finding above that approximately one-third of tech-
nical personnel are subject to noncompetes. While that is a signif-
icant percentage, it means that approximately two-thirds of that 
work force is not subject to any such constraint. Even the high 
usage rates among top-level executives imply that about one-third 
of the relevant labor pool did not agree to a noncompete. Addition-
ally, it is important to keep in mind that effective use of noncom-
petes almost certainly falls well below nominal use. A recent 
study finds that, in the state of Washington, which enforces non-
competes subject to the reasonableness standard, technology 
firms cultivate a reputation for nonenforcement 329 —meaning, 
that the actual use of noncompetes is far less common than the 
nominal use of noncompetes. That finding is consistent with prior 
reports (as discussed earlier) that firms in the Route 128 area 
widely tolerated employee departures and spin-offs during the 
 
 325 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *43–44 
(cited in note 11). 
 326 See id at *19. 
 327 See, for example, Lobel, Companies Compete but Won’t Let Their Workers (cited in 
note 19); White House, Non-Compete Agreements at *5–7 (cited in note 36); Office of Eco-
nomic Policy, Non-compete Contracts at *11–13 (cited in note 36). 
 328 Lobel, 93 Tex L Rev at 791 (cited in note 9). 
 329 See Gomulkiewicz, 49 UC Davis L Rev at 256–57, 277–80 (cited in note 274). 
1036 The University of Chicago Law Review [87:953 
economic heyday (and, presumably, competitive market for tech-
nical talent) of the 1970s and 1980s, even though Massachusetts 
law nominally tolerated enforcement subject to the reasonable-
ness standard.330 Rather than being driven toward widespread 
use of noncompetes to constrain the outflow of human capital to 
competitors, actual market behavior shows that firms sometimes 
or usually decline to use or enforce noncompetes. 
D. Why Employers Decline to Use Noncompetes 
Significant variation in the use and enforcement of noncom-
petes does not favor the thesis that markets are prone to suffer 
from a collective-action problem resulting in inefficient overuse of 
noncompetes. Rather, it is more consistent with a standard com-
petitive market model in which employers bid for managerial and 
technical talent by offering different packages of price and 
nonprice terms. Under competitive conditions, firms seek to  
attract the most highly valued labor by offering different types  
of employment agreements, some with and some without  
noncompetes. 
It is entirely plausible that an employer may prefer to offer 
an employment package without a noncompete. The reason is 
simple: noncompetes are costly to employers and will not always 
be worth the price. Prospective employees anticipate that non-
competes will limit postemployment opportunities, which means 
that employees may be unable to access more lucrative outside 
employment options during the term of the noncompete and, as a 
result, will have reduced capacity to renegotiate the terms of em-
ployment with the employer in the future. The prospective em-
ployee may further anticipate that, given a limited set of outside 
employment options, the employer could hold up the employee 
and unilaterally degrade the terms of employment.331 Based on 
these expectations, the prospective employee will demand either 
compensation up-front or, more plausibly, credible assurance that 
the firm will allocate internal rewards for strong performance 
that mimic the rewards that would be allocated in the external 
 
 330 See notes 186–90 and accompanying text. 
 331 See Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in 
Margaret M. Blair and Mark J. Roe, eds, Employees and Corporate Governance 58, 64–65, 
72 (Brookings Institution 1999). Professor Oliver Williamson, the originator of the hold-
up concept in the institutional economics literature, makes the same observation but ar-
gues that repeat-play forces would typically dissuade employers from engaging in this be-
havior. See Oliver E. Williamson, Economic Institutions of Capitalism 248–49, 259–60 
(Free Press 1985). 
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labor market.332 If the employer is unwilling to pay the required 
up-front compensation, cannot credibly commit to reward employ-
ees’ relative contributions to the firms’ team product, or has other 
mechanisms by which to regulate human capital outflow or pro-
tect against knowledge leakage in the event of an employee de-
parture, then, in any of those cases, it may decline to “purchase” 
a noncompete obligation from the employee. 
The “talent wants to be free” school implicitly assumes a 
world in which employers unilaterally impose or dictate noncom-
petes and therefore the law must intervene. But that implausibly 
assumes that employers always or typically are price-setters in 
the labor market. In most markets, that would typically not be 
the case and, in technology markets in particular, the very oppo-
site is more likely given the widespread observations that, in 
many technology market segments, skilled technical labor is 
scarce and employers bid aggressively to recruit them.333 Absent 
market power, we should therefore expect to observe variation in 
the mix of postemployment constraints as employers compete 
over a limited talent pool. 
More specifically, any such variation in the use of noncom-
petes will reflect different values placed by employers and em-
ployees on two variables: 
(i) Gf: the firm’s net expected future gains from employee 
training and knowledge internalization attributable to a 
noncompete; and 
(ii) Ge: the employee’s net expected future gains from 
postemployment opportunities at competitors within the 
typical duration of a noncompete.334 
The value of Gf and Ge impacts the firm’s and the employee’s 
respective negotiating positions: as the value of Gf rises, the firm 
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is willing to pay a higher price for a noncompete; as the value of 
Ge rises, the employee will demand a higher price for agreeing to 
a noncompete. The interaction between these two variables influ-
ences the likelihood that any given employer-employee negotia-
tion is likely to yield a noncompete. As the value of Gf rises in 
value relative to Ge, we would expect to see greater adoption of 
noncompetes since employers value the noncompete highly and 
employees are willing to “sell” it at a low price; as that ratio is 
reversed, we would expect to see the opposite outcome. When the 
values of Gf and Ge are both high (or low), results are likely to be 
mixed. 
We recognize that this model is inherently stylized and, in 
particular, is vulnerable to the objection that employers and em-
ployees in real-world contracting environments do not engage in 
customized negotiation—rather, employers sometimes include 
noncompetes in a “take-it-or-leave-it” employment package that 
does not facilitate term-specific negotiation.335 This is especially 
so if the employer demands a noncompete not in the original  
employment agreement or terms, but only after the employee be-
gins work.336 
While some evidence supports the view that, in certain mar-
ket segments, noncompete clauses are not typically negotiated,337 
it should not be automatically concluded that rational negotiation 
models have no descriptive force in this setting or, equivalently, 
that employers are free to “impose” noncompetes without paying 
any price for doing so. First, in the case of top-level executives, 
the full negotiation assumption almost always holds true as these 
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who had received the noncompete before accepting their job offers). 
 337 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *21 (cited 
in note 11) (finding that only 10 percent of noncompete signers attempt to negotiate the 
noncompete); Marx, 76 Am Sociological Rev at 706 tbl 4 (cited in note 272) (finding that 
31 percent of surveyed employees received the noncompete request with the job offer, 
22 percent received the request after the offer was accepted but prior to the start of work, 
24 percent received the request on the first day of work, and 23 percent sometime after 
the starting work). 
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agreements are typically entered into with the advice of highly 
sophisticated counsel specialized in executive compensation mat-
ters.338 Second, in the case of lower-level technical and managerial 
talent who may well not have the opportunity to negotiate cus-
tomized terms of employment, the competitive model still has de-
scriptive force even in the absence of transaction-specific negoti-
ation over noncompetes, so long as at least some portion of the 
market observes employer behavior and disseminates infor-
mation concerning the terms of employment.339 Assuming compet-
itive market conditions, that monitoring function may be filled by 
other employers who have a rational incentive to monitor the use 
or enforcement of noncompetes by competitors and offer prospec-
tive employees an employment package without such restrictions 
or a demonstrated enforcement record that tolerates employee de-
partures notwithstanding a noncompete. 
1. Variation in use of noncompetes across employee types. 
While further theoretical refinement and empirical inquiry is 
warranted, this competitive bidding model anticipates the varia-
tion observed in available data on the use of noncompetes among 
executive and technical personnel populations. In particular, it 
explains the significantly higher usage of noncompetes among 
top-level executives as compared to lower-level technical person-
nel. The most comprehensive empirical study on the use of non-
competes finds a correlation between income (which often corre-
lates with higher-skilled occupations) and the incidence of 
noncompetes. More specifically, that study finds that, whereas 
37 percent of employees earning over $100,000 a year are subject 
 
 338 Statement made based on one of the authors’ personal experiences as a practicing 
transactional attorney. 
 339 For the original version of this argument, made in the debate over the efficiency 
of contracts of adhesion, see Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on 
the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U Pa L Rev 630, 
637–38 (1979) (arguing that the presence of consumers who engage in “moderate search” 
can protect consumers who engage in no search from “overreaching firms”). For an appli-
cation to related debates in copyright-related settings, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract 
and Copyright, 42 Houston L Rev 953, 969–70 (2005). As Judge Easterbrook observes, the 
fact that a particular attribute of a product or service is not routinely negotiated on a 
transaction-specific basis does not imply that that attribute is being dictated by the sup-
plier. Rather, that question is more profitably analyzed by asking whether the supplier 
possesses sufficient market power to be in a position to dictate any such term. Nonetheless 
we recognize that, in the noncompete context, this argument is predicated on the assump-
tion that information is being disseminated in the market concerning a specific employer’s 
noncompete policy, which we recognize may vary from case to case. 
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to a noncompete, this is only true of 14 percent of employees earn-
ing up to $40,000.340 These findings conform to the expectations of 
rational bargaining between employers and employees. In the 
case of a higher-level executive, the employer most likely assigns 
a high value to Gf—that is, the firm prioritizes internalizing the 
valuable knowledge assets to which a top-level executive would 
be exposed and is therefore typically prepared to pay a substan-
tial price for obtaining that concession from the employee. By con-
trast, a lower-level employee may not have comparable exposure 
to the highest-value knowledge assets, in which case the firm as-
signs a low value to Gf and is typically willing to forego the non-
compete (or, what is functionally equivalent, foregoes enforce-
ment even if a noncompete clause appears in the employment 
package). 
2. Variation in the use of noncompetes across  
industry types. 
The competitive bidding model not only anticipates variation 
in the use and enforcement of noncompetes across employee 
types, but also across industries. Using this framework, we can 
roughly anticipate the expected use of noncompetes in different 
industry types (a research path that may prove fruitful in future 
empirical inquiries). Industries that exhibit some or all of the fol-
lowing characteristics are less likely to adopt noncompetes: (i) low 
capital requirements; (ii) short product development times; 
(iii) rapid product obsolescence; (iv) strong intellectual property 
protection (including patents, copyrights, and trade secrets); 
(v) robust complementary assets (such as strong marketing or 
manufacturing capabilities); and (vi) high levels of industry- 
specific product interoperability.341 
Under those conditions, the employer assigns a low value to 
Gf. A firm in industries with these characteristics is less likely to 
prioritize maintaining control over its knowledge assets because 
those assets are not particularly costly to develop, even successful 
 
 340 See Starr, Prescott, and Bishara, Noncompetes in the U.S. Labor Force at *17–18 
(cited in note 11). 
 341 In industries involving high levels of interoperability, presumably there is sub-
stantial information sharing among firms, which is either protected by patents and other 
forms of intellectual property rights or not at all, at least within the circle of relevant 
competitors. Either way the gains from internalizing R&D via noncompetes are reduced 
in this situation. Additionally, interoperability implies that training results in industry-
specific capital, which makes the value of intra-industry postemployment opportunities 
more valuable for employees. Thus, on balance, industries characterized by high levels of 
interoperability will, all other factors equal, typically fall into this category. 
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products have short lifetimes, and, in some cases, the product is 
embedded in a portfolio of IP assets and/or supported by comple-
mentary production and distribution assets that are difficult to 
replicate. For the same reason, employees in this setting are 
likely to place a high value on Ge. In a fast-paced market segment 
characterized by short product-development times and rapid 
product obsolescence, employees are likely to demand a high price 
for accepting noncompetes due to the expectation that a current 
employer’s project is likely to conclude rapidly, in which case the 
employee may be compelled to seek employment elsewhere. Em-
ployment contracts in that type of industry are less likely to in-
clude a noncompete clause, and if they do, employers are unlikely 
to enforce them vigorously given the potential adverse  
consequences in the ability to recruit talent in the future. The 
software industry, particularly the Internet-based sector, tends to 
fit this mold. 
Noncompetes are more likely to be selected in markets that 
exhibit the opposite characteristics. In the biopharmaceutical sec-
tor, capital requirements are enormous (approaching or exceeding 
$1 billion in the case of an FDA-approved drug342), product devel-
opment is long (about ten years on average), product obsolescence 
is slow, and interoperability is minimal. Given those considera-
tions, the employer is likely to place a high value on internalizing 
the gains from its R&D investment and therefore should be will-
ing to pay a relatively high price for achieving that objective 
through restrictions on departing employees. Moreover, the po-
tential costs to a biopharmaceutical employee from a noncompete 
are presumably lower than in the software industry given longer 
product development cycles, which—in view of the importance of 
project-specific knowledge to biopharmaceutical development—
tend to ensure longer employee tenures and diminish the number 
of potential opportunities at competing firms. Consistent with 
this expectation, empirical evidence shows low levels of employee 
movement in the Canadian biotechnology industry as compared 
to the free flow of human capital associated with the semiconduc-
tor and other IT industries in Silicon Valley. 343  This observed  
 
 342 See Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen, and Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of 
Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J Health Econ 151, 180–81 
(2003). The development cost estimate includes the costs of failed projects previously 
funded by the pharmaceutical firm. See id. 
 343 See Hugh P. Gunz, Martin G. Evans, and R. Michael Jalland, Career Boundaries 
in a “Boundaryless” World, in Maury A. Peiperl, et al, eds, Career Frontiers: New Concep-
tions of Working Lives 24–53 (Oxford 2000). 
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pattern in human capital flows may be in part a function of insti-
tutional design: empirical evidence shows that California biotech-
nology firms issue stock options with long vesting periods and em-
ployees of those firms hold large percentages of firm equity,344 
suggesting that, even when firms operate in a jurisdiction in 
which noncompetes are unenforceable, they adopt alternative 
tools to constrain the outflow of human capital. 
E. Error Costs and Noncompete Policy 
Economically informed policymaking on noncompetes, and 
other constraints on employee mobility in innovation markets, 
must recognize the fundamental uncertainty that attends the se-
lection of any particular point on the policy continuum ranging 
from full enforcement (equivalent to Option I) to zero enforcement 
(equivalent to Option III). This is akin to the concept of error cost 
that occupies a central place in antitrust law and policy: the poli-
cymaker recognizes the inevitability of erroneous decisions in 
general and then selects a legal standard that minimizes the sum 
of error costs less the administrative costs of implementing any 
particular standard.345 Hence, antitrust law reserves per se illegal 
standards, which have low administrative costs, for practices that 
usually, or almost always, are expected to result in net social 
harms (principally, horizontal price-fixing), while retaining rule 
of reason standards, which have high administrative costs, for 
practices that do not usually result in net social harms (for exam-
ple, below-cost predatory pricing).346 In the case of noncompetes, 
each option on the policy continuum raises the risks of both un-
der- and over-enforcement relative to the socially optimal level of 
noncompete enforcement that would be costlessly and perfectly 
implemented by a hypothetical omniscient regulator. In the case 
of a per se legal policy (Option I), the market is immune from the 
risk of underuse of noncompetes but may be exposed to overuse, 
resulting in suppressed knowledge spillovers and a slowdown in 
innovation, not to mention concerns regarding personal autonomy 
and distributive justice. In the case of a per se illegal policy (Op-
tion III), the market is immune to the risk of overuse of noncom-
petes but may be exposed to underuse, resulting in reduced em-
ployer incentives to invest in employee training and certain types 
 
 344 See Julia Porter Liebeskind, Ownership, Incentives, and Control in New Biotech-
nology Firms, in Margaret M. Blair and Thomas A. Kochan, eds, The New Relationship: 
Human Capital in the American Corporation 299, 306 (Brookings Institution 2000). 
 345 See note 38 (listing the leading sources). 
 346 See Easterbrook, 63 Tex L Rev at 3 (cited in note 38). 
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of R&D projects. The intermediate range of policy options (Op-
tion II), which correspond to the real-world variants of the  
common-law reasonableness standard, result in some mix of ag-
gregate overuse or underuse of noncompetes relative to the social 
optimum. 
It is important to appreciate that the error-cost approach con-
templates that courts and other policymakers may make mis-
takes with respect to any individual enforcement action, but, in 
the aggregate, courts and other policymakers will maximize net 
social gains over time relative to any other enforcement method-
ology, taking into account legal transaction costs. Following this 
long-term net-welfare-maximization standard, the efficient legal 
regime with respect to noncompetes maximizes over time (i) the 
gains generated by net-welfare-increasing noncompetes, less 
(ii) the losses generated by net-welfare-decreasing noncompetes, 
less (iii) the legal transaction costs incurred to distinguish be-
tween “good” and “bad” noncompetes. The selection of any option 
on the noncompete policy continuum inherently involves the task 
of distinguishing between net-welfare-increasing and net- 
welfare-decreasing noncompetes, subject to some positive admin-
istrative cost and taking into account some positive probability 
that any legal rule will sometimes make errors in individual cases 
in distinguishing between good and bad noncompetes. Options I 
(per se legal) and III (per se illegal) both have the advantage of 
low administrative costs as compared to Option II (some version 
of the reasonableness standard), but take extreme views with re-
spect to the likely distribution of good and bad noncompetes and 
therefore run the risk of significant error costs in the form of over-
use or underuse of noncompetes. Option I (“per se legal”) is pred-
icated on the view that noncompetes are always or typically effi-
cient market choices, in which case it is not worthwhile to incur 
the administrative costs of case-specific adjunction and occasional 
erroneous enforcement of a “bad” noncompete would be immate-
rial in the long term. Option III (per se illegal) takes the opposite 
view with respect to each parameter, except that it agrees that it 
is not worthwhile to incur the administrative costs of case-specific 
adjudication. By contrast, Option II takes the intermediate posi-
tion that the distribution of “good” and “bad” noncompetes may 
vary sufficiently across industries, employee populations and 
even individual transactions, so that it is worthwhile to incur the 
administrative costs required to engage in case-specific adjudica-
tion and thereby reduce erroneous enforcement and invalidation 
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of noncompete clauses. This option is also best in our view for tak-
ing account of personal autonomy and distributive justice con-
cerns, which vary depending on the specific circumstances of the 
employer, employee, and industry. 
The earlier generation of law-and-economics scholarship had 
essentially expressed agnosticism as to the appropriate policy op-
tions, on the reasonable ground that available evidence did not 
provide any firm ground on which to make a choice.347 Today, we 
are in a position to take an incrementally firmer view on the effi-
cient legal treatment of noncompetes, grounded in the accumu-
lated body of theoretical and empirical analysis of noncompetes, 
as well as the larger literature on human capital and agglomera-
tion economies. 
An error-cost approach to noncompete policy favors the plia-
ble reasonableness standard set forth several centuries ago in 
Mitchel v Reynolds.348 While it carries a higher administrative-
cost burden compared to Options I and III, the range of more and 
less generous reasonableness standards encompassed by Op-
tion II exhibits a close fit with our best theoretical and empirical 
understanding—which is to say, our self-acknowledged limited 
understanding—of the complex efficiency trade-offs involved in 
enforcing noncompete clauses in any particular case. Moreover, 
we note that courts’ application of the common-law reasonable-
ness standard may not be especially costly given that that inquiry 
has historically been limited to a defined set of factors, usually 
limited to duration, geography, and industry scope.349 Relatedly, 
we note that the administrative costs under Option III (per se il-
legality) may in practice be appreciably greater than zero insofar 
as an absolute ban on noncompetes may lead parties to challenge 
legal arrangements that arguably mimic the effect of noncom-
petes but serve legitimate economic functions. This contingency 
has already been realized in California, where a lower court re-
cently applied the statutory prohibition of noncompetes to an ex-
clusivity clause in a business-to-business agreement, which has 
never been considered to fall within the purview of that statute.350 
In sum, the reasonableness limitations that the common law 
places on the durational, geographic, and industry scope of non-
compete obligations may be interpreted as an indirect instrument 
 
 347 See Part I.B.5. 
 348 24 Eng Rep 347, 347 (KB 1711). 
 349 See note 150 and accompanying text. 
 350 See notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
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for limiting error costs under conditions of uncertainty with re-
spect to the socially optimal enforcement policy in the case of any 
particular noncompete. By tolerating noncompetes subject to 
fairly strict limitations on duration, geographic reach, and indus-
try scope, courts may effectively minimize the expected error costs 
inherent to the enforcement or nonenforcement of the total popu-
lation of noncompetes over time, as compared to a regime in which 
noncompetes were either flatly enforced or prohibited in all cases 
without qualification. Additionally, if and when evidence concern-
ing the net welfare effects of noncompetes achieves greater cer-
tainty, a reasonableness approach provides policymakers with 
latitude to adjust the permitted scope of noncompetes, an option 
that is unavailable under either the full-enforcement or  
zero-enforcement options. While the extreme poles of the policy 
continuum largely eliminate administrative costs, each is likely 
to result in significantly higher error costs over time absent ex-
treme and, based on a close reading of the empirical evidence, fac-
tually unjustified assumptions with respect to the likely distribu-
tion of efficient and inefficient noncompetes in the marketplace. 
CONCLUSION 
Much of current scholarly and policy commentary asserts, of-
ten with little qualification, that prohibiting enforcement of non-
competes and other contractual limitations on employee mobility 
promotes innovation. As one scholar has stated: “[T]here remain 
no persuasive arguments in favor of enforcing [noncompete] 
agreements.”351 Based on these types of unqualified statements in 
the scholarly literature, US senators have proposed—and  
multiple state legislatures have already taken or are actively  
considering—actions to substantially limit or even prohibit  
noncompetes.352 
We respectfully dissent. The case against noncompetes is typ-
ically illustrated by reference to the standard narrative of the rise 
of Silicon Valley and the decline of Route 128. A close review 
shows that this historical episode is substantially more complex 
than has been commonly understood. Technological and economic 
fundamentals, rather than fine differences in state contract law, 
most likely account for each region’s different innovation trajec-
tories—which, in the medium to long term, has been positive in 
 
 351 See Moffat, 52 Wm & Mary L Rev at 879 (cited in note 9). 
 352 See notes 19–28 and accompanying text. 
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both cases.353 The most widely cited empirical studies of a broader 
sample of jurisdictions suffer from material limitations and, con-
trary to repeated characterizations in the policy debate, do not 
provide compelling support for the view that noncompetes inhibit 
innovation.354 Moreover, more recent empirical work has uncov-
ered evidence supporting theoretical claims that noncompetes 
sometimes induce firms to invest in cultivating employees’ hu-
man capital.355 
The current state of our empirical understanding thus con-
tinues to track the most refined theoretical analysis of the com-
plex economics of human capital markets, which suggests that 
the net efficiency effects of noncompetes—and other constraints 
on employee mobility—in innovation markets will vary across in-
dustry types, employee types, and other market parameters.356 
Some market segments may benefit from a high incidence of non-
competes, while others may suffer. Contrary to the direction of 
recent scholarship, popular commentary, and policy activity, 
there is little certainty concerning the net efficiency effects of non-
competes in general and reasonable grounds to believe they have 
a net positive effect in certain innovation environments. If that is 
the case, then, from an economic point of view, the common law’s 
admittedly uncertain reasonableness standard likely represents 
the best available approach for balancing the complex trade-offs 
raised by noncompetes and other constraints on the mobility of 
human capital in innovation markets. 
  
 
 353 See Part II.A. 
 354 See Part II.B. 
 355 See notes 310–13 and accompanying text. 
 356 See Part II.B.3. 
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APPENDIX 
Changes to State Laws Affecting Noncompetes (2014–2019)357 
 










Employee must agree to  






Specifically authorizes  





Prohibits enforcement of non-





Specifically authorizes  






Limits enforceable geographic 
scope and duration of noncom-
petes involving physicians.  
Y 
Idaho (2016)  
(repealed 
2018) 
Specifically authorizes  










Maximum term of noncompete 




Maximum term of noncompete 
limited to twelve months. 
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 357 Note that this Table does not cover judicial decisions that may have effectively 
changed an individual state’s treatment of noncompetes. Relevant statutes (with the ex-
ception of the 2018 Idaho and Utah amendments) are as follows (corresponding to states 
listed above from top to bottom): 28 Del Code Ann § 4109; NH Rev Stat Ann § 275:70; Ark 
Code Ann § 4-75-101 (2015); Hawaii Rev Stat Ann § 480-4; Ala Code § 8-1-190; Conn Gen 
Stat § 20-14p; Idaho Code § 44-2704(6); 820 ILCS 90/10; Or Rev Stat § 653.295; Utah Code 
Ann § 34-51-201; Cal Labor Code § 925; Nev Rev Stat § 613.195; Colo Rev Stat § 8-2-113; 
Neb Rev Stat § 87-404(2); Mass Gen Laws Ann ch 149, § 24L; Washington Substitute HB 
1450, Washington House of Representatives, 66th Regular Legislative Sess (Mar 12, 
2019); Connecticut Bill No 7424, Connecticut General Assembly, Jan Sess (2019); 26 Me 
Rev Stat Ann § 599-A(1); Md Labor & Empl Code Ann § 3-716 (as amended); NH Rev Stat 
Ann § 275-70-a (as amended); North Dakota HB 1351, North Dakota Legislative Assem-
bly, 66th Sess (Jan 9, 2019), codified as amended at ND Cent Code § 9-08-06; RI Gen Laws 
§ 28-58-1 et seq. 
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Limits ability of employers to 
require employees to litigate 
disputes outside of California 






Limits noncompetes to terms 
that are “no greater than is 
required for the protection of 
the employer.” Authorizes 
courts to reform noncompetes 









Repeals Idaho 2016 statute  




Provides that arbitrator or 
court may “reform” noncom-





Curtails enforcement of non-





Prohibits noncompetes for em-
ployees subject to the Fair  
Labor Standards Act and all 
other employees terminated 
without cause.  
Y360 
 
 358 While the limitations on the enforceability of noncompetes would appear to mod-
erately reduce enforceability relative to the existing reasonableness standard, the specific 
authorization of courts to reform noncompetes that have excessive duration, scope, or 
other unreasonable terms tends to enhance enforceability. 
 359 This change increases enforceability because it specifically authorizes a court to 
“blue pencil” a noncompete provision if it is found to be unreasonable in its existing form, 
rather than ruling the provision to be unenforceable in its entirety. 
 360 Note that, while the Massachusetts statute reduced the enforceability of noncom-
petes in certain cases, it also codified the inevitable disclosure doctrine (which Massachusetts 
courts have historically resisted), which enables employers to partially mimic the effect of 
a noncompete. See note 149 and accompanying text. 
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Imposes high salary and com-
pensation minimums on em-
ployees and contractors who 
may be subject to noncompetes; 
sets presumptive eighteen-
month limit on term; requires 
agreement at time of  
acceptance of employment or 
additional compensation;  
requires additional payment 





Bars noncompetes in home 




Bars noncompetes for certain 
lower-wage workers and, in 
all cases, requires that em-
ployers disclose noncompete 















Clarifies that “goodwill sale” 
exception to ban on noncom-
petes can extend to firm’s 





Bars noncompetes for certain 
lower-wage workers, employ-
ees subject to the Fair Labor 
Standards Act, students, and 
workers age eighteen or 
younger.  
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